Khaliq v HMA

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion concerns two charges against the appellants involving the supply of solvents, specifically "glue-sniffing kits," to children under the age of 16. The first charge alleges culpable, wilful, and reckless supply of these substances knowing they would be abused by inhalation to the danger of the children's health and lives. The second charge involves reset (receipt) of stolen goods, with the proceeds allegedly used to supply solvents to some of the children named in the first charge. The appellants challenged the relevancy and specification of these charges, contending that the first charge did not disclose a crime known to the law of Scotland and that both charges lacked fair notice and proper specification. The trial judge rejected these objections, sustaining the relevancy of both charges. The appellants subsequently appealed to the High Court of Justiciary, which is the context of this opinion dated 17 November 1983.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the first charge discloses a crime known to the law of Scotland, given that the supply of solvents for abuse was not previously established as a criminal offence.
2. Whether the charges, particularly the first, are defective for lack of essential specification and fair notice to the appellants.
3. Whether the lapse of time alleged in the charges affects their relevancy or fairness.
4. Whether the second charge, relating to reset of stolen goods, is properly specified and relevant.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

• The first charge is bad because it does not set out a crime recognized by Scottish law; the alleged crime is "new" and cannot be introduced by a single judge.
• Supply of solvents, even with knowledge of intended abuse, is not criminal because the abuse is a voluntary act by the recipient, breaking the causal link (novus actus interveniens).
• There is no precedent or authority supporting criminal liability for mere supply of a potentially harmful substance when the injury results from the voluntary acts of the supplied persons.
• The children named were not under the age of criminal responsibility and were presumably aware of the dangers, negating criminal liability for the supplier.
• The charges lack adequate specification and fair notice, particularly regarding the exact dates and ages of the children involved and the nature of the reset charge.
• The time period covered by the charges is too broad, potentially prejudicing the defence.

Crown's Arguments

• The first charge is not a new crime but an application of existing common law principles relating to conduct causing real injury to another person.
• The supply of solvents with full knowledge of their intended abuse causing injury or death is criminal conduct under the common law.
• The distinction between supply and administration of a noxious substance is immaterial where the supply is closely related to the intended harmful use.
• The voluntary act of the recipient does not break the causal chain if the supply was intended and expected to cause the abuse and consequent injury.
• The charges properly constitute a course of criminal conduct and are adequately specified to give fair notice to the appellants.
• The time period alleged is not unacceptable given the nature of the offences.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Fisher v. Keane (1981 S.L.T. (Notes) 28)	Possession and misuse of glue is not itself a criminal offence.	Supported the court’s view that mere possession or misuse without more does not constitute a crime.
Semple (1937 J.C. 41)	Criminal liability arises where there is direct contact involving force, deceit, or instigation to administer a noxious substance.	Used to illustrate the traditional approach to administration versus supply of harmful substances.
Finlayson (1979 J.C. 33)	Similar principle as Semple regarding administration of harmful substances and culpable homicide.	Confirmed the principle that administration causing injury or death is criminal.
M'Laughlan v. Boyd (1934 J.C. 19)	Criminal law is not static and does not require precise categorisation of crimes; new facts may fall within established principles.	Supported the court’s acceptance that the charge, though novel in facts, falls within established criminal principles.
H.M. Advocate v. Brown and Lawson (1842) 1 Broun 415	Wilful and reckless administration of a dangerous substance causing injury is criminal.	Established the principle that administration causing harm is indictable regardless of victim's age or knowledge.
H.M. Advocate v. Jean Crawford (1847) Arkley 394	Same principle as Brown and Lawson regarding administration of harmful substances.	Reinforced the principle of criminal liability for administration causing injury.
H.M. Advocate v. Milne and Barry (1868) 1 Couper 28	Administration must be wilful and culpable to be criminal; medical or innocent administration is not criminal.	Clarified the need for criminal intent in administration charges.
H.M. Advocate v. Rutherford (1947 J.C. 1)	Consent of victim is irrelevant in certain criminal acts causing injury or death.	Supported the principle that victim's consent does not negate criminal liability of the perpetrator.
Smart v. H.M. Advocate (1975 J.C. 30)	Consent irrelevant in assault causing injury.	Confirmed principle that consent does not excuse criminal acts causing harm.
Finlayson v. H.M. Advocate (1979 J.C. 33)	Culpable homicide by injection of a controlled drug causing death.	Demonstrated criminal liability for administration causing death despite victim’s consent.
The Oropesa [1943] P. 32	Doctrine of novus actus interveniens requires the intervening act to be truly new and extraneous to break causation.	Applied to reject argument that voluntary acts of recipients break causal link.
H.M. Advocate v. Semple (1937 J.C. 41)	Supply coupled with use and instigation may amount to crime.	Supported the court’s view that supply closely related to use can be criminal.
H.M. Advocate v. Macdonald (1888) 1 White 593	Permissible latitude of time in charges of reset involving multiple stolen goods.	Supported the relevancy of the second charge and the time period alleged.
H.M. Advocate v. A.E. (1937 J.C. 96)	Precedent for charging a course of conduct involving fairly young persons over a long period.	Supported the form of the first charge as a course of conduct rather than separate charges.
Bernard Greenhuff (1838) 2 Swin. 236	New crimes may arise under general principles without precise precedent.	Reinforced the principle that criminal law is adaptable to new forms of wrongdoing.
Maguire, 5 Adam 539	Section 59 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 allows charges without specifying from whom stolen goods were received.	Addressed specification objections to the reset charge.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the nature of the first charge, focusing on whether the supply of solvents with knowledge that they would be abused by children to their injury constitutes a crime known to Scottish law. It rejected the appellants' argument that mere supply cannot be criminal because the abuse is a voluntary act breaking the causal link. The court emphasized that the common law is flexible and capable of addressing new forms of criminal conduct that cause real injury, even if the precise facts are novel.

The court relied on established principles from authority that wilful and reckless administration of harmful substances causing injury is criminal, and extended this reasoning to culpable supply closely connected to intended abuse. It found that the appellants' supply of "glue-sniffing kits" was intended to cause abuse and consequent injury, and thus the supply and abuse were sufficiently connected to establish criminal liability. The voluntary act of inhalation by the children did not break the causal chain because it was the known and intended outcome of the supply.

The court further held that the first charge was sufficiently specified to give fair notice, and that charging a course of conduct rather than multiple separate charges was permissible. The alleged time span of the offences was not excessive or prejudicial. Regarding the second charge of reset, the court found it adequately specified under statutory provisions and precedent.

Overall, the court concluded that the charges were relevant, properly specified, and disclosed crimes known to the law of Scotland, rejecting the appellants' objections.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the appeals, affirming the trial judge's decision to sustain the relevancy and specification of both charges.

The direct effect is that the appellants must stand trial on the charges as framed. The decision confirms that the common law of Scotland can encompass criminal liability for the culpable supply of substances intended and known to be abused causing injury, even in the absence of specific statutory provisions. No new precedent was established beyond affirming the adaptability of common law principles to modern circumstances involving solvent abuse.