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AT&T Corporation & Anor v Saudi Cable Company

England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
May 15, 2000
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an appeal arising from arbitration proceedings involving two appellants and one respondent. The appellants challenged the impartiality and conduct of an arbitrator, referred to as Mr. Fortier, who had a non-executive directorship with a competitor of one of the appellants. The appellants contended that this connection created a risk of bias and constituted misconduct, warranting removal of the arbitrator and setting aside of arbitration awards. The matter was heard at the Court of Appeal following a decision by the Queen's Bench Division, Commercial Court (Mr Justice Longmore).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the appropriate legal test for bias or apparent bias in arbitrators under English law, and whether it differs from the test applied to judges and tribunals in public administration of justice?
  2. Whether the arbitrator’s non-disclosure of his non-executive directorship constituted misconduct or procedural mishap sufficient to justify his removal or to set aside arbitration awards under section 23 of the Arbitration Act 1950.
  3. Whether the English courts have jurisdiction to review decisions of the ICC Court concerning challenges to arbitrators despite provisions of finality in ICC Rules.
  4. The interpretation and application of Article 2.7 of the ICC Rules regarding arbitrator independence and disclosure obligations.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The arbitrator’s non-executive directorship with a competitor created a real danger or reasonable suspicion of bias against the appellants.
  • The arbitrator failed to comply with disclosure obligations under the ICC Rules, constituting misconduct or a procedural mishap.
  • The English courts should apply a lower threshold test of bias (reasonable suspicion or reasonable apprehension) in arbitration cases than the "real danger" test applicable in public courts.
  • The arbitrator’s failure to disclose his connection deprived the appellants of the opportunity to object to his appointment based on confidentiality concerns.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The binding legal test for bias in arbitrators is the "real danger" test established in Gough, consistent with the public administration of justice.
  • The arbitrator was unaware of the relevant projects until after appointment and non-disclosure was inadvertent and minimal.
  • The connection with the competitor was incidental and insufficient to raise a real danger of bias or lack of independence under the ICC Rules.
  • The English courts retain jurisdiction to review arbitrator misconduct but no breach of the ICC Rules or misconduct was established.
  • Setting aside awards or removing the arbitrator at this advanced stage would cause injustice and inconvenience without sufficient grounds.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
R v Gough [1993] AC 646 Established the "real danger" test for apparent bias applicable to judges, tribunals, and arbitrators. The court reaffirmed this as the binding test for arbitrator bias in English law and rejected arguments for a lower threshold.
Locabail Discussed different approaches to bias tests including reasonable suspicion and reasonable apprehension. Referenced as part of the debate on appropriate bias standards, noting the preference in other jurisdictions for reasonable suspicion.
Laker Airways Inc v FLS Aerospace Limited [1999] 2 Lloyds Report 45 Applied the Gough test to an arbitration context. The court supported application of the real danger test to arbitrators, consistent with Gough.
R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256 Established the principle that justice must not only be done but be seen to be done. Used to underpin the rationale for bias tests ensuring fairness and public confidence.
Ex parte Dallaglio Clarified the approach to apparent bias, emphasizing possibility of unconscious bias and the court’s ability to examine all relevant material. Supported the court’s reasoning that the appearance of bias is not determinative absent real danger of injustice.
Margulies Brothers Limited v Dafnis Thomaides & Co (UK) Limited [1958] 1 Lloyds Rep 250 Defined "misconduct" of an arbitrator to include failure to comply with arbitration agreement terms. Supported the proposition that non-compliance with arbitration agreement can amount to misconduct justifying removal or setting aside awards.
The "Elissar" [1984] 2 Lloyd's LR 84 Considered difficulties in formulating objective test for bias in arbitrations. Referenced in the discussion of bias tests applicable to arbitrators.
Bremer Handelsgesellschaft -v- Ets Soules et Cie [1985] 1 Lloyd's LR 160 Addressed bias and arbitrator conduct. Referenced in context of bias tests and arbitrator misconduct.
Tracomin S.A. -v- Gibbs [1985] 1 Lloyd's LR 586 Reviewed authority on bias tests and their application. Considered in discussion of the relative stringency of bias tests.
R -v- Camborne Justices ex parte Pearce [1955] 1 QB 41 Commented on the relationship between justice being done and appearing to be done. Used to illustrate the court’s balanced approach to bias tests.
Reg. -v- Barnsley Licensing Justices Illustrated differences in outcomes under different bias tests. Referenced to show practical distinctions between reasonable suspicion and real likelihood tests.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by affirming the binding nature of the "real danger" test for bias established in Gough, applying it uniformly to arbitrators as it does to judges and tribunals in the public administration of justice. It rejected the appellants’ submission that a lower threshold such as reasonable suspicion or reasonable apprehension should apply to arbitrators, emphasizing the public interest in maintaining the integrity of justice.

In assessing whether a real danger of bias existed, the court took an objective approach, personifying the reasonable man informed of all relevant facts. The arbitrator’s role as an experienced lawyer and arbitrator, his lack of knowledge of the relevant projects at the time of appointment, the minimal and incidental nature of his connection with the competitor, and his conduct during arbitration all weighed against a finding of bias.

The court acknowledged the unfortunate non-disclosure of the arbitrator’s directorship but concluded this was an innocent error insufficient to demonstrate actual or apparent bias or lack of independence under the ICC Rules. The court also held that the finality clause in the ICC Rules did not oust the English court’s jurisdiction under section 23 of the Arbitration Act 1950 to consider misconduct and remove an arbitrator.

Regarding misconduct, the court found no established breach of the ICC Rules or arbitration agreement that would justify removal or setting aside awards. It distinguished between the concepts of independence and impartiality, noting that the ICC Rules focus on independence, and that confidentiality concerns raised by the appellants did not amount to misconduct under the rules. The court emphasized that procedural mishaps alone do not warrant overturning arbitration awards absent injustice.

The court further noted that even if a procedural mishap had occurred, the discretion under section 23 should not be exercised to remove the arbitrator or set aside awards, particularly given the advanced stage of the arbitration and the lack of demonstrated prejudice.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the appeal, holding that:

  • The "real danger" test for bias applies to arbitrators as it does to judges and tribunals, and no real danger of bias was established against the arbitrator.
  • The non-disclosure of the arbitrator’s non-executive directorship was an innocent error insufficient to amount to misconduct or justify removal under section 23 of the Arbitration Act 1950.
  • The English courts retain jurisdiction to review arbitrator conduct despite ICC Rules’ finality provisions.
  • Setting aside arbitration awards or removing the arbitrator at this stage would cause substantial injustice and inconvenience without sufficient grounds.

The decision directly affects the parties by upholding the awards and maintaining the arbitrator’s appointment, but it does not establish new precedent beyond reaffirming the application of established tests and principles in the arbitration context.