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Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire
Factual and Procedural Background
The appeals arise from the 15 April 1989 Hillsborough Stadium disaster during a football match between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest. Overcrowding in pens 3 and 4 of the Leppings Lane terrace caused a fatal crush in which 95 people died and more than 400 were physically injured. The Defendant, the Chief Constable responsible for crowd control, admitted negligence for the physical injuries and deaths.
Sixteen separate negligence actions seeking damages for psychiatric illness (commonly labelled “nervous shock”) were brought by individuals who were not themselves injured. Four were inside the stadium elsewhere; the remainder learned of the disaster through live or recorded television or later information. Hidden J. held that the Defendant owed a duty of care to ten of the sixteen Plaintiffs. The Court of Appeal reversed as to nine of those ten and dismissed the six unsuccessful Plaintiffs’ appeals. Ten Plaintiffs then appealed to the House of Lords. The House heard consolidated arguments over five sitting days in October 1991 and delivered judgment on 28 November 1991.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether reasonable foreseeability alone is sufficient to impose a duty of care for negligently inflicted psychiatric illness, or whether additional proximity requirements limit such claims.
- What criteria define the “class of persons” to whom a duty is owed for psychiatric injury: spouses, parents, other close relatives, fiancés, friends, or bystanders.
- The relevance of spatial and temporal proximity—particularly whether viewing live television coverage or identifying a body many hours later constitutes presence at the “event or its immediate aftermath.”
- Whether the House should broaden, restrict, or otherwise clarify the control mechanisms (relationship, proximity, and means by which shock is caused) identified in prior authority.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiffs' Arguments
- The test should be an unfettered application of reasonable foreseeability: if psychiatric injury to a person in the Plaintiffs’ position was reasonably foreseeable, a duty arises.
- The three control mechanisms (relationship, proximity, means) operate merely as factual indicators of foreseeability, not as independent legal limits.
- Live television coverage is the modern “equivalent of sight or hearing of the event” and should satisfy proximity.
- The love and affection between siblings, fiancés, or other close ties can equal that of spouses or parents and should not be excluded by rigid categories.
Defendant's Arguments
- Foreseeability alone is insufficient; policy-based proximity limits recognised in Bourhill v Young and McLoughlin v O’Brian restrict liability.
- Duty is generally confined to spouses, parents, and rescuers; bystanders and more remote relatives fall outside the scope.
- Television broadcasts (which, under broadcasting codes, avoid showing recognisable suffering) do not constitute “direct perception” of the event or its immediate aftermath.
- Identification of a body many hours later is too remote in time and place to create proximity.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bourhill v. Young [1943] AC 92 | Reasonable foreseeability is limited by proximity; ordinary bystanders generally excluded. | Re-affirmed to support the need for proximity beyond mere foreseeability. |
| McLoughlin v. O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410 | Introduced control mechanisms: relationship, spatial/temporal proximity, and means of perception. | Forms the analytical framework applied; House refined but did not extend its boundaries. |
| Hambrook v. Stokes Brothers [1925] 1 KB 141 | Allowed recovery for shock from fear for children without physical impact. | Cited as earlier extension but distinguished; does not justify further broadening to bystanders. |
| Jaensch v. Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549 | Australian authority emphasising proximity and policy limits on foreseeability. | Quoted approvingly to illustrate policy-based restraints. |
| Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562 | Neighbour principle; concept of “persons closely and directly affected.” | Used to explain why proximity, not foreseeability alone, governs duty. |
| Dulieu v. White & Sons [1901] 2 KB 669 | First recognition of nervous shock from fear for personal safety. | Contrasted with secondary-victim claims; illustrates primary victim category. |
| Chadwick v. British Railways Board [1967] 1 WLR 912 | Rescuers owed duty; shock arising from participation in aftermath. | Identified as a special “rescuer” exception, not applicable to present facts. |
| Dooley v. Cammell Laird & Co [1951] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 271 | Liability where Defendant foreseeably put Plaintiff in position of thinking he caused injury. | Distinguished as involving involuntary participant, unlike current Plaintiffs. |
| Hevican v. Ruane [1991] 3 All ER 65 | Recovery after learning of death indirectly. | House expressed serious doubt about its correctness. |
| Ravenscroft v. Rederiaktieb laget Transatlantic [1991] 3 All ER 73 | Similar to Hevican; compensation after notification. | Likewise doubted for departing from direct perception requirement. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
All five Law Lords agreed that reasonable foreseeability, although essential, is insufficient without a relationship of proximity. Drawing on McLoughlin v. O’Brian, they reaffirmed three control mechanisms:
- Class of persons: A duty is presumptively owed to parents and spouses; others (siblings, fiancés, friends, bystanders) must prove a comparable tie of love and affection. None of the Appellants established such a tie on the evidence.
- Proximity in time and space: The claimant must witness the event or its immediate aftermath. Identification of bodies nine or more hours later fell outside this window.
- Means by which shock is caused: Shock must result from direct sight or hearing. Television broadcasts here showed no recognisable suffering and were edited; therefore they were not the legal equivalent of direct perception. Radio reports and later recordings were even more remote.
The House also rejected the argument that mere policy required rigid categorical limits (e.g., only spouses and parents). Instead, proximity is a factual inquiry, but the facts here did not satisfy it. The Court doubted the correctness of recent first-instance decisions (Hevican and Ravenscroft) that had allowed recovery without direct perception.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: Appeals dismissed; Court of Appeal judgment affirmed. Costs orders against legally-aided Plaintiffs were set aside, and the Defendant’s costs were made payable from the Legal Aid Fund, subject to objection by the Legal Aid Board within four weeks.
Implications: The decision confines liability for psychiatric injury to claimants who (a) share a close tie of love and affection with a primary victim, (b) directly perceive the accident or its immediate aftermath, and (c) suffer shock through sight or hearing rather than third-party communication. Viewing ordinary live television coverage or identifying a body many hours later does not satisfy proximity. The ruling solidifies and clarifies the control mechanisms from McLoughlin v. O’Brian and casts doubt on broader first-instance approaches, thereby limiting potential expansion of nervous-shock liability.
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