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Raymond v Honey
Factual and Procedural Background
The Respondent, a prisoner serving sentences for theft and conspiracy to pervert the course of justice, was held at a prison governed by the Appellant (the prison governor). In June 1980 the Respondent (a) wrote a letter to his solicitors concerning pending criminal proceedings and (b) prepared an application to the High Court seeking leave to commence committal proceedings against the Appellant for contempt. The Appellant stopped both documents, relying on the Prison Rules 1964 and related Standing Orders that require “prior ventilation” of complaints against prison staff.
The Respondent initiated proceedings in the High Court. A Divisional Court on 7 April 1981 found: (i) the Appellant was in contempt for stopping the High Court application, but (ii) not in contempt for stopping the 26 June 1980 solicitor’s letter. Both parties appealed to the House of Lords. The House sat on 27–28 January 1982 and issued its order on 4 March 1982, affirming the Divisional Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether stopping the Respondent’s application to the High Court constituted contempt of court.
- Whether stopping the Respondent’s solicitor’s letter constituted contempt of court.
- Whether the Prison Rules 1964 and associated Standing Orders lawfully authorised the Appellant’s interference with the Respondent’s access to the courts.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The High Court application was not a “communication” within Prison Rule 33(3); therefore the Governor was entitled to stop it.
- The Prison Rules and Standing Orders required “prior ventilation” of allegations against prison staff, justifying the stoppage.
Respondent's Arguments
- Stopping either document impeded the Respondent’s constitutional right of unimpeded access to the courts and therefore amounted to contempt.
- The Prison Rules could not lawfully curtail a prisoner’s civil right to institute proceedings unless authorised by express statutory language.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Reg. v. Gray [1900] 2 Q.B. 36 | Any act calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice is contempt. | Formed the starting point for determining whether the Governor’s conduct was contemptuous. |
| Attorney-General v. Times Newspapers Ltd [1974] A.C. 273 | Inhibiting suitors’ access to courts may constitute contempt. | Cited to reinforce the breadth of the contempt doctrine. |
| Golder v. United Kingdom (1980) 1 E.H.R.R. 524 | Article 6 ECHR protects a prisoner’s right of access to a court. | Used to support the view that prisoners’ court access enjoys strong protection. |
| R. v. Board of Visitors of Hull Prison [1979] 1 Q.B. 425 | Prisoners retain civil rights unless expressly removed. | Applied in holding that the Respondent retained the right to sue. |
| Solosky v. The Queen (1979) 105 D.L.R. (3d) 745 | Canadian authority affirming retention of prisoners’ civil rights. | Cited illustratively in support of the same principle recognised in English law. |
| Chester v. Bateson [1920] 1 K.B. 829 | Only express legislation can remove a citizen’s right of access to courts. | Relied upon by Judge Bridge to show the rule-making power was insufficient to fetter court access. |
| R. & W. Paul Ltd v. The Wheat Commission [1937] A.C. 139 | Same principle as Chester v. Bateson. | Supporting authority for the ultra vires analysis of the Prison Rules. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
All five Law Lords delivered concurring speeches, the principal opinion being that of Judge Wilberforce.
- Two foundational principles govern the inquiry: (a) any act that obstructs the due course of justice is contempt; (b) prisoners retain all civil rights not expressly removed.
- Statutory authority: Section 47 of the Prison Act 1952 empowers the Secretary of State to make rules for prison management, but does not authorise rules that deny or hinder a prisoner’s right to court access. Consequently, any such rules would be ultra vires.
- Stopping the High Court application: The Governor’s action temporarily denied the Respondent the ability to commence proceedings. Because no rule validly authorised that interference, it amounted to contempt. The Divisional Court’s finding was therefore correct.
- Stopping the solicitor’s letter: Although the Governor wrongly prevented the letter from being sent, the Respondent failed to prove that this act impeded his defence. The evidence showed the Respondent could have rewritten the letter or consulted his solicitor at an imminent visit. The court was not persuaded that the conduct was calculated to obstruct justice; hence no contempt was established.
- Ultra vires assessment: Judge Bridge emphasised that Rule 33(2) and related Standing Orders purported to give the Secretary of State an absolute discretion over a prisoner’s ability to commence proceedings, but such fetters are invalid because Section 47 concerns only prison discipline and management, not deprivation of fundamental rights.
Holding and Implications
ORDER AFFIRMED; APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL DISMISSED.
Direct effect: The Governor remains liable for contempt regarding the stopped High Court application, while the Governor is cleared of contempt for stopping the letter. No order for costs was made in the House of Lords save for taxation of the Original Respondent’s Legal Aid costs.
Broader implications: The decision reinforces that a prisoner’s constitutional and Convention right of unimpeded access to the courts cannot be curtailed by prison regulations unless clearly authorised by primary legislation. It circumscribes the scope of the Prison Rules and Standing Orders, signaling that administrative convenience in prisons must yield to fundamental rights.
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