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Scott v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis
Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellant was indicted at the Central Criminal Court in October 1973 together with nine co-accused on an indictment containing thirty-six counts. He was charged in fifteen counts, six of which alleged conspiracy. Count 1 alleged a conspiracy to defraud various copyright owners by unlawfully copying and distributing cinematograph films; Count 7 alleged a conspiracy to contravene section 21(1)(a) of the Copyright Act 1956.
During the prosecution’s opening, Attorney Blom-Cooper (for the Appellant) admitted on the Appellant’s behalf that he had entered into agreements with cinema employees to remove films without permission so that infringing copies could be commercially distributed. Relying on those admissions, counsel submitted that the Appellant could not be convicted on Count 1 because, he argued, conspiracy to defraud required deceit. The trial judge, Judge Hines, rejected the submission. The Appellant thereupon pleaded guilty to Counts 1 and 7 and was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment on Count 1 and one year concurrent on Count 7.
The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) dismissed his appeal against conviction on Count 1 but reduced the sentence on that count to one year’s imprisonment. It certified a question of general public importance concerning whether conspiracy to defraud necessarily requires an agreement to deceive. The Appellant obtained leave to appeal to the House of Lords, where the matter was heard by Judge Reid, Judge Dilhorne, Judge Diplock, Judge Simon, and Judge Kilbrandon.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, on a charge of conspiracy to defraud, the prosecution must prove an agreement to deprive the owner of property by deception, or whether it is sufficient to establish an agreement dishonestly to prejudice another’s proprietary rights.
- Whether the enactment of the Theft Act 1968 impliedly abolished the common-law offence of conspiracy to defraud.
- Whether a common-law charge of conspiracy to defraud can be maintained where the conspirators also agree to commit a statutory summary offence (here, contravention of section 21(1)(a) of the Copyright Act 1956).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- A conspiracy to defraud cannot exist absent deceit; Attorney Blom-Cooper relied on dicta of Buckley J in In re London & Globe Finance Corp. [1903] 1 Ch 728 to contend that “to defraud is to deprive by deceit.”
- The Theft Act 1968, by abolishing various common-law offences of dishonesty, had impliedly abolished the common-law offence of conspiracy to defraud.
- A common-law conspiracy to defraud charge is not available where the agreement is to commit only a statutory summary offence; therefore, an agreement to contravene section 21(1)(a) of the Copyright Act could not be charged as conspiracy to defraud.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| In re London & Globe Finance Corp. [1903] 1 Ch 728 | Buckley J’s dictum equating defrauding with depriving by deceit. | Held not exhaustive; House rejected the view that deceit is an essential element of conspiracy to defraud. |
| R. v. Orbell (1703) 6 Mod 42 | Conspiracy to defraud without false representation. | Cited as historical example that deceit is not required. |
| R. v. Button (1848) 3 Cox C.C. 229 | Conspiracy to defraud employer of profit without deceit. | Supported the proposition that dishonest deprivation suffices. |
| R. v. Yates (1853) 6 Cox C.C. 441 | Words alleging false pretence may be surplusage; conviction possible without deceit. | Used as precedent that deceit is not indispensable. |
| R. v. De Kromme [1892] 17 Cox C.C. 492 | Solicitation of servant to undersell goods amounts to fraud on employer. | Illustrated conspiracy to defraud without deceptive misrepresentation. |
| R. v. Quinn [1898] 19 Cox C.C. 78 | Fraud on railway company by resale of tickets; no deceit of employer. | Cited to demonstrate absence of deceit requirement. |
| R. v. Radley (1973) (unreported) | Conspiracy to defraud via theft of company property. | Example where courts upheld conviction absent deceit. |
| Welham v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1961] A.C. 103 | Meaning of “intent to defraud” in forgery context. | Lord Radcliffe stated that defrauding need not involve deceit; House relied on this reasoning. |
| R. v. Sinclair [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1246 | Definition of “to cheat and defraud” as deliberate dishonesty prejudicing proprietary rights. | Quoted with approval to support wider meaning of defraud. |
| R. v. Wheatly (1761) 2 Burr 1127 | Common-law offence of cheating must affect the public. | Used to contrast cheating with broader conspiracy to defraud. |
| R. v. Withers (cited contemporaneously) | General discussion of conspiracy to defraud. | Referenced to corroborate propositions stated by Judge Diplock. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Judge Dilhorne delivered the principal speech, with the other Law Lords concurring:
- Meaning of “defraud”. Historical sources, including Stephens and a long line of authority, show that fraudulent conduct need not entail deceit; dishonesty coupled with prejudice to proprietary rights suffices. Theft is paradigmatic of fraud without deceit.
- Case law survey. Numerous 18th–20th-century cases upheld conspiracy-to-defraud convictions where no deceit was alleged, demonstrating that Buckley J’s dictum was not exhaustive.
- Importance of dishonesty. Drawing on the Criminal Law Revision Committee’s Eighth Report and the Theft Act 1968, the House observed that “fraudulently” is essentially synonymous with “dishonestly.” Therefore, “to defraud” ordinarily means “dishonestly to deprive” another of property or proprietary rights.
- Rejecting implied repeal. Section 31(1) of the Theft Act abolished certain common-law offences (e.g., cheating) but made no mention of conspiracy to defraud. Parliament knew how to abolish conspiracies expressly (as it did in the Theatres Act 1968); silence signified intent to preserve the offence.
- Multiple offences permissible. By virtue of section 33 of the Interpretation Act 1889, conduct constituting offences under both statute and common law may be prosecuted under either, provided there is no double punishment.
- Application to facts. The Appellant bribed cinema employees to obtain films for infringing copying, thereby dishonestly prejudicing copyright owners’ proprietary and economic interests. That conduct squarely fits the definition of conspiracy to defraud; deceit of the owners was unnecessary.
- Certified questions answered. (1) Deceit is not a required element; dishonest prejudice is enough. (2) An agreement dishonestly to deprive or injure proprietary rights constitutes conspiracy to defraud.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED. The House of Lords upheld the Appellant’s conviction for conspiracy to defraud and rejected all grounds of appeal.
Implications: The decision authoritatively confirms that deceit is not an essential ingredient of conspiracy to defraud and that the offence survived the Theft Act 1968. It clarifies that any dishonest agreement to prejudice another’s proprietary rights can constitute the offence, thereby providing significant guidance for future prosecutions involving non-deceptive but dishonest schemes.
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