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McGhee v National Coal Board
Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellant was employed for many years by Company A as a labourer at [The Worksite]. On 30 March 1967 he was assigned to empty brick kilns whose conditions were markedly hotter and dustier than his usual workplace. Within days he developed extensive skin irritation and was later diagnosed with dermatitis.
The Appellant sued Company A in the Court of Session (Scotland) alleging breaches of common-law duties, chiefly the failure to provide adequate washing facilities such as showers. After proof before answer, Judge Kissen (the Lord Ordinary) dismissed the action. On 17 March 1972 the First Division refused a reclaiming motion, upholding that dismissal. The Appellant then petitioned the House of Lords. The Lords heard argument on 9–10 October 1972 and delivered judgment on 15 November 1972.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Company A’s admitted breach of its duty to provide adequate washing facilities caused, or materially contributed to, the Appellant’s dermatitis.
- Whether, in circumstances where medical science cannot pinpoint the precise mechanism of an industrial disease, proof that negligence materially increased the risk of injury is sufficient to establish legal causation.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Company A owed and breached a common-law duty to provide showers; that breach materially increased the risk of dermatitis.
- Under Wardlaw v. Bonnington Castings and Nicholson v. Atlas Steel Foundry, a material increase in risk is tantamount to a material contribution to injury.
- Where scientific knowledge cannot segregate compound causes, policy and justice require the risk-creator to bear the loss.
Company A's Arguments
- Although breach of duty was conceded, the Appellant failed to prove on the balance of probabilities that the absence of showers caused the dermatitis.
- A mere increase in risk is not enough; the Appellant had to show that with proper facilities he would probably have avoided the disease.
- The case is distinguishable from Wardlaw because not every abrasion could be shown to play a causative part.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Wardlaw v. Bonnington Castings Ltd. (1956 S.C.(H.L.) 26) | Material-contribution test: defendant liable if negligence made a material contribution to injury even if not the sole cause. | The Lords treated the increased risk from the absence of showers as analogous to the additional faulty dust in Wardlaw, concluding it satisfied the material-contribution test. |
| Nicholson v. Atlas Steel Foundry & Engineering Co. Ltd. (1957 S.C.(H.L.) 44) | Employer liable where negligence materially increases the risk of contracting an industrial disease. | Cited to reinforce that a non-negligible increase in risk fulfils the causal requirement. |
| Gardiner v. Motherwell Machinery & Scrap Co. (1961 S.C.(H.L.) 1) | Proof of exposure to known injurious conditions raises a presumption of causation unless displaced by the employer. | Used as supporting authority for treating risk-increase as evidence of causation. |
| Alphacell Ltd. v. Woodward ([1972] A.C.) | Causation is a practical matter to be judged by common sense rather than abstract theory. | Quoted by Judge Salmon to justify rejecting a rigid distinction between risk and cause. |
| Gibson v. British Insulated Callenders' Construction Co. Ltd. (citation not provided) | Illustrates circumstances where an employer can rebut causation by showing the employee would not have used the safety measure. | Referenced by Judge Kilbrandon to contrast situations where employers can negate causation, unlike the present case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Judge Reid emphasised that a pursuer need only show that the defender’s fault materially contributed to the injury. Medical evidence demonstrated that remaining unwashed after dusty, sweaty work “added materially to the risk” of dermatitis; in practical terms that was equivalent to a material contribution.
Judge Wilberforce framed the matter as a policy choice: where a defendant’s breach creates a risk and the very injury within that risk occurs, the burden should shift to the defendant unless it shows some other cause. Scientific uncertainty should not defeat an otherwise meritorious claim.
Judge Simon reasoned that failure to take a step which would materially reduce risk necessarily constitutes a substantial contribution to injury, and that the Wardlaw/Nicholson line of authority excuses a claimant from proving the impossible segregation of compound causes.
Judge Kilbrandon rejected the respondents’ contention that probability of individual avoidance had to be proved. Once the breach of duty and subsequent disease were established, and the precaution was known to reduce risk, it was more probable than not that the breach contributed to the dermatitis.
Judge Salmon concluded that the law, guided by common sense, treats a material increase in risk as a cause where medical knowledge cannot be more precise; otherwise employers could ignore safety duties with impunity.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED. The interlocutors of 4 June 1971 and 17 March 1972 were recalled. The case was remitted to the Court of Session with a direction to award the Appellant £1,000 in damages plus interest at 5 % from the date of citation to judgment. Company A was ordered to pay the Appellant’s expenses in the Court of Session and the costs of the appeal, enforceable if unpaid within one month.
Implications: The judgment extends the material-contribution principle by accepting a “material increase in risk” as sufficient proof of causation in industrial disease cases where scientific uncertainty prevents precise attribution. It reinforces employers’ obligations to implement preventive measures and is a significant precedent in UK causation jurisprudence.
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