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Re Baden (No 1) McPhail v Doulton
Factual and Procedural Background
A Deed dated 17 July 1941 created a fund for the benefit of the staff of Company A and their relatives or dependants. Clause 9(a) obliged the Trustees to “apply the net income of the fund” by making discretionary grants to the stated class. Clause 9(b) allowed them to retain unexpended income and Clause 9(c) permitted realisation of accumulations and, with unanimity, of capital.
The Settlor died in 1960. The Appellants (his executors) contended that the Deed was void and that the fund should revert to the estate. At first instance Judge Goff held that Clause 9(a) was a mere power (not a trust) and, on that footing, valid. A majority in the Court of Appeal agreed but, applying a test later endorsed in Whishaw v. Stephens, remitted the matter to the Chancery Division to decide whether the power was void for uncertainty.
The Appellants appealed to the House of Lords, arguing that Clause 9(a) is a trust and that different principles of certainty apply.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Clause 9(a) of the 1941 Deed imposes a trust binding the Trustees to distribute income or merely confers a power that they may exercise at discretion.
- If a trust is created, what is the correct test of certainty for its validity: the “complete list” test adopted in I.R.C. v. Broadway Cottages Trust or the “is–or–is-not” test adopted for powers in Whishaw v. Stephens.
- Whether, applying the proper test, the trust (or power) is void for uncertainty.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- Clause 9(a) is expressed in mandatory terms (“shall apply”) and, read with Clause 9(b), constitutes a trust to distribute income, merely tempered by an administrative power to withhold or accumulate for a period.
- Clause 10, stating that no person has an interest except by exercise of discretion, simply restates the effect of the discretionary trust and does not convert it into a mere power.
- The Broadway Cottages “complete list” test is unsatisfactory; the House should assimilate the test for discretionary trusts to that for powers in Whishaw v. Stephens.
Respondents' Arguments
- Because all benefits are discretionary and beneficiaries acquire no interest until selection, Clause 9(a) confers only a power.
- Clause 10 reinforces the absence of any enforceable duty to distribute.
- If only a power exists, the Deed is valid under the less stringent certainty test approved in Whishaw v. Stephens.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Re Main’s Settlement [1961] 1 W.L.R. 440 | Mandatory wording as an indicator of trust. | Supported the view that Clause 9(a) imposes a trust. |
| Morice v. Bishop of Durham (1805) 10 Ves 522 | A trust must be enforceable and objects sufficiently certain. | Used to evaluate what “sufficient certainty” requires. |
| In re Ogden [1933] Ch 678 | Ascertainability of class in discretionary trusts. | Cited but considered weak authority for a “complete list” requirement. |
| I.R.C. v. Broadway Cottages Trust [1955] Ch 20 | Trusts void unless all beneficiaries are ascertainable. | Expressly rejected as laying down an unduly rigid test. |
| Whishaw v. Stephens (“Gulbenkian”) [1968] 3 W.L.R. 1127 | For powers, validity if it can be said of any individual whether he is within the class. | Extended to discretionary trusts to formulate the new test adopted. |
| Gisborne v. Gisborne 2 App Cas 300 | Limited court control over mere powers. | Illustrated difference between powers and trusts. |
| Tempest v. Lord Camoys 21 Ch D 571 | Court’s power to compel performance of fiduciary duties. | Supported enforceability of trust powers. |
| Brown v. Higgs 8 Ves 562 | Court may execute “trust powers” if trustees fail. | Used to show that discretionary trusts can be administered without a complete list. |
| Moseley v. Moseley (1673) Rep Temp Finch 53 & related “relations” cases | Historical examples of court selecting beneficiaries without equal division. | Demonstrated that equal division is not the only mode of execution. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. Construction of the Deed. The House held that the mandatory language of Clause 9(a), read with Clause 9(b) and the administrative nature of Clause 9(c), imposed a duty on the Trustees to distribute all income, subject only to temporary retention or investment. Clause 10 merely confirmed that no beneficiary had an interest until selected and did not convert the duty into a mere power.
2. Re-examining the certainty requirement. The Lords observed that the traditional division between trusts (requiring a complete list of beneficiaries) and powers (requiring only an “is–or–is-not” test) rested on “narrow and artificial” distinctions. They reviewed historical authorities showing that courts have, when necessary, executed discretionary trusts without knowing every beneficiary—sometimes through schemes, sometimes by appointing new trustees.
3. Rejection of the Broadway Cottages rule. The House found the “complete list” test “unfortunate and wrong.” It overruled that decision and held that the correct test for discretionary trusts is the same as for mere powers: a trust is valid if it is possible to say of any given individual whether he or she is within the class.
4. Practical administration. The Court emphasised that trustees must make a reasonable survey of the field of potential beneficiaries, but need not identify every possible member before exercising their discretion. If trustees default, the Court can step in—by appointing new trustees, approving a scheme, or otherwise—without resorting to arbitrary equal division.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: APPEAL ALLOWED. The House declared that Clause 9(a) constitutes a trust, not a power, and remitted the case to the Chancery Division to consider validity under the new certainty test, subject to section 164 of the Law of Property Act 1925.
Implications: The decision harmonises the certainty test for discretionary trusts with that for powers, overruling Broadway Cottages. Trusts benefiting large, indeterminate classes (such as employees and their relatives) are now less likely to be invalidated for conceptual uncertainty, provided it can be said of any person whether he or she is within the class. The ruling therefore broadens the effectiveness of modern employee benefit and similar discretionary trusts.
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