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Wheat v E Lacon & Co Ltd

United Kingdom House of Lords

Feb 15, 1966

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Factual and Procedural Background

On 4 September 1958, at approximately 9 p.m., the Deceased sustained a fatal skull fracture after falling down the rear staircase of a public house (“The Public House”) situated in The City. The staircase was narrow, steep, and ended in a small vestibule with a concrete floor covered by linoleum. A hand-rail on the left-hand side terminated above the third step from the bottom, and the bulb in the ceiling light above the staircase was missing at the time of the accident.

The Plaintiff—widow and administratrix of the Deceased’s estate—brought an action in 1960 against Company A (the brewery that owned the premises), the on-site Manager, and the Manager’s Wife, alleging negligence and breach of statutory duty under the Fatal Accidents Acts and the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934. At first instance, Judge Winn dismissed the claim. The Court of Appeal, by a 2-to-1 majority, upheld that dismissal. The Plaintiff appealed to the final appellate court, which delivered the present opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether Company A was an “occupier” of the relevant part of the premises within the meaning of the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957.
If so, whether it breached the common duty of care owed to the Deceased.
Whether the Deceased’s own conduct amounted to contributory negligence.
Whether the termination of the hand-rail and/or the absence of lighting constituted actionable dangers that caused the fall.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff’s Arguments

Company A, as owner, retained sufficient control over both commercial and residential portions of the building and was therefore an occupier owing a statutory duty.
The staircase was unsafe because the hand-rail stopped short of the bottom two steps and because adequate lighting had not been ensured.
No contributory negligence should be attributed to the Deceased, who reasonably relied on the hand-rail and expected adequate lighting.

Defendant’s Arguments

Operational control of the residential portion (including the back stairs) rested exclusively with the Manager; therefore, Company A was not an occupier of that area.
Even if deemed an occupier, Company A acted reasonably: the staircase design had been unchanged since 1938 without prior incident, and a working light fitting and switch had been provided.
The Deceased failed to take reasonable care for his own safety by attempting to descend an unfamiliar, poorly lit staircase.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Benmax v. Austin Motor Co. [1955] AC 370	Appellate courts may draw their own inferences where credibility is not in issue.	Supported the appellate tribunal’s duty to evaluate undisputed facts independently of the trial judge.
Montgomerie & Co. Ltd. v. Wallace-James [1904] AC 73 Mersey Docks & Harbour Bd. v. Procter [1923] AC 253	Same principle as above regarding appellate review.	Quoted to justify the House’s re-assessment of inferential findings.
Read v. Cattermole [1937] 1 KB 613	Occupancy distinctions between servants and masters.	Used to classify the Manager’s residence as occupation on behalf of the employer.
Dobson v. Jones (1844) 5 M.&G. 112 Hughes v. Chatham Overseers (1843) 5 M.&G. 54	Early formulation of servant-occupation tests.	Relied on in determining whether residence was obligatory for employment.
Glasgow Corporation v. Johnstons [1965] 2 WLR 657	Test for charity/servant occupation.	Analogous reasoning adopted to show occupation remained with the employer.
Tennant v. Smith [1892] AC 150	Servant’s residence may still constitute occupation by the master.	Cited to reinforce dual occupation analysis.
Hartwell v. Grayson Rollo & Clover Docks [1947] 1 KB 901	Liability can rest on those exercising control short of exclusive occupation.	Used by some Law Lords to illustrate multiple-occupier scenarios.
Slater v. Clay Bros. [1956] 2 QB 264	Convergence of invitee and licensee duties into a single reasonable-care standard.	Referenced when discussing the rationale behind the 1957 Act.
Heaven v. Pender (1883) 11 QBD 503; Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562	Foundational statements of the general duty of care.	Cited by Judge Denning to link occupiers’ liability to the neighbour principle.
Grote v. Chester Railway Co. (1848) 2 Ex. 251	Historic illustration of occupier’s duty.	Referred to as an example underlying the neighbour principle.
Cavalier v. Pope [1906] AC 428	Landlord’s lack of control over demised premises.	Contrasted with the present facts to show retained control by Company A.
Miller v. Hancock [1893] 2 QB 177; Hargroves v. Hartopp [1905] 1 KB 472; Sutcliffe v. Clients Investment Co. [1924] 2 KB 746	Landlord liability for retained parts.	Used to analogise Company A’s residual control over the staircase.
Fairman v. Perpetual Investment Building Society [1923] AC 74; Jacobs v. L.C.C. [1950] AC 361	Extent of duty in retained-part situations.	Discussed when comparing pre- and post-1957 Act duties.
Hawkins v. Coulsdon & Purley U.D.C. [1954] 1 QB 319; Greene v. Chelsea BC [1954] 2 QB 127	Owner’s duty where only a licence (not a demise) is granted.	Analogy for Company A’s relationship to the upper floor.
Haseldine v. Daw [1941] 2 KB 343; Thomson v. Cremin [1956] 1 WLR 103 (in notis); Davie v. New Merton Board Mills [1959] AC 604	Delegation of duty to independent contractors.	Cited to explain when reliance on contractors suffices to discharge duty.
Billings v. Riden [1958] AC 240	Independent contractor’s concurrent duty as occupier.	Referenced in discussion of multiple occupiers.
Glasgow Corporation v. Muir [1943] AC 448; Indermaur v. Dames (1866)	Scope of duty owed to invitees/licensees.	Authorities for including persons with partial control within occupier concept.
Pegler v. Craven [1952] 2 QB 69; Prenton v. General Steam Navigation Co. (77 Ll.L.R. 174)	Vicarious occupation through servants or agents.	Invoked in analysing Company A’s control exercised via the Manager.
Canter v. J. Gardner & Co. Ltd. [1940] 1 All ER 325; Duncan v. Cammell Laird & Co. [1943] 2 All ER 621; Creed v. McGeoch [1955] 1 WLR 1005	Temporary or contractual control sufficing for occupier status.	Provided background on contractor occupation principles; specifics not elaborated in the opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate court undertook its own evaluation of undisputed facts, noting that the absence of eyewitness evidence meant it was “as well placed” as the trial judge to infer how the accident occurred. The majority concluded that:

Multiple parties (Company A, the Manager, and the Manager’s Wife) simultaneously possessed sufficient control over the premises to be classed as occupiers. This dual (or plural) occupation did not, however, automatically establish liability.
Company A retained occupational control because:
- The employment agreement required the Manager to reside on-site solely to further Company A’s business.
- Company A expressly authorised the taking of summer guests and held an unfettered right to inspect and repair the entire property.
No breach of the common duty of care was established:
- The staircase had existed since 1938 without prior incident and was not inherently dangerous when used with ordinary caution.
- The missing light bulb constituted an intervening act by an unidentified third party; Company A had installed a proper fitting and switches.
- The truncated hand-rail was, at most, a helpful feature; its end point did not create a foreseeable risk that a prudent visitor would mistake it for the final step.
Even on the trial judge’s reconstruction, the Deceased’s decision to descend an unfamiliar, poorly lit staircase may have involved a “high degree of contributory negligence,” further undermining any claim.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

The court affirmed that Company A qualified as an occupier but had not breached the common duty of care under the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957. The decision leaves intact the principle that multiple parties can share occupier status, yet liability still turns on foreseeability and reasonable care. No new rule was created; the immediate effect is that the Plaintiff recovers no damages.

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