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Chapman v Chapman

United Kingdom House of Lords
Mar 25, 1954
Smart Summary (Beta)

Chapman and Others v Chapman and Others
(House of Lords, 25 March 1954)

Factual and Procedural Background

Three family settlements established in 1944, 1950 and 1950 (the “Nicholas Settlement”) held approximately £77,000 for the children of two brothers. Clauses in the 1944 and 1950 instruments gave trustees a discretionary power of “common maintenance”. Expert advice indicated that, because of those discretionary trusts, estate duty (c. £30,000) would fall on the funds when the settlors died.

The trustees therefore proposed advancing the whole of the existing funds to a new settlement in which the discretionary clauses would be omitted. The adult beneficiaries consented, and the scheme would undoubt­edly benefit the infant and unborn beneficiaries by removing the estate-duty charge.

On 28 July 1952 Judge Harman (Chancery Division) dismissed the application for want of jurisdiction. Judge Roxburgh reached similar conclusions on the same day in Re Downshire and Re Blackwell. The Court of Appeal, by a majority, dismissed the present appeal but allowed the appeals in the other two cases; Judge Denning dissented, holding that the Court possessed an unlimited jurisdiction to vary trusts in the interests of infants. The trustees (“Appellants”) appealed to the House of Lords. Attorney Buckley appeared amicus curiae.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Does the Chancery Division possess an inherent jurisdiction, as parens patriae or otherwise, to vary the beneficial trusts of a settlement on behalf of infants and unborn persons solely to achieve a fiscal saving, where no dispute exists and all adults consent?
  2. If the Court lacks such general jurisdiction, can the proposed variation nonetheless be approved as a “compromise” within the recognised power to sanction compromises on behalf of persons under disability?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

  • The historical equity jurisdiction over infants’ property is unlimited: wherever a variation is demonstrably for their benefit and competent adults assent, the Court may approve it.
  • Early authorities show the Court altering property rights for infants; later statutory enlargements merely removed self-imposed judicial restraints.
  • Even if the jurisdiction is not unlimited, the scheme is a “compromise in the broad sense” analogous to Re Trenchard and other twentieth-century cases.

Respondents’ / Amicus Curiae Arguments

  • Historic decisions (Re New; Re Tollemache; Re Walker) establish only four narrow categories where alteration is possible: (1) conversion of an infant’s property, (2) “salvage” transactions, (3) maintenance out of income directed to be accumulated, and (4) true compromises of disputed rights. The present case falls into none.
  • The Court’s duty is to execute, not rewrite, trusts; any wider power belongs to Parliament.
  • Calling the proposal a “compromise” is a misuse of language; there is no dispute to compromise.

Table of Precedents Cited

PrecedentRule or Principle Cited ForApplication by the Court
Earl of Winchelsea v Norcliffe (1686)Early example of converting infants’ propertyHeld to illustrate limited conversion power, not a broad jurisdiction.
Pierson v Shore (1739)SameTreated as confined to property-conversion category.
Inwood v Twyne (1762)SameUsed by Appellants; House restricted relevance.
Bridges v Bridges (1752)Conversion authorityCited to show narrow paternal jurisdiction.
Ashburton v Ashburton (1801)Conversion authoritySame application.
Re Jackson (1882) 21 Ch D 786Conversion jurisdiction “jealously exercised”Relied on to show the exception’s narrowness.
D’Eyncourt v Gregory (1878) 3 Ch D 635Court must execute, not alter, trustsQuoted in support of refusal.
Johnstone v Baber (1845) 8 Beav 233Same principleCited similarly.
Re New [1901] 2 Ch 534“Salvage” jurisdictionDefined high-water mark; did not justify variations here.
Re Tollemache [1903] 1 Ch 457Limits of extraordinary jurisdictionBacked refusal to extend powers.
Re Trenchard [1902] 1 Ch 378Approval of compromise between life tenant and remaindermenHeld to be isolated; not a precedent for broad variations.
Re Wells [1903] 1 Ch 848Settlement of derivative interestsDistinguished; no alteration of original trusts occurred.
Re Crawshay (1888) 60 LT 357Court cannot alter trusts for expediencyRelied on to deny jurisdiction.
Re Morrison [1901] 1 Ch 701SameCited as contra Appellants.
Re Montagu [1897] 2 Ch 8No power to raise capital for improvementsSupported narrow view.
Revel v Watkinson (1748) 1 Ves S 93Maintenance exceptionAccepted as sole true exception to rule against varying beneficial interests.
Cavendish v Mercer (1776) 5 Ves 195Maintenance exceptionSame.
Greenwell v Greenwell (1800) 5 Ves 194Maintenance exceptionSame.
Emit v Barlow (1807) 14 Ves 202Maintenance exceptionSame.
Haley v Bannister 4 Madd 279Maintenance exceptionSame.
Havelock v Havelock (1881) 17 Ch D 807Maintenance explainedEmphasised that maintenance is an exception, not the rule.
Re Collins 32 Ch D 232Rationale for maintenanceQuoted to illustrate narrowness.
Re Walker [1901] 1 Ch 879“Impossible” to alter will because beneficialCentral dictum adopted by House.
Brooke v Mostyn (1864) 2 De G J & S 373Power to sanction true compromisesCited; held inapplicable where no dispute exists.
Re Downshire [1952] 2 All ER 603C.A. allowed variation for taxHouse said decision “went too far”.
Re Blackwell [1952] 2 All ER 647Same as aboveAlso disapproved.
Re Duke of Leeds [1947] 1 Ch 525Lump-sum commutation of life interestDiscussed; viewed as distinguishable or doubtful.
Re Lucas [1947] 1 Ch (reported after Duke of Leeds)Similar commutationTreated the same way.

Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

The House surveyed the historical growth of the Court of Chancery’s jurisdiction and concluded that it never embraced a power to rewrite trusts for mere expediency or tax advantage.

Four narrowly defined exceptions were reaffirmed:

  1. Conversion of an infant’s property from realty to personalty (and vice-versa).
  2. Maintenance orders despite directions to accumulate income.
  3. “Salvage” authorisations enabling trustees to protect the estate in unforeseen emergencies.
  4. Approval of genuine compromises of disputed rights.

The present application fell within none of these. Expanding the “compromise” exception to undisputed cases would obliterate the boundaries of the jurisdiction and invite constant applications whenever fiscal legislation changed. That would constitute law-making, properly the province of Parliament.

Earlier decisions which appeared to sanction broad variations (Re Trenchard, Re Downshire, Re Blackwell) were either isolated, distinguishable, or wrongly decided. The dictum of Judge Farwell in Re Walker—“I decline to accept any suggestion that the Court has an inherent jurisdiction to alter a man’s will because it thinks it beneficial”—was endorsed as stating the governing principle.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED. The Chancery Division has no jurisdiction to authorise the proposed variation. All parties’ costs were ordered to be paid out of the trust funds.

Implications: The decision firmly limits judicial power to vary trusts, confirming that any wider power must be conferred by statute. The ruling curtails the use of court-sanctioned variations as an instrument of tax planning and re-establishes the boundary between judicial administration of trusts and legislative reform.