REGINA v Saville

Factual and Procedural Background

On 26th April 1973, three indictments were preferred against the Appellant for acts of dishonesty committed while in a position of trust. The Appellant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a substantial prison term. Additionally, a criminal bankruptcy order was made against the Appellant for the sum of £35,000. The present appeal concerns solely the figure of £35,000 specified in the criminal bankruptcy order.

The criminal bankruptcy order was made under sections 39 and 40 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973. Section 39(1) permits the court, upon conviction and where loss or damage exceeding £15,000 has been suffered by known persons, to make a criminal bankruptcy order specifying the amount of loss or damage. Section 39(3)(a) requires that the order specify the amount of loss or damage resulting from each offence if more than one offence is involved.

At the original hearing before the trial Judge, the criminal bankruptcy order specified a lump sum of £35,000 for all offences rather than apportioning the amount among multiple offences as required by statute. Since only one creditor—the Appellant's employer—was involved, the failure to apportion was of no practical consequence. Upon being notified of this defect on 19th July, the trial Judge agreed to apportion the amount accordingly and issued a corrected order.

The present appeal challenges the validity of the Judge's correction, arguing that the initial order was defective and that the court lacked jurisdiction to amend it after the statutory 28-day period for varying orders had expired.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether a criminal bankruptcy order that specifies a lump sum for multiple offences without apportionment is defective under section 39(3)(a) of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973.
2. Whether the Crown Court has jurisdiction to vary or amend a criminal bankruptcy order after the 28-day period prescribed by section 11(2) of the Courts Act 1971.
3. Whether the court can subsequently apportion a lump sum specified in a criminal bankruptcy order among multiple offences outside of the variation period under section 11 of the Courts Act 1971.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The initial criminal bankruptcy order was defective because it failed to apportion the £35,000 loss among the multiple offences as required by section 39(3)(a) of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973.
• The trial Judge lacked jurisdiction to amend or vary the order after the 28-day period for varying orders under section 11(2) of the Courts Act 1971 had expired.

Respondent's Arguments

• The correction made by the trial Judge was not a variation of the original order but rather the completion of an inchoate order that was defective in form but valid in substance.
• The court possesses an inherent jurisdiction to rectify mistakes or omissions in its orders, particularly when the correction reflects the court’s original intention and does not affect substantive rights.
• The case of R. v. Michael (1976) was cited to support the proposition that courts may remedy omissions in orders without infringing statutory time limits for variations.
• The factual distinctions between the present case and Customs and Excise Commissioners v. Menocal (1979) justify a departure from the strict application of the 28-day limitation in this instance.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Customs and Excise Commissioners v. Menocal (1979) 2 W.L.R. 876	Interpretation of "sentence" under section 11(2) of the Courts Act 1971 and the limitation on varying orders after 28 days.	The House of Lords held that the Crown Court has no power to vary or rescind a sentence or order after the 28-day period; however, the present court distinguished the case on its facts and did not consider it binding.
R. v. Michael (1976) Q.B. 414	Court’s inherent jurisdiction to rectify mistakes or omissions in its orders and the discretionary nature of including certain costs.	Supported the view that the court can correct omissions in orders where the correction reflects the court’s original intention and does not constitute a prohibited variation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the statutory framework governing criminal bankruptcy orders under the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973, focusing on the obligation under section 39(3)(a) to specify the amount of loss attributable to each offence when multiple offences are involved. The court acknowledged that the initial order specifying a lump sum without apportionment was formally defective but found that the defect was of no practical consequence in this case, given there was only one creditor.

The court then considered whether the trial Judge had jurisdiction to amend the order after the 28-day period for variations under section 11(2) of the Courts Act 1971 had expired. While recognizing the authority of the House of Lords in Menocal that the court lacks power to vary orders after this period, the court distinguished that case on its facts. Unlike Menocal, where a new penalty was imposed after the trial, the amendment here was a correction of an inchoate order that reflected the court's original intention.

The court further relied on the principle established in R. v. Michael that courts have inherent jurisdiction to remedy mistakes or omissions in their records or orders when such corrections are consistent with the original intent and cause no injustice. Applying this principle, the court held that the trial Judge's correction was valid and did not constitute an impermissible variation.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is DISMISSED. The court held that the trial Judge properly made the adjustment to apportion the lump sum specified in the criminal bankruptcy order among the offences, treating the original order as inchoate rather than a final, unalterable sentence.

The direct effect of this decision is that the correction of a defective criminal bankruptcy order to comply with statutory requirements is permissible beyond the 28-day variation period, provided it constitutes a completion or rectification of an inchoate order rather than a substantive variation of a final sentence or order. No new binding precedent was established beyond the facts of this case.