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Inland Revenue v Broadway Cottages

England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
Jul 26, 1954
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

These appeals arise from two Orders dated 11th March 1954, made by Mr Justice Wynn-Parry, allowing appeals by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue against decisions of the Special Commissioners. The Special Commissioners had held that two charitable institutions, The Sunnylands Trust and Broadway Cottages Trust (the Appellants), were entitled to exemption from Income Tax for the years 1950/51 and 1951/53 under Section 37(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act 1918, in respect of certain sums received from the Trustees of a Settlement dated 14th July 1950. The Settlement was made by the Settlor in favour of the Trustees. While the charitable status and consequent right to tax exemption of the Appellants is undisputed, the central issue is whether the sums received by the Appellants constituted income of those institutions. This depends on whether the Settlement created a valid trust of income in favour of the Appellants and other beneficiaries, or whether, as held by Mr Justice Wynn-Parry and contended by the Commissioners, no such valid trust was created.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the provisions of the Settlement created a valid trust of income in favour of the Appellants and other beneficiaries.
  2. If the trust was valid, whether the sums received by the Appellants constituted income of those institutions for the purposes of income tax exemption.
  3. Whether the Court could control and execute the trust given the nature of the class of beneficiaries and the discretion conferred on the Trustees.
  4. Whether the trust was void for uncertainty due to the unascertainable nature of the class of beneficiaries.
  5. Whether any power conferred on the Trustees to distribute income was irrevocable and capable of constituting income to the Appellants.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The Trustees, having undertaken the trust, must be assumed ready and willing to carry it out by distributing income among members of the class of beneficiaries, who can be identified with certainty individually.
  • The Court could restrain misfeasance by Trustees distributing income outside the class and could remove Trustees failing to act, appointing others until proper execution was ensured.
  • The possibility of continuous Trustee non-feasance is so remote it can be disregarded.
  • The Court could, by analogy with "relations" cases, declare a trust in default of distribution or hold the income divisible in specified proportions according to the Schedule.
  • Even if clause 8 creates no valid trust, it at least confers an irrevocable power on the Trustees to distribute income, making payments to the Appellants income for tax purposes.
  • In re Ogden was not an authority against them, as the uncertainty there related to complete enumeration rather than qualification for membership.

Crown's Arguments

  • The Court cannot compel the Trustees to make any distribution under clause 8, as the discretion is absolute and exercisable only by the Trustees.
  • No trust can be implied in default of distribution because the class of beneficiaries is unascertainable.
  • No beneficiary or group short of the whole class can enforce the trust, making the Trustees' duty illusory and the trust void for uncertainty.
  • The validity of the trust must be tested on the assumption that Trustees might fail or refuse to distribute, and in such case the Court cannot execute the trust, only replace Trustees who may also fail.
  • There is a distinction between a trust for an unascertainable class with no trust in default of appointment (as here, void for uncertainty) and a power with a trust in default (which may be valid).
  • The "relations" cases are sui generis and do not assist the Appellants.
  • The Court cannot remedy invalidity by imposing an arbitrary distribution among a subset of the class.
  • The trust declared by clause 8 is invalid and only confers a revocable mandate, so payments under it are not income of the institutions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Morice v. The Bishop of Durham, 10 Vesey 522 Trust must be capable of Court control and execution; administration must be reviewable and enforceable. The Court applied this principle to assess whether the trust was valid given the discretion and ascertainability issues.
In re Gestetner, 1953 Ch. 672 Validity of powers of appointment to unascertainable classes and distinction from trusts. The Court relied on this case to illustrate that a power over an unascertainable class may be valid, but a trust over such a class is void.
In re Park, 1932 1 Ch. 580 Power to appoint to any except the donee herself and its validity. Used to support the distinction between powers and trusts in relation to unascertainable classes.
In re Jones, 1945 Ch. 105 Power to appoint to any natural person living at the death of the donee. Supported the view that certain powers are valid despite broad classes.
In re Ogden, 1933 Ch. 678 Necessity of ascertainability of the entire class for validity of a trust for selection. Held that a trust for members selected from an unascertainable class is void for uncertainty; Court followed this authority.
Grant v. Lynam, 4 Russ. 292 Relations cases concerning trusts for relatives and their limitations. The Court distinguished these cases as sui generis and not applicable to the present facts.
Harding v. Glyn, 1 Atk. 469, 5 Ves. 501 Relations cases on trusts for relatives. As above, cited and distinguished.
Salusbury v. Denton, 3 Kay & J. 529 Relations cases and principles on trusts for relatives. Cited as analogy but distinguished from present case.
Wilson v. Duguid, 24 CD 244 Relations cases on trusts for relatives. Cited and distinguished.
Re Scarlsbrick, 1951 Ch. 622 Relations cases on trusts for relatives. Cited and distinguished.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by examining the terms of the Settlement, particularly clause 8, which confers on the Trustees an absolute and uncontrolled discretion to apply income for the benefit of the Settlor's wife and the beneficiaries as the Trustees see fit. The class of beneficiaries, as defined in the Schedule, was conceded by the Appellants to be unascertainable in the sense that a complete enumeration of all members at any given time was impossible, although the Crown conceded that individual membership could be determined with certainty.

The Court applied the principle from Morice v. The Bishop of Durham that a trust must be capable of control and execution by the Court. It found that the unascertainability of the class of beneficiaries meant the trust of capital was void for uncertainty, as division in equal shares among an unknown class is impossible. Similarly, a trust to divide income among such a class would also be void.

The discretion conferred on the Trustees was absolute and uncontrolled, and the Court could neither compel exercise of that discretion nor itself exercise it. The absence of a valid trust in default of exercise further rendered the trust void. The Court rejected the Appellants' argument that the Court could enforce the trust by removing or replacing Trustees who failed to act, holding that substitution of Trustees with the same uncontrolled discretion does not constitute execution of the trust.

The Court distinguished the "relations" cases as sui generis and not applicable, since those involved trusts with valid trusts in default of appointment or ascertainable classes. It also accepted the reasoning in In re Ogden that a trust for selection from an unascertainable class is void for uncertainty.

The Court rejected the submission that clause 8 created an irrevocable power to appoint income to beneficiaries, concluding that no valid power arises from an invalid trust. Consequently, sums paid under the invalid trust were held on resulting trust for the Settlor.

Accordingly, the Court agreed with Mr Justice Wynn-Parry's decision to dismiss the appeals in favour of the Crown.

Holding and Implications

The Court DISMISSED the appeals of The Sunnylands Trust and Broadway Cottages Trust with costs.

The direct effect is that the sums paid to the Appellants under the Settlement do not constitute income of those charitable institutions for the purposes of income tax exemption. No new precedent was established beyond affirming the application of existing principles regarding trusts for unascertainable classes and the necessity of Court control and execution of trusts.