Attia v British Gas Corporation

Factual and Procedural Background

In the summer of 1981, the Plaintiff resided at No. 11 Leaver Gardens, Greenford, Middlesex. The Defendant, Company A, was engaged to install central heating at the Plaintiff's residence. On 1st July 1981, the Plaintiff discovered smoke emanating from the loft of her house and subsequently witnessed the house burning for over four hours until the fire brigade controlled the fire. The house and its contents were extensively damaged. The Defendant admitted negligence causing the fire, and claims related to damage to the house and contents were settled. The Plaintiff’s sole remaining claim sought damages for nervous shock, alleging psychiatric illness resulting from witnessing the fire. The parties agreed to determine as a preliminary issue whether the Plaintiff could recover damages for nervous shock caused by witnessing the destruction of her property due to the Defendant’s negligence. The deputy judge ruled in favor of the Defendant, holding that the Plaintiff’s claim failed on the basis that it was not reasonably foreseeable she would suffer psychiatric illness from the fire. The Plaintiff appealed this decision.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Plaintiff can recover damages for nervous shock caused by witnessing the destruction of her home and possessions by a fire negligently started by the Defendant.
2. Whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the Plaintiff might suffer psychiatric illness as a result of the Defendant’s negligence in causing the fire.
3. Whether, as a matter of law and public policy, damages for nervous shock can only be recovered if caused by death or injury to a person, rather than injury to property alone.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant's Arguments

• The Plaintiff’s psychiatric illness was not reasonably foreseeable as a result of the Defendant’s negligence in starting the fire.
• Even if psychiatric illness was foreseeable, damages for nervous shock should be limited by law and public policy to cases involving death or injury to a person or fear thereof, typically a close relative, and not injury to property alone.

Plaintiff's Arguments

• The Plaintiff suffered a positive psychiatric illness as a result of witnessing the fire, which meets the required threshold beyond normal grief or distress.
• The Defendant owed a duty of care to the Plaintiff, who was directly affected by their negligence, making the claim for nervous shock within the scope of foreseeable damage.
• There is no valid public policy reason to exclude recovery for psychiatric injury caused by property damage, especially where the Defendant owed a duty of care and the injury was foreseeable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
McLoughlin v. O'Brian [1983] 1 AC 410	Establishes that a plaintiff must prove a positive psychiatric illness, not mere grief or distress, and discusses foreseeability and policy considerations in claims for nervous shock.	The court relied on this authority to clarify the threshold for psychiatric injury and to reject a categorical exclusion of claims based solely on property damage.
Jaensch v. Coffey [1984] 58 Aus L.J. 426	Analysis of foreseeability and policy in claims for nervous shock, emphasizing the necessity of reasonable foreseeability of psychiatric injury.	Used to support the proposition that foreseeability of psychiatric injury is the key test, and that policy considerations should not automatically bar claims arising from property damage.
King v. Phillips [1959] 1 Q.B. 429	Distinguishes between breach of duty and remoteness, arguing that emotional shock should be treated similarly to physical injury regarding duty of care and foreseeability.	Cited to reject the idea of different torts for physical and emotional injury and to emphasize that liability depends on foreseeability and remoteness, not the nature of injury.
Bourhill v. Young [1943] AC 92	Establishes the test of foreseeability for recovery of damages for nervous shock and the scope of duty of care.	Referenced to support the foreseeability test as central to determining liability for psychiatric injury.
Wagon Mound No. 1 [1961] AC 388	Endorses foreseeability as the test for remoteness of damage in negligence claims.	Used to affirm that foreseeability governs liability for psychiatric damage as for other types of damage.
Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562	Foundational case establishing the modern duty of care principle and the tests of proximity and foreseeability.	Applied as the basis for determining duty of care and scope of liability in psychiatric injury cases.
Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. v. Home Office [1970] AC 1004	Confirms the application of duty of care and foreseeability in negligence claims involving psychiatric injury.	Used to support the analytical framework for duty and remoteness in nervous shock claims.
Owens v. Liverpool Corporation [1939] 1 K.B. 394	Rare precedent involving psychiatric injury caused by property damage without personal injury or fear for personal safety.	Noted as an exception and relevant to the novel nature of the Plaintiff’s claim.
Czarnikow Ltd. v. Koufos [1969] 1 AC 350	Defines the standard for reasonable foreseeability of damage in negligence for remoteness purposes.	Referenced to clarify the foreseeability standard applied to psychiatric injury claims.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by assuming the facts pleaded by the Plaintiff to be true, including the existence of psychiatric illness caused by witnessing the fire. It acknowledged that the Defendant owed a duty of care to the Plaintiff as the Defendant was working in her home and caused the fire. The court distinguished this case from others because the Plaintiff was directly affected and the Defendant had knowledge of her presence, removing issues of proximity.

Relying primarily on the principles established in McLoughlin v. O'Brian and Jaensch v. Coffey, the court reiterated that a claimant must prove a positive psychiatric illness and that foreseeability of such injury is a necessary condition for liability. However, it rejected the Defendant’s submission that damages for psychiatric injury caused solely by property damage are precluded as a matter of law or public policy.

The court emphasized that the question of whether psychiatric injury was reasonably foreseeable is one of fact, not law, and cannot be resolved on a preliminary issue based on assumed facts alone. It noted that the deputy judge erred in concluding as a matter of law that it was not reasonably foreseeable the Plaintiff would suffer psychiatric illness from witnessing the fire, especially given the protracted nature of the fire and the Plaintiff’s direct exposure.

The court also addressed policy concerns, particularly the fear of opening floodgates to numerous claims, but found these insufficient to bar the Plaintiff’s claim at this stage. Instead, it advocated for judicial discretion and the application of foreseeability to control claims.

Ultimately, the court held that the claim for psychiatric damage caused by witnessing destruction of property is not barred in principle, and that the issues of foreseeability, causation, and remoteness require full factual examination at trial.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed. The court set aside the order of the deputy judge and remitted the case for trial on all live issues, including reasonable foreseeability, causation, and damage. The Plaintiff may proceed with the claim for damages for psychiatric injury resulting from witnessing the fire.

The decision clarifies that psychiatric injury claims arising solely from witnessing damage to property, without personal injury or fear of injury to a person, are not precluded as a matter of law or public policy. This expands the scope of recoverable nervous shock claims, subject to the established requirements of proof of psychiatric illness and reasonable foreseeability. The ruling does not establish a definitive legal rule but leaves the matter open for factual determination at trial, thereby avoiding premature closure of potentially valid claims.