Elguzouli-Daf v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis & Anor

Factual and Procedural Background

These appeals concern whether the Crown Prosecution Service ("the CPS") owes a duty of care to individuals it prosecutes. The appeals arise from an order dated 8 October 1993 by a Deputy High Court Judge striking out statements of claim in two negligence actions brought by plaintiffs against the CPS. Both plaintiffs alleged that the CPS negligently caused a prolongation of their detention.

The first plaintiff, referred to as Plaintiff A, was arrested following a bombing incident and detained for 85 days before the prosecution was abandoned when forensic evidence suggested possible innocent contamination of explosive residue. Plaintiff A sued the Ministry of Defence, the CPS, and the police; claims against the Ministry of Defence and police were either struck out or withdrawn, leaving only the claim against the CPS at issue.

The second plaintiff, Plaintiff B, was arrested and charged with sexual offences but was detained for 22 days before the CPS discontinued the prosecution after forensic evidence excluded him as the source of the semen found. Plaintiff B sued the police and the CPS, with only the claim against the CPS contested at trial and appeal.

Both claims against the CPS alleged negligence in failing to clarify forensic evidence promptly, failing to advise the plaintiffs or courts about exculpatory evidence, and failing to discontinue prosecutions in a timely manner.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Does the Crown Prosecution Service owe a duty of care in negligence to those it prosecutes?
2. If such a duty exists, what is its scope and are there any applicable immunities?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

• The CPS owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs because it was foreseeable that negligent prosecution decisions could cause harm such as prolonged detention.
• The CPS failed to act with reasonable diligence in obtaining, processing, and communicating forensic evidence that was exculpatory or consistent with innocent contamination.
• It was unjust to deny a remedy for damages where negligent CPS conduct caused anxiety, distress, and unlawful detention.
• The three-part test from Caparo Industries PLC v. Dickman is satisfied: foreseeability, proximity, and fairness in imposing a duty.
• They relied on the decision in Welsh v. Chief Constable of Merseyside Police, where a duty of care was found based on an assumption of responsibility by the CPS.

Respondent's Arguments

• The CPS does not owe a duty of care to those it prosecutes, as this would be contrary to public policy and would interfere with the independent exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
• Recognizing such a duty would lead to defensive practices, increased litigation, and diversion of resources from prosecuting crime.
• Existing remedies, including malicious prosecution and misfeasance in public office, provide adequate protection.
• The CPS is a public law enforcement agency with statutory functions and accountability to Parliament, not a private party.
• Analogies with police immunity in negligence claims (e.g., Hill v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire) support immunity for the CPS.
• Lawyers engaged by the CPS do not owe a duty of care to the opposing party in criminal proceedings absent a specific assumption of responsibility.
• The decision in Welsh is distinguishable as it involved an assumption of responsibility by the CPS, which is not present in these cases.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Caparo Industries PLC v. Dickman [1990] 2 AC 606	Established three-part test for duty of care: foreseeability, proximity, and whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty.	Used as the foundational test to analyze whether the CPS owes a duty of care to prosecuted individuals.
Welsh v. Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [1993] 1 AER 692	Recognition of duty of care where CPS assumed responsibility by conduct to keep magistrates informed.	Distinguished as involving assumption of responsibility not present in the instant cases; not regarded as wrongly decided but limited to its facts.
Hill v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53	Police immunity from negligence claims in investigation and suppression of crime on public policy grounds.	Applied by analogy to CPS to support immunity and argue against imposing a duty of care.
Al Kandary v. J R Brown & Co [1988] QB 665	No duty of care owed by lawyers to opposing parties absent specific assumption of responsibility.	Supported the proposition that CPS lawyers do not owe a private law duty to defendants in criminal proceedings.
Business Computers International Ltd v. Registrar of Companies [1988] Ch 229	Similar to Al Kandary on lawyers' duties to opposing parties.	Reinforced the analogy with CPS lawyers' lack of duty to prosecuted individuals.
Bourgoin S.A. v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1986] 1 QB 716	Requirements for misfeasance in public office tort: malice or knowledge of lack of power.	Outlined limits of private law remedies available against public officials, relevant to CPS liability.
Spring v. Guardian Assurance PLC [1994] 3 WLR 354	Assumption of responsibility can give rise to legal duties in negligence.	Qualified the general ruling by recognizing possible liability where CPS assumes responsibility to a particular defendant.
Yuen Kun Yeu v Attorney-General of Hong Kong (1988) 1 AC 175	Reluctance to impose common law duty of care where statutory framework exists.	Supported the view that no additional common law duty should be superimposed on CPS statutory duties.
Downshire Nominees v First City Corporation [1993] AC 295	Caution against extending negligence to supplant other torts or statutory duties.	Used to argue against recognizing a new duty of care that would overlap with malicious prosecution and misfeasance torts.
Field v. Nott 62 C.L.R. 660	Consideration of vicarious liability of prosecuting authorities for actions of prosecutors.	Raised as a hypothetical issue should a duty of care be recognized, but not decided as the main claim failed.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by framing the question as whether the CPS owes a duty of care to those it prosecutes, applying the established Caparo test focusing on foreseeability, proximity, and fairness. While foreseeability of harm was accepted for argument's sake, the court found the element of proximity and whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impose such a duty to be determinative.

The CPS is a public law enforcement agency created by statute, independent and accountable to Parliament, with a public interest role distinct from private parties or corporations. The court emphasized that imposing a duty of care would risk inhibiting the CPS's prosecutorial discretion, leading to defensive practices, diversion of scarce resources, and an increase in litigation that would undermine the efficiency of the criminal justice system.

The court noted existing remedies such as malicious prosecution and misfeasance in public office torts provide protections against abuse of power, and that the CPS's statutory framework does not contemplate a private law duty of care to prosecuted individuals. Analogies with police immunity in negligence claims reinforced the policy reasons against imposing such a duty.

The court distinguished the Welsh case, which involved an assumption of responsibility by the CPS, a factor absent in the present appeals. It acknowledged that such assumption of responsibility could give rise to duties but found no such assumption here.

Ultimately, the court concluded that despite the injustice to individual plaintiffs, the broader interests of the community and the criminal justice system outweigh the arguments for recognizing a duty of care. It rejected attempts to limit any such duty to operational rather than discretionary acts as impractical and unworkable.

In the alternative, should a duty of care exist, the court held the CPS would be immune from negligence liability on public policy grounds. The court found the question suitable for determination on a striking out application as a matter of law.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED both appeals.

The holding establishes that the Crown Prosecution Service does not owe a duty of care in negligence to those it prosecutes, absent a specific assumption of responsibility. This ruling prevents negligence claims against the CPS by prosecuted individuals for alleged prosecutorial carelessness, preserving prosecutorial discretion and the efficient functioning of the criminal justice system. The decision leaves intact existing remedies such as malicious prosecution and misfeasance in public office torts and does not create new private law duties. The ruling applies broadly, subject only to exceptional cases involving assumption of responsibility, which were not present here.