Breslin & Ors v Murphy & Ors

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal concerns a judgment delivered by the trial judge on 20 March 2013, wherein the appellants were found jointly and severally liable for damages claimed by the plaintiffs for trespass to the person. The claims arose from a bomb explosion in The City on 15 August 1998, which caused personal injuries and deaths, leading to claims under relevant fatal accidents and law reform legislation. The original trial was before a different judge, whose decision was partially overturned on appeal, leading to a retrial held as a de novo hearing. The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal on points of law arising from the first appeal. The retrial focused on whether the appellants were involved in the preparation, planting, and detonation of the bomb.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether a person who plants a bomb intending it to explode, but without intent to kill or injure, is liable for battery if reckless as to death or injury.
2. Whether the evidence proved the appellants' involvement in the bomb's preparation, planting, and detonation.
3. The appropriate standard of proof in civil proceedings involving serious allegations of terrorism.
4. The admissibility and weight of evidence obtained under a European Regulation concerning cross-border evidence gathering.
5. Whether adverse inferences could be drawn from the appellants' failure to give evidence.
6. Whether the trial judge was biased or pre-judged the issues due to prior rulings and evidence.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

• The plaintiffs produced no direct evidence that the appellants detonated the bomb; Garda interviews were unreliable and incomplete.
• The telephone evidence (LKP5) was insufficient to link the appellants to the bombing, with no evidence connecting the relevant phones to the bomb warnings or to terrorist activity.
• The appellants lacked knowledge or intent regarding the bomb and thus could not be liable for battery.
• The trial judge erred in finding the appellants lied about their phone usage and movements; no compelling evidence contradicted their accounts.
• Appellants' silence or failure to give evidence could be credibly explained, particularly due to distrust in the justice system.
• The European Regulation evidence, particularly the O'Connor testimony, was inadmissible due to procedural defects and lack of jurisdiction.
• The trial judge was cognitively biased, influenced by prior judgments and evidence from the earlier trial.

Respondents' Arguments

• The circumstantial evidence, including telephone records and witness interviews, established a strong prima facie case of the appellants' involvement.
• The standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities but requires cogent evidence given the seriousness of the allegations.
• The European Regulation was properly applied; the requested Irish court lawfully admitted the O'Connor evidence, and procedural objections were unfounded.
• Adverse inferences were properly drawn from the appellants' failure to give evidence or explain phone usage.
• The trial judge conducted a careful and impartial de novo hearing without pre-judgment or bias.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Re D [2008] UKHL	Standard of proof in civil proceedings involving serious allegations and drawing inferences from silence.	Applied to affirm that the trial judge used the correct standard and properly drew adverse inferences from appellants' silence.
R v Lucas [1991] 2 All ER 1008	Recognition that people may lie for shame or to conceal disgraceful behavior.	Used to support trial judge's conclusion that one appellant lied deliberately without innocent explanation.
Hollington v Hewthorne [1943] KB 587	Rule on inadmissibility of convictions as evidence in civil proceedings.	Applied to exclude direct use of one appellant's conviction, but plea of guilty was treated as admission.
McIlveen v Charlesworth Developments [1973] NI 216	Test for whether a case should be left to the jury, viewing evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff.	Applied to uphold trial judge’s refusal to dismiss case at no case stage.
McNeill v Department of the Environment [1986] NI 290	Principles for appellate review of findings of fact.	Referenced to affirm appellate deference to trial judge’s factual conclusions.
Alexander v Rayson [1936] 1 KB 169	Proper procedure for submissions of no case and putting defendant to election.	Discussed to confirm trial judge’s discretion and no error in not putting appellants to election.
Lowry v Rogan [1942] 1 KB 152	Proper practice regarding no case submissions and defendant election.	Referenced in support of trial judge’s approach at direction stage.
Benhams Ltd v Kythira Investments Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 1794	Standard for prima facie case and approach to no case submissions.	Applied to reject appellants’ no case submission.
Boyce v Wyatt Engineering [2001] EWCA Civ 692	Reasons for putting defendant to election to avoid unnecessary retrials.	Discussed to explain trial judge’s procedural choices.
R v Exall [1866] 4 F&F	Analogy of circumstantial evidence as multiple cords in a rope; combination of circumstances can establish guilt.	Applied to illustrate how circumstantial evidence in this case combined to establish liability on balance of probabilities.
Huddleston and another v Central Risks Information Services Ltd [1987] 2 All ER 1035	Distinction between medium and message in evidence and discovery.	Used to support admissibility of recorded evidence transmitted by CD under European Regulation.
EKW v Wein and Co [2000] ECR 1-1157	Interpretation of EU regulations by reference to purpose and general scheme.	Applied to interpret European Regulation governing cross-border evidence gathering.
Borgman [2004] ECR 1-3219	Supporting authority on purposive interpretation of EU regulations.	Referenced alongside EKW v Wein and Co for Regulation interpretation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court reaffirmed the principle that a person who plants a bomb with intent for it to explode is liable for battery if reckless as to death or injury, binding itself to prior appellate authority. The court emphasized that the retrial was a de novo hearing, not bound by previous trial rulings, and carefully analyzed the circumstantial evidence presented.

The evidence was predominantly circumstantial, focusing on telephone records linking the appellants’ phones to suspicious movements and calls coincident with the bombing events in The City and other locations. The court found the pattern of phone usage compelling, noting the movement of phones along routes consistent with the bomb’s placement and timing.

The trial judge’s rejection of certain evidence (notably the Morgan evidence) was accepted, as was the assessment that the appellants’ denials and explanations were implausible and amounted to deliberate lies. The court endorsed the drawing of adverse inferences from the appellants’ failure to give evidence, particularly given the gravity of the allegations and the absence of credible explanations for phone usage.

Regarding the European Regulation on cross-border evidence, the court held that the requested Irish court’s procedures and rulings must be respected. The Regulation’s purposive interpretation allowed for the admissibility of evidence obtained via recorded testimony despite procedural objections. The court rejected arguments that the evidence was inadmissible due to technical or jurisdictional defects.

The court dismissed claims of cognitive bias by the trial judge, finding the judge conducted a careful, impartial analysis of the evidence. It held that the combination of evidence strands, including phone records, witness identifications, and admitted membership of a terrorist organization, formed a sufficiently strong prima facie case to establish liability on the balance of probabilities.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the appeals of both appellants, affirming the trial judge’s finding that the plaintiffs had proved their case to the requisite civil standard of proof. The appellants were held jointly and severally liable for damages arising from their involvement in the bombing incident.

The decision confirms that in civil claims arising from serious terrorist acts, circumstantial evidence, including telecommunications data and witness identifications, can establish liability where direct evidence is lacking, provided the evidence collectively meets the balance of probabilities standard. The ruling also underscores the applicability and respect for cross-border evidence gathering under European Regulations, reinforcing procedural comity between jurisdictions. No new precedent was established beyond the affirmation of existing principles and the application of evidential standards in this context.