Croome, R v

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an appeal against a conviction for causing death by dangerous driving. Leave to appeal was granted by Judge Weir. The appeal was allowed following a hearing, and a retrial was ordered due to an irregularity at the original trial: the trial judge failed to leave an alternative verdict of causing death by careless driving to the jury. The appellant was driving to an airport and attempted to overtake a group of cyclists involved in an organised race when a dog ran onto the road, causing one cyclist to swerve and be struck by the appellant’s vehicle, resulting in the cyclist’s death. The appellant challenged the conviction on several grounds, including discrepancies in the prosecution case, admission of bad character evidence, unclear directions on causation, and failure to leave the alternative verdict to the jury.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the conviction for causing death by dangerous driving was unsafe due to discrepancies in the prosecution evidence.
2. Whether the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of the appellant’s previous driving offences.
3. Whether the trial judge’s direction on causation linking dangerous driving to death was adequate and clear.
4. Whether the trial judge erred in failing to leave the alternative verdict of causing death by careless driving to the jury.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The conviction was unsafe because of discrepancies and inconsistencies in the prosecution’s case.
• The trial judge erred by admitting bad character evidence relating to previous speeding convictions.
• The directions on causation were confusing and failed to properly link dangerous driving to the death.
• The trial judge wrongly refused to leave the alternative verdict of causing death by careless driving to the jury, potentially prejudicing the appellant’s defence.

Prosecution's Arguments

• The appellant was driving too fast and too close to the cyclists, leaving no time or space to avoid the collision caused by the dog’s sudden appearance.
• The bad character evidence was relevant and properly admitted as it related to propensity to speed, which was central to the prosecution’s case.
• The jury should have been left the alternative verdict of causing death by careless driving to avoid a stark choice between dangerous driving causing death and acquittal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
R v Pollock [2004] NICA 34	Guidance on the Court of Appeal's role in assessing the safety of a verdict without retrying the case or speculating on jury decisions.	Used to assess whether inconsistencies in prosecution evidence rendered the verdict unsafe; court found discrepancies typical and jury had been properly directed.
R v Tirnaveaneu [2007] EWCA Crim 1239	Admissibility of bad character evidence relevant to propensity and important issues in the case.	Supported the trial judge’s discretion to admit evidence of appellant’s previous speeding convictions.
R v Coutts [2006] 1 WLR 2154	Duty of trial judges to leave alternative verdicts to the jury when supported by evidence, regardless of counsel’s wishes, to serve justice and fairness.	Established that failure to leave an alternative verdict can render a conviction unsafe; court applied this principle to quash the conviction and order a retrial.
Von Stark v Queen [2000] 1 WLR 1270	Judge’s responsibility to fairly present all possible conclusions to the jury, beyond the parties’ submissions.	Referenced to reinforce the judge’s duty to leave alternative verdicts to ensure justice and jury understanding.
Gilbert v The Queen (201) CLR 414	Failure to give proper directions according to law affects the fairness of the trial and the validity of the verdict.	Supported the view that the absence of an alternative verdict direction constituted an irregularity making the conviction unsafe.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court carefully examined the inconsistencies and discrepancies in the prosecution evidence, concluding they were typical in such circumstances and had been properly highlighted to the jury. The court applied the principles from R v Pollock to determine that the verdict was not unsafe on this ground alone. Regarding the admission of bad character evidence, the court found the trial judge acted within a proper exercise of discretion, as the evidence was relevant to the issue of speed, a central element of the prosecution’s case.

On the issue of causation, the court held that the trial judge’s directions were clear and adequately linked the dangerous driving to the death, even considering the intervening event of the dog running onto the road. The critical analysis focused on the failure to leave the alternative verdict of causing death by careless driving to the jury. The court relied heavily on the authoritative guidance in R v Coutts and related authorities, emphasizing the judge’s duty to present all obvious alternative verdicts supported by evidence, regardless of trial counsel’s strategy.

The court found that the jury themselves had identified the alternative verdict early in the trial, and there was a strong public interest in ensuring the jury could consider all proper alternatives. The trial judge’s acceptance of the appellant’s counsel’s submission not to leave the alternative verdict was an error that rendered the conviction unsafe. The court rejected the suggestion that leaving the alternative verdict would have caused unfairness, noting no specific unfairness was identified on appeal.

Holding and Implications

The court QUASHED the conviction for causing death by dangerous driving and ordered a retrial. The failure to leave the alternative verdict of causing death by careless driving to the jury was held to be an irregularity that made the conviction unsafe. The direct effect of this decision is to provide the appellant with a new trial at which the jury will be properly directed on the alternative verdict. The court did not establish any new precedent beyond applying established principles about the duty to leave alternative verdicts and the assessment of unsafe convictions.