Lewisham & Guys Mental Health NHS Trust v Andrews (Deceased)

Factual and Procedural Background

The deceased, an employee of Company A, presented a complaint alleging racial discrimination against her employer. The complaint was received by an Employment Tribunal on 6th April 1998. The deceased was dismissed on 16th July 1998 and subsequently died on 23rd August 1998. The deceased's family sought to continue both the discrimination complaint and to present a new complaint of unfair dismissal. The unfair dismissal issue was scheduled for hearing by an Employment Tribunal, focusing on whether the complaint was practicable within the statutory time limits.

The discrimination complaint was still extant at the date of the deceased's death. The Employment Tribunal Chairman, hearing the matter on 6th November 1998, ruled that the deceased's personal representatives could continue the discrimination claim. The employer appealed this decision.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether a discrimination complaint under the Race Relations Act 1976 can be continued by the personal representatives of a deceased complainant.
2. Whether the Employment Tribunal has jurisdiction to allow substitution of the deceased complainant by their estate in discrimination proceedings.
3. The interpretation and applicability of statutory provisions relating to continuation of claims after death, particularly comparing the Employment Rights Act 1996 with the Race Relations Act 1976.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Employer)

• The Employment Rights Act 1996 expressly permits continuation of unfair dismissal claims by personal representatives, but the Race Relations Act 1976 contains no such provision for discrimination claims.
• General legal principle holds that proceedings abate upon a party's death unless a statute or court rules expressly allow continuation by personal representatives.
• Reference to Court of Appeal Criminal Division decisions (R v Jeffries and R v Maguire) supports that statutory jurisdiction is limited to what is expressly conferred, and no inherent power exists to substitute a deceased party.
• Employment Tribunals have no jurisdiction beyond that conferred by Parliament and thus cannot permit substitution in discrimination claims.
• The Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 does not apply to Employment Tribunal complaints as these are not 'causes of action' in the technical sense contemplated by the Act.
• Legislative history and statutory scheme indicate Parliament deliberately chose not to allow discrimination claims to survive the death of the complainant, unlike unfair dismissal claims.

Respondent's Arguments (Deceased's Estate)

• The complaint was properly commenced under section 54 of the Race Relations Act 1976, which allows "any person" to present a complaint, a term argued to include personal representatives.
• Section 6 of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 permits representation by any person, supporting the personal representative’s entitlement to conduct proceedings.
• The Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 provides that causes of action survive death and pass to the estate, allowing continuation of the statutory tort alleged in the discrimination claim.
• Public policy and the purpose of the Race Relations Act 1976 support allowing continuation of complaints after death to prevent evasion of investigation into alleged discrimination.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
R v Jeffries [1968] 3 All ER 238	General principle that proceedings abate on death unless statute allows substitution of personal representatives.	Supported the view that no inherent court power exists to substitute a deceased party absent statutory authority.
R v Maguire and others [1992] 2 All ER 433	Statutory jurisdiction is limited to that expressly granted; the term "person" may include deceased in certain contexts.	Distinguished the statutory scheme for criminal appeals; noted jurisdiction must be found in statute.
Re: Simpkin Marshall Ltd [1958] 3 All ER 611	Definition of "action" excludes certain statutory proceedings not commenced by writ; importance of statutory form of proceedings.	Used by analogy to argue Employment Tribunal complaints are not "causes of action" under the Law Reform Act 1934.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the statutory framework governing continuation of claims after death, focusing on the presence or absence of express statutory provisions allowing personal representatives to continue discrimination claims. It noted that while the Employment Rights Act 1996 explicitly permits continuation of unfair dismissal claims by personal representatives, no equivalent provision exists in the Race Relations Act 1976 or related legislation.

The court considered the general legal principle that proceedings abate upon a party’s death unless statute or court rules provide otherwise, supported by precedents from the Court of Appeal Criminal Division. It rejected the argument that the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 applies to Employment Tribunal discrimination complaints, reasoning that such complaints are not "causes of action" in the technical sense contemplated by the Act.

The court found that the statutory scheme and legislative history indicate Parliament deliberately chose not to allow discrimination claims to survive the complainant’s death, contrasting this with the clear provision for unfair dismissal claims. The court also rejected the argument that the phrase "any person" in section 54 of the Race Relations Act 1976 should be interpreted broadly to include personal representatives.

Furthermore, the court held that the Employment Tribunals Act 1996's provision for representation at hearings does not confer a right to continue proceedings on behalf of a deceased complainant. It concluded that the Employment Tribunal Chairman erred in law by allowing continuation of the discrimination claim after the complainant's death, as the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to make such an order.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is allowed.

The court held that there is no statutory power permitting the personal representatives of a deceased complainant to continue a discrimination claim under the Race Relations Act 1976 before an Employment Tribunal. Consequently, the Employment Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to allow the continuation of the deceased's discrimination complaint. The decision of the Employment Tribunal Chairman permitting continuation was therefore set aside.

The direct effect is that discrimination claims under the Race Relations Act 1976 do not survive the death of the complainant and cannot be pursued by their estate. No new precedent was established beyond clarifying the limits of tribunal jurisdiction in this context. The court granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal but expressed no view on the likelihood of success of any further appeal.