Marsland v Shropshire Mental Health NHS Trust

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant commenced employment with Company A on 28 March 1977. On 1 April 1993, his employment was transferred to Company B pursuant to a relevant transfer under the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981, preserving his terms and conditions of employment. On 7 February 1995, Company B warned the Appellant he was at risk of redundancy and subsequently dismissed him by notice dated 14 March 1995, effective 31 March 1995, citing redundancy as the reason.

The Appellant lodged a complaint of unfair dismissal with an Industrial Tribunal on 4 May 1995. The original hearing commenced on 9 October 1995 but was not concluded. A fresh hearing was convened before a new Tribunal chaired by Judge Williams, which sat on 16 and 17 April 1996 and dismissed the complaint by decision dated 23 May 1996. The Appellant now appeals that decision. The current hearing is a Preliminary Hearing to determine whether the appeal raises any arguable legal point for a full appeal hearing.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the dismissal was for a genuine redundancy situation.
2. Whether a collective agreement was incorporated into the Appellant’s contract protecting him from compulsory redundancy.
3. Whether the selection of the Appellant for redundancy was reasonable.
4. Whether there was sufficient consultation before dismissal.
5. Whether the overall treatment of the redundancy was reasonable.
6. Whether the Appellant’s appeal raises any arguable point of law to proceed to a full appeal hearing.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Appellant argued that a collective agreement titled "Job Transfer affected by Organisational Change" (the 1988 Agreement), which included a clause stating "The Authority remains committed to a policy of no enforced redundancy," was incorporated into his contract and protected him from compulsory redundancy.
• The Appellant contended that the employer breached a Code of Practice issued under the Industrial Relations Act 1971, although this Code was no longer in force at the time of dismissal.
• The Appellant claimed that the Respondent failed to produce all relevant documents following an order for discovery, which he argued were relevant to his duties and the redundancy selection process.
• The Appellant complained that after his dismissal, services were contracted out and employees formerly working under him were transferred to contractors, denying him the benefit of the Transfer Regulations.

Respondent's Arguments

• The Respondent maintained that the 1988 Agreement was not incorporated into the Appellant’s contract, either expressly or by implication, nor was there sufficient custom and practice to incorporate it.
• Even if the 1988 Agreement had been incorporated, the "no enforced redundancy" clause was too vague to be enforceable by an individual employee.
• The Code of Practice cited was no longer in force and therefore could not be relied upon.
• The documents sought by the Appellant were of marginal relevance and did not justify interference with the Tribunal’s decision.
• The complaint about contracting out services after dismissal did not pertain to the fairness of the dismissal itself.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Gascol Conversions Ltd v Mercer [1974] ICR 420	Establishing that a signed document can constitute a written contract of employment.	Used to confirm that the November 1984 document signed by the Appellant was his written contract of employment.
Alexander v Standard Telephones & Cables Ltd (No.2) [1991] IRLR 286	Vagueness of terms in collective agreements may render them unenforceable by individual employees.	Applied to conclude that Clause 1.3 of the 1988 Agreement was too vague to be enforceable by the Appellant.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined whether the collective agreement containing a "no enforced redundancy" policy was incorporated into the Appellant’s contract. It found no express or implied incorporation, nor sufficient evidence of custom and practice. Even if incorporated, the relevant clause was too vague to be enforceable by an individual employee, referencing established case law.

The court noted that the Code of Practice relied upon by the Appellant was no longer in force at the time of dismissal and therefore could not support his claim.

Regarding the failure to produce all documents, the court assessed the relevance of the documents and found them marginal to the key issues, thus not warranting interference with the Tribunal’s decision.

The complaint about contracting out services post-dismissal was held irrelevant to the fairness of the dismissal itself and did not affect the Tribunal’s findings.

Overall, the court concluded that none of the Appellant’s grounds raised an arguable point of law sufficient to merit a full appeal hearing.

Holding and Implications

The appeal was DISMISSED.

The direct effect is the affirmation of the Tribunal’s decision dismissing the unfair dismissal complaint. No new legal precedent was established by this ruling, and the dismissal for redundancy stands as lawful and reasonable under the circumstances presented.