Cullinane v Balfour Beatty Engineering Services Ltd & Anor (Jurisdictional Points : Extension of time: reasonably practicable)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal concerns the reasonableness of the period between the Appellant learning of a potential blacklisting claim under section 137 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act and the commencement of proceedings. The matter was before the Employment Appeal Tribunal, with the question focusing on whether the delay in bringing the claim was reasonable within the meaning of section 139(1) of the same Act, which is identically worded to section 111(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. The case was remitted for consideration of whether the Dedman principle applies equally to the question of the reasonableness of the delay between discovery of the cause of action and the presentation of the claim. The original judge was found to have failed to take into account part of the evidence relevant to this issue.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the period between the Appellant discovering a possible blacklisting claim under section 137 of TULR(C)A and bringing proceedings was reasonable within the meaning of section 139(1) of the Act.
2. Whether the Dedman principle applies equally to the question of the reasonableness of the delay between discovery of the cause of action and presentation of the claim.
3. Whether delay caused by the Claimant's advisers can be taken into account in assessing the reasonableness of the delay.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The delay in bringing the claim should be considered reasonable.
• The judge failed to consider all relevant evidence regarding the timing of the claim.
• Any delay attributable to the Claimant's advisers should be taken into account when assessing reasonableness.

Respondents' Arguments

• The delay between the Appellant learning of the claim and commencing proceedings was unreasonable.
• The Dedman principle should apply to the assessment of the reasonableness of the delay.
• Delay caused by the Claimant's advisers should not assist the Claimant in justifying the delay.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Dedman Principle	Assessment of reasonableness of delay in bringing a claim after discovery of cause of action.	The Court considered whether this principle applies equally to the question of the reasonableness of the delay between discovery and presentation of the claim.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the reasonableness of the delay under section 139(1) of TULR(C)A, which mirrors section 111(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. It noted that the judge below had failed to consider all relevant evidence concerning the timing of the Appellant’s claim. The Court considered the application of the Dedman principle, which relates to the assessment of delay after discovering the cause of action, and held that it applies equally in this context. Importantly, the Court determined that any unreasonable delay caused by the Claimant's advisers cannot be used to assist the Claimant in justifying the delay. This means that the fault or negligence of the Claimant's legal representatives does not extend the reasonable period for bringing the claim.

Holding and Implications

The Court remitted the issue for reconsideration with directions to apply the Dedman principle correctly and to disregard any delay attributable to the Claimant's advisers when assessing the reasonableness of the delay in bringing the claim.

The direct effect of this decision is to clarify that delays caused by a claimant’s legal representatives do not justify extending statutory time limits for employment claims under TULR(C)A. No new precedent was established beyond this clarification, and the case was returned for further consideration consistent with this ruling.