Paterson v. Commissioner of Police of The Metropolis

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal concerns whether the Tribunal erred in law by concluding that the Appellant, a police officer diagnosed with dyslexia, was not disabled within the meaning of the Disability Discrimination Act 1996. The Appellant alleged discrimination related to his disability and claimed his employers failed to make reasonable adjustments in promotion processes. The Tribunal found that although the Appellant had dyslexia, it did not substantially adversely affect his ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities, and thus he was not disabled under the Act. The appeal challenges this conclusion.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Tribunal erred in law in concluding that the Appellant was not disabled under the Disability Discrimination Act 1996 despite having dyslexia.
2. Whether the adverse effects of the Appellant's dyslexia on promotion assessments constitute a substantial adverse effect on his ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities.
3. Whether the Tribunal correctly applied the statutory definition of disability and relevant guidance, including the comparison standard for assessing disability.
4. Whether the Tribunal properly evaluated expert evidence and coping strategies in determining disability status.
5. Whether the European Court of Justice decision in Chacón Navas v Eurest Colectividades SA affects the interpretation of disability under the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Tribunal's conclusion that the Appellant was not disabled was impossible given its own findings that the Appellant faced a definite disadvantage in promotion assessments due to dyslexia.
• The adverse effect on promotion prospects necessarily implies a substantial adverse effect on normal day-to-day activities.
• It is insufficient for the Tribunal to rely on employer goodwill or good industrial practice for adjustments; the legislation requires legal protection and enforceable rights.
• The Tribunal misdirected itself by comparing the Appellant to the average population rather than assessing the difference between his abilities with and without impairment.
• The Tribunal failed to properly consider that coping strategies involved taking longer to perform reading and comprehension tasks, which should have indicated a substantial adverse effect.
• The Tribunal improperly discounted expert evidence without adequate explanation.
• The European Court of Justice decision in Chacón Navas requires a broad interpretation of disability that includes hindrance in participation in professional life, such as promotion assessments.

Respondent's Arguments

• The Tribunal was correct in its conclusion that the Appellant was not disabled under the Act.
• The relevant comparison is between the Appellant and the average person in the population, not a hypothetical unimpaired version of the Appellant.
• Promotion assessments are not normal day-to-day activities and thus do not fall within the scope of the Act’s disability definition.
• Employer adjustments are a matter of good industrial practice, not legal obligation if the employee is not legally disabled.
• The Tribunal properly preferred the evidence of one expert over the other and gave sufficient reasons for doing so.
• The Appellant’s coping strategies and evidence about day-to-day activities were properly considered by the Tribunal.
• The Chacón decision should not apply here because the UK had not yet fully implemented the Directive at the time of the alleged discrimination.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Ekpe v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2001] ICR 1084	Clarification of the assessment of substantial adverse effect on normal day-to-day activities under the Disability Discrimination Act.	Used to explain that impairment affecting abilities in Schedule 1 will almost inevitably affect normal day-to-day activities.
Vicary v British Telecommunications plc [1999] IRLR 680	Medical expert evidence assists but does not determine the legal question of disability.	Confirmed that tribunals must use common sense to determine disability, not rely solely on expert opinion.
Cruickshank v VAW Motorcast Ltd [2002] ICR 729	The relevant date for determining disability discrimination is the date of the alleged discrimination.	Applied to reject the argument that pre-discrimination evidence was irrelevant where the disability was lifelong.
Law Hospital NHS Trust v Rush [2001] IRLR 611	Evidence of ability to perform normal day-to-day activities at work is relevant to disability assessment.	Supported the Tribunal's approach to considering the Appellant’s work performance in assessing disability.
R (H) v Ashworth Hospital Authority [2003] 1 WLR 127	Tribunal must give adequate reasons when discounting expert reports.	Appellant argued the Tribunal failed to sufficiently explain preferring one expert over another.
Chacón Navas v Eurest Colectividades SA [2006] IRLR 706	EU Directive requires a broad, autonomous concept of disability covering hindrance in participation in professional life.	Applied to interpret the Disability Discrimination Act in line with EU law, including promotion-related hindrance as disability.
Adelener v ELOG, Case C-212/04	Timing of obligation to interpret national law in conformity with EU Directives.	Discussed by the Court but rejected as limiting the duty to interpret the Act compatibly with EU law prior to implementation deadline.
Mangold v Helm [2006] IRLR 143	Duty to interpret national law consistently with EU law from adoption of Directive.	Rejected by the Court in favor of a more limited approach but accepted that post-implementation domestic law must be interpreted compatibly.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed the statutory definition of disability under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (as amended), emphasizing that disability requires a physical or mental impairment with a substantial and long-term adverse effect on normal day-to-day activities. The Court noted that the Tribunal had found the Appellant had dyslexia but concluded the adverse effects were minor and did not substantially affect normal activities.

The Court rejected the Tribunal's approach of comparing the Appellant's abilities with the average population, clarifying that the correct comparison is between the Appellant's actual ability and his hypothetical ability without the impairment. The Court held that the Tribunal misdirected itself by excluding promotion assessments as not being normal day-to-day activities and by failing to recognize that reading and comprehension are themselves normal day-to-day activities.

The Court gave significant weight to the European Court of Justice decision in Chacón Navas, which requires a broad interpretation of disability to include hindrance in participation in professional life, such as promotion assessments. The Court concluded that requiring 25% extra time for promotion assessments demonstrated a substantial adverse effect on normal day-to-day activities.

The Court also addressed the treatment of expert evidence, finding that while the Tribunal preferred one expert's report, the ultimate legal question was for the Tribunal to decide. The Court found no material error in the Tribunal’s preference but noted the Tribunal should have considered coping strategies more explicitly.

Regarding the timing of the disability assessment, the Court held it was proper for the Tribunal to consider the Appellant's lifelong coping with dyslexia in his police work. The Court rejected the argument that the Directive’s implementation deadline limited the duty to interpret domestic law compatibly with EU law once the implementing legislation was in force.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is allowed. The Court substitutes a finding that the Appellant is a disabled person within the meaning of section 1 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995.

The case is remitted to the Tribunal for determination on the merits of the discrimination claim.

This decision clarifies that substantial disadvantage in promotion assessments caused by a disability constitutes a substantial adverse effect on normal day-to-day activities, aligning domestic law with EU law as interpreted by the ECJ. The ruling emphasizes the proper comparative test for disability and confirms the necessity of reasonable adjustments to ensure equal participation in professional advancement. No new precedent beyond the direct effect on this case was established.