Parshall v Hackney

Factual and Procedural Background

This case concerns the ownership of a small parcel of land located in Chelsea, London, which is part of a charitable estate. The land, measuring less than 2 metres across and 4 metres long, is disputed between two neighbouring property owners: the Appellant, who owns No 29 Milner Street, and the Respondent, who owns No 31 Milner Street. Both properties have registered titles that mistakenly overlap the disputed land, resulting from errors by the Land Registry.

The Appellant's title to No 29 was first registered in 1904, and the property was acquired by the Appellant’s predecessors in 2006. The Respondent's title to No 31 was first registered in 1980, with the disputed land included in that title due to a Land Registry mistake in 1986. The Land Registry also made a further error in 2000 by excluding the disputed land from the Appellant's title plan.

Following these mistakes, the Appellant sought rectification of the register to exclude the disputed land from the Respondent's title and reinstate it to No 29. The Respondent resisted, asserting adverse possession and an easement for parking over the disputed land. The dispute has undergone three rounds of litigation: first before a Deputy Adjudicator to the Land Registry in 2011, then in the High Court in 2012, and finally on this second appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether, under the Limitation Act 1980 and the Land Registration Act 1925, a person with a registered title can have a "right of action" to recover land from another person who also has a registered title and is in possession of it.
2. Whether possession of land by a registered proprietor can amount to "adverse possession" within the meaning of the Limitation Act 1980.
3. Whether a prescriptive easement can be acquired over land that is registered in the claimant’s own name through long user as of right.
4. Whether the dispute is essentially a boundary dispute to be resolved by the general boundaries rule or a title dispute requiring rectification.
5. What principles govern the exercise of the court’s discretion to rectify the land register in cases of concurrent registered titles.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Deputy Judge erred in law by holding that the Respondent acquired possessory title despite the Respondent’s predecessors being registered proprietors throughout the relevant period.
• The Deputy Judge wrongly relied on the decision in Malory Enterprises Ltd v. Cheshire Homes (UK) Ltd, which was obiter and distinguishable, and does not support the proposition that a registered title plus a right to seek rectification suffices to commence an action for recovery.
• The effect of first registration under section 5 of the 1925 Act was not adequately considered; the Appellant’s predecessors held legal and beneficial title and were deemed in possession unless dispossessed.
• The only remedies for the Land Registry's mistake are rectification and indemnification; rectification is a substantive prerequisite to any right of action for possession and not merely procedural.
• The Respondent’s possession was lawful due to concurrent registration, so time for adverse possession could not begin to run against the Appellant.
• The dispute concerns registered title to a specific piece of land, not a boundary dispute.
• The Respondent’s claim to an easement for parking should be rejected because a registered owner cannot acquire an easement over their own land.

Respondent's Arguments

• The owners of No 29 could have brought a possession claim against the owners of No 31 between 1988 and 2000 based on their registered title coupled with a claim for rectification or a declaration of boundary, negating the need for prior rectification.
• The general boundaries rule would have prevented the owners of No 31 from relying on their registration as a defense, making rectification unnecessary before recovery action.
• It would be unjust to rectify the register given the Respondent’s predecessors acquired title by adverse possession due to long exclusive possession.
• The cause of action for recovery arose in July 1988 when the owners of No 31 physically demarcated the disputed land, dispossessing the owners of No 29.
• The Respondent’s title is based on adverse possession, not the mistaken registered title.
• The 1986 conveyance did not purport to transfer any part of No 29; the inclusion of the disputed land in No 31's title plan was a Land Registry error.
• The discretion to refuse rectification should be exercised in favor of the Respondent to avoid injustice, considering the Respondent’s long possession, lack of fault, and value of the land to her.
• The easement claim is a valid alternative, relying on long and open use for parking.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the competing claims under the framework of the Limitation Act 1980 and the Land Registration Act 1925, focusing on the effect of concurrent registration of the disputed land in two titles. It emphasised that both parties held registered legal and beneficial title to the disputed land during the relevant period, which meant that possession by the Respondent’s predecessors was lawful and not adverse under the 1980 Act.

The court rejected the notion that the owners of No 29 were dispossessed in July 1988, as the Respondent’s predecessors had registered title, and their possession was not unlawful. Consequently, no right of action to recover possession accrued to the Appellant at that time, and the limitation period for adverse possession did not begin to run.

The court further held that the right to apply for rectification of the land register is distinct from a right of action for recovery of possession and does not trigger limitation periods. Rectification is a procedural remedy to correct errors in registered title, and the determination of who has the better title must logically precede any adverse possession claim.

Regarding the general boundaries rule, the court clarified that the dispute is about title to a specific parcel of land, not about boundary delineation, so the rule did not assist the Respondent.

The court also found that an easement for parking could not be acquired by a registered owner over land they also own, invalidating the Respondent’s alternative claim.

Finally, the court acknowledged that the mistake by the Land Registry could be rectified, and that rectification and indemnification are the proper remedies for concurrent registration errors, not adverse possession.

Holding and Implications

The court ALLOWED THE APPEAL.

The holding establishes that concurrent registration of legal title to the same land precludes adverse possession claims during the period of overlap, as possession by a registered proprietor is lawful and not adverse. The right of action to recover possession does not accrue while the land remains concurrently registered until rectification occurs. Consequently, the limitation period under the 1980 Act does not run against a registered proprietor in such circumstances.

The direct effect is that the Appellant retains the superior title to the disputed land, and the Respondent’s claim to possessory title and easement fails. The court’s decision clarifies the interaction between the Limitation Act and land registration principles, emphasizing the primacy of registered title and the necessity of rectification to resolve concurrent registrations. No new precedent beyond the case’s facts is established, but the ruling underscores the importance of rectification as the mechanism to correct registration errors before adverse possession can be considered.