- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
M, R (on the application of) v Gateshead Council
Factual and Procedural Background
These proceedings concern the duty of local authorities to provide secure accommodation for arrested juveniles under section 38(6) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 ("PACE"). The case arose after a juvenile ("Appellant") was arrested and detained at a police station. The police requested secure accommodation from the local authority ("Council"), which did not have secure units and could not provide such accommodation locally on short notice. The Appellant challenged the Council's failure to provide secure accommodation, alleging a breach of duty under section 21(2)(b) of the Children Act 1989.
The Appellant commenced judicial review proceedings seeking to challenge the Council's failure to provide secure accommodation. Permission was initially refused by the High Court on the grounds of academic interest and lack of real interest, but the Court of Appeal granted permission to proceed, recognizing the public interest in the legal issues raised.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the duty under section 21(2)(b) of the Children Act falls on any local authority that receives a request to provide accommodation for a child, or only on the local authority where the child is within its area at the time of the request.
- Whether there is a duty under section 21(2)(b) on a local authority to provide secure accommodation when requested by a custody officer under section 38(6) of PACE, and if so, the nature and extent of that duty.
- Whether the Council breached its duty in this case by failing to provide secure accommodation for the Appellant.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The local authority owes an absolute duty under section 21(2)(b) to provide secure accommodation when requested by the police under section 38(6) of PACE.
- The duty to provide accommodation should be interpreted as requiring the use of best or reasonable endeavours to provide secure accommodation, especially given the serious consequences of detention in police custody.
- Failure to provide secure accommodation breaches the statutory duty, and the Council’s refusal to provide such accommodation in this case was unlawful.
- Relied on precedent including R v Chief Constable of Cambridgeshire, ex p M [1991] 2 QB 499 to support the principle that detention of juveniles in police custody should be avoided where possible.
- Argued that the statutory scheme supports an interpretation imposing a duty to provide secure accommodation to prevent detention in police cells.
Council's Arguments
- The duty under section 21(2)(b) is an absolute duty to provide accommodation, but this does not extend to an absolute duty to provide secure accommodation.
- Secure accommodation is governed by section 25 of the Children Act, which restricts when secure accommodation can be used and does not impose a separate duty to provide it.
- Local authorities have discretion in the type of accommodation provided, subject to statutory restrictions and practical considerations such as resource availability.
- The Council’s arrangements, including access to secure accommodation outside the local area and cooperation with police, are reasonable and lawful.
- Relied on statutory interpretation principles and case law such as R(K) v Camden and Islington Health Authority [2001] EWCA Civ 240 to argue that duties should not be construed as absolute if impossible to perform.
- Asserted that it is impractical and unreasonable to require local authorities to maintain secure accommodation for rare and urgent requests.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| R v Chief Constable of Cambridgeshire, ex p M [1991] 2 QB 499 | Detention of juveniles in police custody should be avoided if possible; custody officers must do everything practicable to secure accommodation outside police stations. | The court found the observations of Watkins LJ persuasive in interpreting the duty under section 38(6) of PACE, supporting the policy that children should not be detained in police cells unless unavoidable. |
| R(K) v Camden and Islington Health Authority [2001] EWCA Civ 240 | A statutory duty that is impossible to perform due to external factors should not be construed as absolute but as a duty to use reasonable endeavours. | The court considered this principle in rejecting the argument that the local authority's duty to provide secure accommodation should be construed as a duty to use best endeavours, emphasizing the language of the statute. |
| R v Ealing District Health Authority, ex p Fox [1993] 1 WLR 373 | Clarification of the scope of statutory duties and reasonable efforts required. | Referenced in support of the proposition that failure to make practical arrangements constitutes breach of duty. |
| R v Mental Health Review Tribunal, ex p Hall [2000] 1 WLR 1323 | Interpretation of statutory duties concerning provision of services and reasonable efforts. | Used to support the reasoning on the nature of duties imposed on authorities. |
| Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997 | Discretionary statutory powers must be exercised to promote the policy and objects of the statute. | The court applied this principle to the local authority’s discretion to provide secure accommodation when requested, emphasizing the policy objective of avoiding detention in police custody. |
| R(G) v Barnet London Borough Council [2003] UKHL 57 | More specific statutory duties are more likely to be absolute; broader duties afford local authorities discretion. | Used to distinguish the nature of the duty under section 21(2)(b) as absolute in providing accommodation but discretionary in the type of accommodation. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court undertook a detailed statutory interpretation of sections 20, 21, 25 of the Children Act 1989 and section 38(6) of PACE. It noted that other duties under the Children Act are limited to children "within their area," but section 21(2)(b) contains no such limitation, indicating Parliament’s intention that the duty arises upon receipt of a request, regardless of the child’s location.
The court rejected the argument that the duty under section 21(2)(b) imposes an absolute obligation to provide secure accommodation. Instead, it held that the duty is to provide accommodation generally, with discretion as to whether this accommodation is secure, subject to the restrictions in section 25 of the Children Act.
Section 38(6) of PACE requires custody officers to secure that the juvenile is moved to local authority accommodation but allows for certification that secure accommodation is unavailable and that detention in police custody is necessary. This structure indicates Parliament contemplated that secure accommodation might not always be available.
The court emphasized the seriousness of restricting liberty through secure accommodation and the policy that such measures be a last resort. The rarity of requests for secure accommodation and the resource implications for local authorities reinforce the reasonableness of a discretionary approach.
The court found that local authorities must have reasonable systems to respond to requests for secure accommodation but are not under an absolute duty to provide it whenever requested.
Applying these principles to the facts, the court concluded that the Council’s arrangements, including reliance on distant secure units and the practical difficulties of late-night requests, were reasonable and lawful. The Council was not in breach of duty for failing to provide secure accommodation to the Appellant on the night in question.
Holding and Implications
The court DISMISSED the application for judicial review.
The holding clarifies that under section 21(2)(b) of the Children Act 1989, local authorities have an absolute duty to provide accommodation to children when requested by the police under section 38(6) of PACE, but this duty does not extend to an absolute obligation to provide secure accommodation. The provision of secure accommodation remains discretionary and subject to practical considerations, including availability and resource constraints. The decision confirms that local authorities are expected to have reasonable arrangements in place to respond to requests for secure accommodation but are not unlawfully in breach if they cannot meet all such requests, especially urgent ones made late at night.
No new precedent was established beyond confirming the interpretation of the statutory framework and the reasonableness standard applicable to local authorities’ duties in this context.
Alert