Adams, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Justice

Factual and Procedural Background

Three individuals (hereafter “Appellant 1”, “Appellant 2” and “Appellant 3”) were separately convicted of murder in the 1970s and 1990s. All three convictions were later quashed by the Court of Appeal after references from the Criminal Cases Review Commission. No retrial was ordered for Appellant 1; a retrial was also not pursued in the cases of Appellant 2 and Appellant 3. Each applicant then sought statutory compensation from the Secretary of State (“Defendant”) under section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which provides for compensation where a conviction is reversed because a “new or newly discovered fact shows beyond reasonable doubt that there has been a miscarriage of justice.” The Defendant refused compensation. Judicial-review challenges failed at first instance and in the Court of Appeal. The present consolidated appeals to the Supreme Court required the Court to decide what amounts to a “miscarriage of justice” and what counts as a “new or newly discovered fact” for the purpose of section 133.

Legal Issues Presented

1. The correct interpretation of the phrase “miscarriage of justice” in section 133(1): must the applicant prove factual innocence, or is a lesser standard sufficient?
2. The meaning of “new or newly discovered fact”: whether material already disclosed to, or discoverable by, the defence can qualify.
3. Whether the Secretary of State’s refusal of compensation breached Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (presumption of innocence).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

• “Miscarriage of justice” is not confined to cases of demonstrable innocence; it also covers situations where fresh evidence renders the conviction unsafe, including cases where no reasonable jury could convict.
• Facts overlooked by the defence (even if available pre-trial) are “newly discovered” if the convicted person was unaware of them.
• Refusing compensation after the convictions were quashed undermines the presumption of innocence protected by Article 6(2) ECHR.

Defendant’s Arguments

• Section 133 gives effect to Article 14(6) ICCPR and should be read narrowly: only those proven innocent “beyond reasonable doubt” qualify.
• Material in the prosecution’s unused material (or otherwise available to the defence) is not “newly discovered.”
• No violation of Article 6(2) arises; compensation is a distinct, lex-specialis scheme with its own statutory test.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1 – Meaning of “miscarriage of justice.” The Justices divided. A majority (Lord Phillips, Lord Hope, Lady Hale, Lord Kerr & Lord Clarke) rejected the “innocence-only” approach. They held that compensation is payable where a new fact so undermines the prosecution case that no conviction could possibly be based on the remaining evidence. This covers proof of innocence (former Category 1) and cases where the prosecution case collapses (re-labelled Category 2), but not cases where a conviction is merely “unsafe” (Category 3).

2 – Meaning of “new or newly discovered fact.” A fact can be “newly discovered” even if it was technically available before trial, provided it was not appreciated or deployed and its non-disclosure is not attributable to the convicted person. Knowledge by lawyers is not automatically imputed to the client.

3 – Article 6(2) ECHR. Refusal of compensation does not violate the presumption of innocence; section 133 operates as a specialised statutory scheme distinct from criminal liability.

4 – Application to the Individual Appeals.

• Appellant 1: fresh material only showed a possible doubt; evidence not wholly undermined. Majority held no entitlement.
• Appellants 2 & 3: newly exposed prosecution misconduct destroyed the evidential basis for conviction; no reasonable jury could convict. Compensation ordered.

Dissent. Lord Judge, Lord Brown and Lord Rodger (concurring) favoured Lord Steyn’s earlier view: only demonstrably innocent claimants qualify. They would have dismissed all appeals or remitted Appellants 2 & 3 for reconsideration.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court (by majority) ruled that a “miscarriage of justice” under section 133 occurs when a new or newly discovered fact shows beyond reasonable doubt that the evidence against the claimant is so undermined that no conviction could safely be based upon it. Compensation is payable to Appellants 2 and 3 but not to Appellant 1.

Implications:

• Establishes a middle-ground test: compensation is no longer confined to proven innocence but remains narrower than the broader “unsafe” standard.
• Clarifies that disclosure failings by defence lawyers do not automatically bar compensation if the claimant was unaware of the material.
• Secretary of State must assess whether the new fact removes the foundation of the conviction; courts’ judgments guide but do not bind that assessment.
• The ruling limits, but does not eliminate, situations where a factually guilty person might be compensated; equally, some who are probably innocent may still fall outside the scheme.