THE QUEEN v NW

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, a 15-year-old schoolgirl, was involved in an incident on 16th July 2008 in Croydon town centre that escalated from a minor confrontation into a violent disturbance involving two police officers and a crowd of between 40 and 100 people. The incident began when another girl, S, dropped litter and was asked by police officers to pick it up. After S failed to comply, one officer attempted to detain her, prompting the appellant to intervene physically. This led to a scuffle between the appellant and one officer, during which the appellant bit the officer and resisted arrest. The crowd became hostile and some members intervened to prevent the arrest, contributing to violent disorder.

The appellant was charged with violent disorder under section 2 of the Public Order Act 1986 alongside two others. At trial before H.H.J. Waller and a jury, the prosecution argued the officers acted properly and that the appellant’s actions, combined with others, constituted unlawful violence. The defence contended that the appellant acted alone and was not "present together" with others using violence within the meaning of the statute, also raising self-defence. The judge acquitted the co-defendants on a 'No case to answer' submission but rejected the appellant's submission, and the trial proceeded.

The jury convicted the appellant of violent disorder, and she was sentenced to a Community Punishment and Rehabilitation Order. The appellant appealed against conviction by leave of the single judge.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether, to be guilty of violent disorder under section 2 of the Public Order Act 1986, a person must deliberately act in combination with at least two other persons present at the scene;
2. Or whether it is sufficient that three or more persons be present together, each separately using or threatening unlawful violence;
3. Whether the judge erred in rejecting the submission of 'No case to answer' and in directing the jury on the offence.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The phrase "present together" implies a degree of acting together or united by a general purpose or intent, not mere physical proximity.
• The appellant was engaged in a personal struggle with one officer and did not incite or encourage the crowd's actions.
• Some conscious participation or foresight of wider disorder is required to establish guilt under section 2.
• Parliament could not have intended that a person be guilty of violent disorder merely because others independently joined or engaged in violence nearby without the defendant's cooperation.
• Where there are two possible interpretations of "present together," the court should prefer the one more favourable to the appellant.

Crown's Arguments

• No link beyond physical proximity is required between those using or threatening violence; being "present together" means being in the same place at the same time.
• The purpose of section 2 is to suppress public disorder by penalising anyone actively involved in violent conduct in a public setting.
• Any suggestion of requiring common intention adds little beyond physical proximity and is not necessary.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Brutus v Cozens [1973] AC 854	Interpretation of ordinary words and factual determination of presence "together."	The court held that the phrase "present together" is a question of fact to be given its ordinary meaning, supporting the jury’s role in assessing whether persons were present together for the offence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the statutory language of section 2 of the Public Order Act 1986, emphasizing the absence of any requirement for a common purpose among those using or threatening unlawful violence. The court reviewed the legislative history, including the Law Commission's report, which clarified that the offence targets public disorder caused by three or more persons present together, without requiring concerted action.

The court rejected the appellant's argument that "present together" requires some conscious cooperation or foresight of collective disorder. Instead, it concluded that "present together" means merely being in the same place at the same time while using or threatening unlawful violence. The purpose of the offence is to address public disorder that would cause fear to ordinary members of the public.

The court found that the jury was entitled to conclude that the appellant and at least two others were present together using or threatening unlawful violence, fulfilling the statutory requirement. The judge's directions to the jury were correct and consistent with this interpretation. The court therefore upheld the rejection of the 'No case to answer' submission and the correctness of the jury directions.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is DISMISSED.

The court's decision confirms that under section 2 of the Public Order Act 1986, the offence of violent disorder is committed when three or more persons are present together in the same place at the same time using or threatening unlawful violence, without the need for any common purpose or cooperation. This interpretation emphasizes the statute's focus on public disorder and the effect of collective violent conduct on bystanders. The ruling directly upholds the appellant's conviction and does not establish new precedent beyond clarifying the statutory interpretation of "present together."