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Mathieson v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions
Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellant was a severely disabled child who, after more than 84 consecutive days as an in-patient at The Hospital, had his Disability Living Allowance (“DLA”) suspended by the Government Agency on 3 November 2010. The suspension relied on regulations that stop payment of the care and mobility components of DLA once a child has been in hospital free of charge for 84 days.
The Appellant’s father pursued successive challenges to that decision:
- First-tier Tribunal: appeal dismissed (10 January 2012).
- Upper Tribunal: First-tier decision set aside for legal error but appeal again dismissed (15 January 2013).
- Court of Appeal: appeal dismissed (5 February 2014).
- Supreme Court: present appeal.
During the 13-month hospital stay, the parents provided extensive daily care, incurred approximately £8,000 in additional expenses and lost about £7,000 when DLA ceased. Survey evidence from national charities indicated that the vast majority of families in comparable circumstances continue to provide equal or greater care in hospital and face increased costs.
Legal Issues Presented
- Does suspending a child’s DLA after 84 days in hospital breach Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) when read with Article 1 of Protocol 1 (“A1P1”) and/or Article 8?
- Is any difference in treatment justified between (a) severely disabled children hospitalised for more than 84 days and (b) severely disabled children cared for at home?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The suspension amounted to discrimination on the ground of “other status” (a severely disabled child needing lengthy in-patient care), contrary to Article 14 read with A1P1.
- Parental care and related expenses continued unabated in hospital; DLA therefore met ongoing disability-related needs and its removal imposed hardship.
- The Government Agency never assessed the best interests of affected children, breaching international obligations (UNCRC and CRPD) and undermining justification.
- Survey and expert evidence showed the policy adversely affects a significant group, not just exceptional cases.
Government Agency’s Arguments
- The 84-day rule is a rational “bright-line” designed to prevent double provision because in-patient needs are met by the National Health Service.
- Families continued to receive other benefits (child benefit, child tax credit, increased income support) so overall support remained adequate.
- Any affected cohort is a small minority; administrative certainty and cost control justify a uniform rule.
- Article 14 is not engaged because the Appellant lacked a relevant “status,” and in any event the measure falls within the wide margin of appreciation for social-security policy.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Cockburn v Chief Adjudication Officer; Fairey [1997] 1 WLR 799 | Definition of “bodily functions” for DLA care component | Confirmed that the Appellant satisfied the statutory test for highest-rate care component |
| Carson v UK (2010) 51 EHRR 369 | State schemes within A1P1 must be administered without discrimination under Article 14 | Used to show DLA falls within the “ambit” of A1P1 |
| Hode & Abdi v UK (2012) 56 EHRR 960 | Scheme within Article 8 “ambit” attracts Article 14 scrutiny even absent interference | Illustrated the scope principle underpinning Article 14 claim |
| AL (Serbia) v SSHD [2008] UKHL 42 | “Status” under Article 14 often concerns characteristics not chosen by the individual | Supported classifying severe disability plus long hospitalisation as a protected status |
| R (RJM) v SSWP [2008] UKHL 63 | Homelessness recognised as “other status”; concentric-circle analysis of discrimination grounds | Analogous reasoning used to accept the Appellant’s status |
| Sidabras & Dziautas v Lithuania (2004) 42 EHRR 104 | Broad reading of “other status” | Cited as further authority for inclusive approach |
| Stec v UK (2006) 43 EHRR 1017 | Justification test: measure must not be “manifestly without reasonable foundation” in social-security context | Provided the standard against which the 84-day rule was judged |
| Humphreys v HMRC [2012] UKSC 18 | Court should defer to Parliament but still scrutinise discriminatory benefit rules | Guided the level of deference appropriate in examining justification |
| R (Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State [2008] UKHL 15 | Legislation inevitably draws lines; individual “hard cases” do not by themselves invalidate a rule | Referenced when weighing administrative certainty against individual injustice |
| R (Carson) v SSWP [2005] UKHL 37 | Line-drawing in social security acceptable if it reflects majority circumstances | Considered but distinguished due to evidence that majority of affected children remain disadvantaged |
| Clift v UK (App. 7205/07) | Personal characteristic assessed in “all the circumstances” when determining status | Bolstered finding that Appellant possessed a qualifying status |
| AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 | Appellate restraint toward specialist tribunals | Supreme Court nevertheless found Upper Tribunal erred in its legal focus and evidence appraisal |
| Obrey v SSWP [2013] EWCA Civ 1584 | Upheld Upper Tribunal’s justification of 52-week hospital rule for housing benefit | Distinguished because evidence here showed widespread unmet need and increased costs |
| X v Austria (2013) 57 EHRR 405 | International treaties may inform Article 14 analysis | Supported reference to UNCRC and CRPD in assessing justification |
| SG v SSWP [2015] UKSC 16 | International child-rights instruments can illuminate discrimination claims | Cited in rejecting the Government Agency’s contention that such treaties were irrelevant |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court held that payment of DLA clearly falls within the scope of A1P1. Suspension after 84 days therefore required compliance with Article 14.
It accepted the Appellant’s “status” as a severely disabled child needing prolonged in-patient treatment, drawing on domestic and European authority for an expansive reading of “other status.”
On justification, the Court applied the “manifestly without reasonable foundation” threshold but found the Government Agency had not met even that generous standard:
- Empirical evidence (charity surveys and expert letters) demonstrated that 99 % of parents provide the same or more care in hospital and 93 % incur extra costs. The Appellant’s experience was representative, not exceptional.
- The rule’s historical rationale—that hospital care meets all disability-related needs—no longer matched the realities of modern paediatric practice, where parental participation is integral.
- No evaluation had been conducted of disabled children’s best interests as required by international conventions, revealing a procedural and substantive deficit.
- Arguments about overlapping benefits and administrative convenience were unpersuasive; means-tested benefits only maintained subsistence and did not cover the additional expenses triggered by long hospitalisation.
- The Upper Tribunal erred in narrowly focussing on “bodily functions” and in assuming only a “small minority” were adversely affected.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED.
The Supreme Court declared that suspending the Appellant’s DLA violated Article 14 of the ECHR when read with A1P1. The decision of 3 November 2010 was unlawful, and the Appellant was entitled to continued payment of DLA from 6 October 2010 until normal payment resumed.
Implications: although relief was limited to the individual case, the reasoning casts serious doubt on the legality of applying the 84-day suspension rule to similarly situated children. The Government Agency must re-evaluate the regulations or introduce tailored exceptions to avoid future Convention breaches; however, no new binding precedent was formally set beyond this factual matrix.
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