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Power v. Panasonic UK Ltd

United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
Sep 17, 2002
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal against the unanimous Decision of an Employment Tribunal that the Appellant had failed to show that she was disabled within the meaning of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. The Employment Tribunal made this Decision on a preliminary point.

The Appellant had brought proceedings against her former employer, Company A, complaining of unfair dismissal, discrimination contrary to the Disability Discrimination Act, and breach of contract. The complaints principally concern her summary dismissal on 4 November 1998, as well as allegations of detriment contrary to the Disability Discrimination Act.

Following a preliminary hearing before the Employment Appeal Tribunal, two grounds of appeal were permitted to proceed. The first concerns the Employment Tribunal’s approach to whether the Appellant had a disability under the Act, specifically whether depression had a substantial and long-term adverse effect on her ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. The second ground challenges the Tribunal’s conclusion that the Appellant’s phobic anxiety was not a disability within the meaning of the Act.

The Appellant was employed by Company A from 2 January 1991 until 4 November 1998 as an Area Sales Manager. After a reorganisation in 1997, her client base and geographical coverage changed adversely. From early October 1997, the Appellant was signed off sick and was drinking heavily. She remained off work until dismissal. It was undisputed that during this period she suffered from depression and alcohol abuse. Expert psychiatric evidence was adduced by both parties, with disagreement as to which condition preceded the other.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Employment Tribunal erred in law by failing to consider if the Appellant’s depression had a substantial and long-term adverse effect on her ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities, instead focusing improperly on the causal relationship between alcoholism and depression.
  2. Whether the Employment Tribunal’s conclusion that the Appellant’s phobic anxiety was not a disability within the meaning of the Disability Discrimination Act was perverse.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Employment Tribunal erred by prioritising the Disability Discrimination (Meaning of Disability) Regulations 1996 over the statutory Guidance issued under the Act, despite the Guidance directing tribunals not to consider the cause of a disability when determining its existence.
  • The minority member of the Tribunal adopted the correct approach by giving full weight to the Guidance, which requires ignoring the cause of impairment, even if that cause is excluded (e.g., alcohol addiction).
  • The Tribunal incorrectly focused on whether alcoholism caused depression or vice versa, which was irrelevant to the determination of disability under the Act.
  • The Tribunal’s finding that the Appellant’s phobic anxiety was not a disability was perverse, based on inaccuracies such as implying the complaint was raised late and underestimating the long-term nature and impact of panic attacks.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The Appellant was precluded from relying on arguments about the Guidance and Regulations due to concessions made at the Employment Tribunal regarding the material issues.
  • Although some observations in the Tribunal’s Decision may have been erroneous, the overall approach to the evidence was correct and not legally flawed.
  • The Tribunal correctly concluded that there was no evidence that panic attacks had a substantial adverse effect on the Appellant’s ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the statutory framework of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, the Secretary of State’s power to issue Guidance, and the Disability Discrimination (Meaning of Disability) Regulations 1996. It found that both the Guidance and the Regulations were valid and complementary instruments enacted under the Act, with different purposes and enabling powers, and there was no conflict between them.

The court held that the Employment Tribunal erred in focusing on the cause of the Appellant’s impairment, rather than on whether the impairment itself met the statutory definition of disability. Specifically, it was irrelevant whether depression was caused by alcohol addiction or vice versa; the key question was whether the impairment was excluded by the Regulations.

The Tribunal’s identification of the “core issue” as the causal relationship between depression and alcoholism demonstrated a fundamental error of approach, rendering its preliminary decision unsound.

Regarding the phobic anxiety claim, the court acknowledged that while there might be grounds to challenge the Tribunal’s findings on the long-term nature of panic attacks, the conclusion that the panic attacks did not substantially affect the Appellant’s ability to perform normal day-to-day activities was not perverse. This was supported by the absence of direct evidence from the Appellant and the medical evidence before the Tribunal.

Holding and Implications

The court ALLOWED THE APPEAL on the first ground and remitted the case to the Employment Tribunal for rehearing of the preliminary point concerning whether the Appellant had a disability within the meaning of the Disability Discrimination Act at the relevant time.

The case is to be returned to the same Employment Tribunal if practicable, or to another Tribunal as directed by the Regional Chairman.

The decision directly affects the parties by requiring reconsideration of the disability question under the correct legal approach. No new precedent was established beyond clarifying the proper interpretation and application of the Act, Guidance, and Regulations in this context.