- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
A & B (Children) (Surrogacy: Parental orders: time limits)
Factual and Procedural Background
This case concerns an application for parental orders in respect of two children born as a result of gestational surrogacy agreements entered into in the USA in 2006 and 2009. The application was originally for adoption orders under section 46 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (ACA) but was converted to an application for parental orders following a recent precedent allowing such orders to be made outside the statutory six-month time limit.
The Applicants, a married couple, commissioned the surrogacy arrangements in California due to the commissioning mother's inability to carry a pregnancy. The children were born in the USA, where the Applicants were recognized as the legal parents under Californian law. The children have lived with the Applicants in the UK since birth, with their legal status as parents unchallenged by any professionals involved with the children.
The Applicants only became aware that their parental status was not recognized under UK law in 2012 after reading a newspaper article. They initially applied for adoption orders as parental orders were thought to be time-barred. Following a judgment in Re X, allowing parental orders outside the six-month limit in exceptional circumstances, the Applicants sought to amend their application to parental orders.
The respondents, the gestational surrogate and her husband, support the application and have consented to the parental orders. The children are represented by a guardian who supports the application on welfare grounds. There is no dispute between the parties regarding the facts or the order sought.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether parental orders can be made despite the applications being submitted significantly outside the six-month statutory time limit set out in section 54(3) of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (HFEA 2008).
- Whether the payments made in connection with the commercial surrogacy arrangements can be retrospectively authorized under section 54(8) HFEA 2008.
- Whether parental orders or adoption orders better serve the lifelong welfare and identity interests of the children.
Arguments of the Parties
Applicants' Arguments
- The Applicants were unaware of the requirement to apply for parental orders within six months under UK law due to their reliance on Californian legal recognition and advice.
- They acted in good faith, complied with all legal requirements in California, and have been open about the children's origins in the UK.
- The delay in applying for parental orders was innocent and caused by lack of knowledge rather than any deliberate avoidance.
- The payments made to the surrogate and agency were lawful under Californian law and made in good faith, and thus should be retrospectively authorized by the court.
- Parental orders better reflect the children's identity and lifelong welfare than adoption orders, which carry stigma and do not recognize the biological relationship.
Respondents' Position
- The respondents, the surrogate and her husband, consent to the making of parental orders and have supported the Applicants throughout.
- They have no intention to assert parental responsibility and their legal status under UK law is at odds with their intentions and expectations under Californian law.
Guardian's Position
- The guardian supports the application for parental orders as opposed to adoption orders on welfare grounds, emphasizing the children's secure identity and attachment to the Applicants.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Re X [2014] EWHC 3135 (Fam) | Parental order applications can be accepted outside the six-month time limit under s54(3) HFEA 2008 as a discretionary extension; the time limit is a directive, not mandatory. | The court applied the principle that the six-month time limit should not bar applications made late where welfare demands it and no prejudice arises, extending this approach to a significantly longer delay in this case. |
| Re X and Y [2008] EWHC 3030 (Fam) | Framework for authorising payments under s54(8) HFEA 2008; court considers whether payments were disproportionate, made in good faith, and not intended to defraud authorities. | The court found payments lawful, reasonable, and made in good faith, authorizing retrospective approval under s54(8). |
| Re S [2009] EWHC 2977 | Public policy considerations for authorizing payments in surrogacy cases: preventing circumvention of UK childcare laws, avoiding payment for children, and protecting surrogate's free will. | The court considered these policies but found no abuse or public policy breach in the present case. |
| Re L (a minor) [2010] EWHC 3146 (Fam) | Child's welfare is the paramount consideration, outweighing public policy concerns; parental orders should be granted unless there is a clear abuse of public policy. | The court emphasized welfare paramountcy and applied this to allow parental orders despite delay and payments. |
| A v P [2011] EWHC 1738 (Fam) | Endorsed the approach that welfare is the court's paramount consideration in parental order applications. | Supported the court's welfare-focused analysis. |
| Re X (children) [2011] EWHC 3147 (Fam) | Confirmed paramountcy of children's welfare and importance of legal recognition of identity in parental orders. | Reinforced the court's approach to identity and welfare in deciding parental orders. |
| CC v DD [2014] EWHC 1307 (Fam) | Parental orders provide a birth certificate reflecting the child's identity as a child of reproduction, preferable to adoption certificates. | Supported the preference for parental orders to protect children's identity and welfare. |
| JP v LP and others [2014] EWHC 595 (Fam) | Policy for prompt consensual regularisation of parental status post-surrogacy. | Referenced in discussing the purpose of s54(3) but distinguished from the present case due to innocent delay. |
| Adesina v Nursing and Midwifery Council [2013] EWCA Civ 818 | Strict application of statutory deadlines in administrative contexts. | Distinguished for parental orders due to the child's welfare and identity considerations. |
| Marckx v Belgium (1979-80) 3 EHRR 230 | Article 8 ECHR includes the right to adequate legal recognition of family ties. | Supported the court's obligation to respect family life and identity rights under ECHR. |
| Johnston v Ireland (1986) 9 EHRR 203 | Article 8 ECHR protects family life and legal recognition. | Reinforced the court's interpretation of Article 8 rights relevant to the case. |
| Kroon v Netherlands (1995) 19 EHRR 263 | Legal recognition of biological and social family ties under Article 8 ECHR. | Supported the importance of legal recognition of parentage in the court's reasoning. |
| Artico v Italy (1980) 3 EHRR | Interpretation of domestic law must be practical and effective to realize ECHR aims. | Informed the court's approach to interpreting UK law compatibly with Article 8. |
| Wemhoff v Germany (1979-1980) 1 EHRR | Practical and effective interpretation of law under ECHR obligations. | Supported the court's obligation to interpret UK law compatibly with human rights. |
| Odievre v France (2003) 38 EHRR 871 | Article 8 ECHR encompasses the right to an identity. | Emphasized the importance of legal recognition of identity in parental order decisions. |
| Anufrijeva v Southwark London Borough Council [2003] EWCA Civ 1406 | Article 8 infringement where family life is prevented. | Supported the factual existence of family life between Applicants and children. |
| K v UK (1986) 50 DR 199 | Existence of family life is fact-specific based on close personal ties. | Supported the court's finding that the Applicants and children share family life. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by confirming that all statutory conditions for parental orders under section 54 of the HFEA 2008 were met except the time limit in s54(3). The children were born to the surrogate following IVF involving the commissioning father’s sperm and a donor egg. The Applicants are married, domiciled in the UK, and have cared for the children since birth. The surrogate and her husband consented to the orders and have supported the Applicants throughout.
The court acknowledged that the applications were made significantly outside the six-month limit, with delays of over eight and five years respectively. However, following the precedent set in Re X [2014], the court interpreted the six-month limit as a directive rather than an absolute bar, allowing discretion to extend the time limit where the welfare of the child demands it and no prejudice would result.
The court balanced public policy concerns against the paramount welfare of the children. It found no evidence of bad faith or attempts to circumvent UK law by the Applicants, who acted in good faith based on Californian legal advice and recognition. The payments made in the surrogacy arrangements were lawful under Californian law, reasonable, and made in good faith, thus authorizable retrospectively under s54(8).
Welfare considerations were paramount throughout. The court emphasized the importance of the children’s identity as biological and social children of the Applicants, recognizing that parental orders, unlike adoption orders, preserve this identity and confer permanent legal status consistent with their lived reality. The court also considered the European Convention on Human Rights, particularly Article 8, requiring respect for family life and legal recognition of biological and social ties.
The court rejected adoption orders as an inferior alternative, noting that adoption would impose an artificial and stigmatizing status inconsistent with the children’s identity and the legislative intent behind parental orders. Adoption also raises additional public policy complications related to payments and international arrangements.
Ultimately, the court concluded that despite the considerable delay, the welfare of the children and the absence of prejudice or public policy abuse justified granting parental orders. The court applied the discretion recognized in Re X to extend the time limit and authorize the payments retrospectively.
Holding and Implications
The court granted the parental orders sought by the Applicants in respect of both children, notwithstanding the applications being made well beyond the statutory six-month time limit.
This decision confirms that the six-month limit in section 54(3) HFEA 2008 is not an absolute bar and that courts have discretion to extend the time limit in exceptional circumstances where the welfare of the child demands it and no prejudice arises. The ruling reinforces the paramount importance of the child's lifelong welfare and identity in surrogacy cases.
The court also authorized retrospectively the payments made in connection with the commercial surrogacy arrangements, applying established public policy safeguards to ensure good faith and proportionality.
The decision emphasizes that parental orders are the preferred legal mechanism for resolving parentage and identity issues in surrogacy cases, providing a permanent and accurate legal status that adoption orders cannot replicate. No new precedent beyond the application of Re X discretion was established, but the ruling extends its application to significantly longer delays.
Alert