Jukes & Anor v Director of Public Prosecutions

Factual and Procedural Background

On 9 November 2011, participants in a public march protesting against education budget cuts deviated from the designated route to join a separate demonstration by the Occupy Movement in Trafalgar Square. On 17 April 2012, two individuals were convicted by the District Judge at Westminster Magistrates' Court for breaching conditions imposed under section 12 of the Public Order Act 1986, which regulated the route of the march. The conditions had been imposed following meetings between the march organisers—Company A and Company B—and the Metropolitan Police. The designated route started at Mallet Street and ended at London Wall, with a police cordon at Duncannon Street near Trafalgar Square. The cordon was not intended to prevent participants from leaving the march but allowed passage at the discretion of police officers.

Shortly after 1:30 pm, the appellants sought police permission to leave the march route and enter Trafalgar Square. They were initially advised to remain within the march but were allowed through by a police sergeant to avoid disorder. The District Judge found that the appellants had a pre-arranged plan to leave the march and establish a political encampment in Trafalgar Square as part of a protest similar to the anti-capitalist demonstration at St Paul's Cathedral. Upon leaving the route, they joined an existing encampment, which police sought to disperse. The appellants were arrested for breaching the section 12 conditions and subsequently convicted, receiving conditional discharges.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether conditions imposed under section 12 of the Public Order Act 1986 continue to apply to individuals who leave the designated route of a public procession to join a different demonstration.
2. Whether the section 12 notice imposing route conditions was valid.
3. Whether the appellants were guilty of an offence under section 12(5) of the Public Order Act 1986 for breaching the route conditions despite being permitted by police officers to leave the march route.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

• The appellants contended that once they left the designated route with the intention of joining the Trafalgar Square Occupy assembly, the section 12 conditions no longer applied to them and thus they could not be guilty of any offence.
• They argued that the terms of the conditions were vague and inconsistent, particularly the prohibition on marching to certain public places despite a designated route already being specified.
• They claimed that the police leaflet distributed did not clearly indicate that conditions had been imposed, creating doubt about their applicability.
• They raised a challenge regarding proper service of the conditions, though this was not pursued orally.
• They criticized the conduct of the police sergeant who allowed them to leave the march route, suggesting this undermined the validity of their conviction.

Respondent's Arguments

• The prosecution accepted that leaving the public procession to go home would not amount to an offence but maintained that leaving the route while still participating in the procession did constitute a breach.
• They argued that the conditions were validly imposed and clear in their requirements.
• They maintained that the police sergeant had no power to waive the conditions but was entitled to allow participants to leave the procession if they ceased participation.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by examining the statutory framework under the Public Order Act 1986, focusing on section 12, which allows senior police officers to impose conditions on public processions to prevent disorder, damage, disruption, or intimidation. The conditions imposed in this case were specific to the education cuts march and designated a particular route participants were required to follow.

The court emphasized that section 12 conditions apply only to a specific public procession and do not extend to participants of other processions or public assemblies. The Occupy assembly in Trafalgar Square was classified as a public assembly under section 14, to which the section 12 conditions did not apply.

The critical legal question was whether the appellants were still participants in the public procession when they left the designated route and crossed the police cordon. The court agreed with the District Judge's finding that the appellants remained part of the procession at that moment and thus were subject to the conditions. Their deliberate deviation from the route constituted a breach and an offence under section 12(5).

The court rejected the appellants' arguments regarding vagueness and inconsistency of the conditions, finding the conditions clear and valid. The leaflet's disclaimer was noted but did not affect the appellants’ knowledge of the conditions. The alleged improper service was dismissed as irrelevant since the statutory requirement was only to give a written direction.

Regarding the police sergeant's conduct, the court acknowledged that officers must exercise discretion to maintain public order. The sergeant did not waive the conditions but allowed participants to leave the procession if they ceased participation. The appellants’ choice to leave the route while still participating did not negate their liability.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED THE APPEAL, affirming the District Judge's decision that the appellants were guilty of breaching the conditions imposed under section 12 of the Public Order Act 1986.

The decision confirms that conditions imposed on a public procession apply strictly to participants of that procession and that deviation from a designated route while still participating constitutes an offence. The ruling clarifies the distinction between a public procession and a public assembly under the Act, emphasizing that conditions for one do not automatically apply to the other. There are no broader precedential implications beyond affirming the established statutory interpretation and application to the facts of this case.