Rudall v The Crown Prosecution Service & Anor

Factual and Procedural Background

Between approximately 2001 and 2013, the Plaintiff, a solicitor, was investigated by the second Defendant ("the SWP") and prosecuted by the first Defendant ("the CPS") for alleged involvement in money laundering and other criminal offences. A search warrant was executed at the Plaintiff's offices in June 2002. In 2004, the Plaintiff was charged with conspiracy to defraud and perverting the course of justice but was acquitted in May 2005 after a Crown Court trial. Subsequently, the investigation into suspected money laundering resumed, leading to charges in 2010 which were dismissed in 2013 for lack of evidence. The CPS notified the Plaintiff in July 2013 that it would not seek a voluntary bill of indictment.

In April 2014, the Plaintiff issued proceedings alleging that the Defendants engaged in an improper operation designed to prevent him from practising as a solicitor. His claims included misuse of process (regarding the search warrant), malicious prosecution (relating to the 2004 and 2010 charges), misfeasance in public office, and breach of section 6 of the Human Rights Act. The Plaintiff sought damages for loss of earnings and personal injury, including psychological harm.

In September 2015, both Defendants applied to strike out the claims or for summary judgment, asserting that some claims were statute-barred and others lacked legal or factual merit. The court considered whether the Plaintiff's allegations could give rise to a claim in conspiracy to injure and allowed an adjournment for the Plaintiff to seek permission to amend the pleadings accordingly, which was opposed by the Defendants.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Plaintiff's claims regarding the search warrant and prosecutions are statute-barred or otherwise defective.
2. Whether the Plaintiff has an arguable claim for malicious prosecution in respect of the 2010 prosecution.
3. Whether the Plaintiff may amend his pleadings to include claims of conspiracy to injure by unlawful means.
4. The applicability of limitation periods and the possibility of their extension due to concealment or continuing operations.
5. The viability of claims for misfeasance in public office and breach of the Human Rights Act post-dating April 2008.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

• The search warrant was unlawful due to containing untrue statements and improper procedure under section 8 of PACE, particularly because privileged material was seized.
• The Defendants engaged in a continuing operation to prevent him practising, thus postponing limitation periods.
• There was deliberate concealment of documents relevant to limitation and merits of claims.
• The 2010 prosecution lacked reasonable and probable cause and was pursued maliciously, with the Defendants ignoring evidential deficiencies.
• The Plaintiff sought to amend his claim to include conspiracy to injure by unlawful and lawful means.

Defendants' Arguments

• The claims relating to the search warrant and 2004-2005 prosecution are statute-barred and legally defective.
• The search warrant application was properly made under section 8 of PACE, and the seizure of privileged material was lawful or not sufficient to render the search unlawful.
• There was no deliberate concealment of documents; the Plaintiff and his advisers knew where to obtain relevant information.
• The 2010 prosecution was supported by reasonable and probable cause, regularly reviewed at the highest levels, and was not malicious.
• The SWP was not the prosecutor and thus not liable for malicious prosecution, though closely involved.
• The claims for misfeasance in public office and Human Rights breaches add nothing beyond other claims and face limitation issues.
• The Plaintiff’s proposed conspiracy claims lack sufficient basis, particularly for lawful means conspiracy.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Gibbs v Rea [1998] AC 786 HL	Elements of malicious procurement of a search warrant: lack of reasonable or probable cause and malice.	The court found the Plaintiff failed to plead these essential elements, supporting strike out of the claim on limitation and substantive grounds.
Martin v Watson [1996] AC 74	Essential elements of malicious prosecution: lack of reasonable or probable cause and malice.	The court accepted the Plaintiff had pleaded these elements in relation to the 2004-2005 prosecution but found no real prospect of success on the merits.
Swain v Hillman [2001] 1 All ER 91	Standard for summary dismissal: court should not conduct a mini-trial on documents.	Applied to refuse summary dismissal of the 2010 malicious prosecution claim, allowing it to proceed to trial.
Easyair Limited v Opal Telecom Limited [2009] EWHC 339 (Ch)	Similar to Swain v Hillman on summary judgment standards.	Supported the court's approach to allow the claim to proceed despite strong defence arguments.
Ward Limited v Catlin Fire Limited [2009] EWCA Civ 1098	Summary judgment principles and the need to avoid premature disposal where disputes of fact exist.	Reinforced the court's decision not to dismiss the 2010 malicious prosecution claim at this stage.
Clerk & Lindsell on Torts 21st ed.	Legal principles on limitation periods and conspiracy to injure.	Guided the court's conclusion on limitation and allowed amendment to plead conspiracy to injure by unlawful means.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the claims in light of limitation periods, the pleaded facts, and the applicable legal principles. It found that claims relating to the 2002 search warrant and the 2004-2005 prosecution were statute-barred and substantively defective. The Plaintiff failed to plead essential elements of malicious procurement of the search warrant, and limitation barred those claims. The court rejected the Plaintiff's contention of a continuing operation or concealment sufficient to postpone limitation.

Regarding the 2004-2005 prosecution, although the Plaintiff pleaded lack of reasonable or probable cause and malice, the evidence showed reasonable cause existed, and the prosecution was properly conducted, justifying summary disposal against the Plaintiff on limitation and merits.

In contrast, the 2010 prosecution was not statute-barred. The court found an arguable case that the prosecution lacked reasonable and probable cause, given the reliance on incomplete and uncertain evidence (notably exhibit TE/91) and the failure to obtain fresh evidence despite concerns. The prolonged prosecution and internal counsel advices raised legitimate questions of bad faith or malice, warranting trial. The involvement of the SWP alongside the CPS in the prosecution justified their joint tortfeasor status for this claim.

The claims for misfeasance in public office and breach of the Human Rights Act were allowed to proceed only for alleged wrongful conduct occurring after 25 April 2008, due to limitation constraints.

The court permitted the Plaintiff to amend the pleadings to include conspiracy to injure by unlawful means related to the 2010 prosecution, as it was arguable that the Defendants acted in combination with predominant intent to injure. However, claims for conspiracy by lawful means were rejected for lack of basis.

Holding and Implications

The court made the following rulings:

• The Defendants are entitled to summary judgment or strike out of the Plaintiff's claims relating to the 2002 search warrant and the 2004-2005 prosecution on limitation and substantive grounds. DISPOSED OF.
• The Plaintiff's claim for malicious prosecution in relation to the 2010 prosecution has an arguable basis and shall proceed to trial. The Plaintiff may amend the claim to include conspiracy to injure by unlawful means related to this prosecution. PROCEED TO TRIAL.
• The claims for misfeasance in public office and breach of the Human Rights Act may proceed only insofar as they relate to wrongful conduct post-dating 25 April 2008. LIMITED PROCEEDING.

The decision directly affects the parties by narrowing the issues for trial and clarifying limitation defenses, but it does not establish new legal precedent. The court will hear further submissions on consequential orders and directions, including amendments to pleadings.