Myles v Director Of Public Prosecutions

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an appeal by way of case stated from a decision of the Crown Court dated 26th February 2002. The appeal arose from the Appellant’s conviction at a Magistrates Court on 18th June 2001 for two offences under the Road Traffic Act 1988: (i) failing to provide a specimen for a breath test, for which the Appellant was fined and had his licence endorsed, and (ii) failing without reasonable excuse to provide a specimen of blood for analysis, for which the Appellant was fined, ordered to pay costs, disqualified from driving for 12 months, and had his licence endorsed. The appeal against the first conviction was abandoned, and the current appeal concerns the second offence following dismissal by the Crown Court.

The factual findings by the Crown Court were that the Appellant was driving erratically late at night when stopped by police. After failing a roadside breath test and being informed of his legal rights, the Appellant refused to provide a blood specimen when lawfully required to do so by a police officer in the presence of a police surgeon. The Appellant claimed he required further or legal advice, but persisted in refusal despite warnings of prosecution.

The Crown Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Appellant had been properly required to give a blood specimen, understood his rights, and had declined the services of a solicitor. The Court found domestic law clear and binding, and did not find foreign authorities persuasive.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether, in interpreting Article 6(3)(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Crown Court was correct to find that clear, emphatic, and repeated domestic law outweighed persuasive foreign authorities.
2. Whether, on the facts found, the Crown Court was correct to dismiss the appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Appellant relied on section 58 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, arguing that the evidence of the request for a blood sample should be disregarded due to denial of the right to consult a solicitor, constituting a breach of that section.
• The Appellant invoked Article 6(3)(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights, contending that foreign and colonial case law should influence domestic law.
• Regarding delay, the Appellant argued that the excessive delay in the appeal process breached his right to a hearing within a reasonable time under Article 6(1), and sought just satisfaction possibly amounting to “special reasons” to reduce or expunge the mandatory disqualification period.

Respondent's Arguments

• The Respondent maintained that domestic law applied and that the Appellant had been offered and declined the opportunity to consult a solicitor.
• It was argued that allowing delay for further legal advice would contravene established domestic law requiring prompt specimen collection.
• The Respondent did not dispute the breach of Article 6(1) regarding delay but contended that the mandatory disqualification period could not be reduced as it was prescribed by statute and that any just satisfaction should be reflected in the financial penalty only.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
DPP v Billington [1988] 1 WLR 535	Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s.58 does not require delay in taking specimens to allow legal advice.	Confirmed that the police must permit consultation with a solicitor as soon as practicable but are not obliged to delay specimen taking.
Kennedy v CPS [2002] EWHC 2297 (Admin)	Clarified the interaction between ECHR Article 6 and domestic law on legal advice; delay for legal advice must not significantly impede specimen collection.	Supported the view that prompt specimen taking is required and that a general request for legal advice does not justify delay.
Campbell v DPP [2002] EWHC (Admin) 1314	Article 6 does not impose a blanket requirement for legal advice at all stages of detention.	Held that community interests in drink driving suppression justify curtailment of legal advice rights at specimen collection stage.
Kirkup v DPP [2003] EWHC 2354 (Admin)	Followed Kennedy LJ’s approach regarding legal advice and specimen-taking procedures.	Reinforced the established domestic law limiting delay for legal advice.
Whitley v DPP [2003] EWHC 2512 (Admin)	Consistent with Kennedy LJ’s ruling on prompt specimen collection and limited delay for legal advice.	Supported the prevailing domestic legal framework.
Prosper v R, Supreme Court of Canada	Right to counsel under Canadian Charter requires reasonable opportunity to contact duty counsel; police must delay eliciting evidence if detainee is diligent.	Considered but found limited assistance due to differences in jurisdiction and unanimous English authority.
Bartle v R [1994] 118 DLR (4th) 83	Earlier Canadian authority on right to counsel and duty counsel availability.	Referenced in Prosper for principles on diligence and right to counsel.
Minister of Transport v Noort; Police v Curran [1992] 3 NZLR 260	New Zealand Bill of Rights right to consult counsel without delay requires a test of reasonableness and no abuse of right.	Paralleled English approach emphasizing fact-specific reasonableness and no fixed rules for delay.
R v Wickens [1958] 42 Cr. App. R 236	Definition of "special reasons" for mitigating mandatory disqualification in drink driving cases.	Held that special reasons must be connected to the offence and not personal hardship.
R v Anderson [1972] RTR 113	Events after the offence may constitute special reasons in exceptional circumstances.	Referenced regarding the scope of special reasons in sentencing.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed the interplay between the statutory framework under the Road Traffic Act 1988 and the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 with the rights under Article 6(3)(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights. It affirmed that domestic law clearly requires prompt specimen collection without undue delay for legal advice, as supported by a consistent line of English authorities. The Court found that while the right to legal advice is engaged, it does not mandate delay beyond what is practicable, especially given the public interest in effective drink driving enforcement.

Foreign authorities from Canada and New Zealand, although addressing similar rights, were found to offer limited assistance due to jurisdictional differences and the unanimity of English case law. The Court rejected the Appellant’s contention that a fixed short delay (such as 15 minutes) should be allowed for obtaining legal advice, emphasizing the necessity of avoiding significant delay in specimen collection.

Regarding the delay in the appeal process itself, the Court acknowledged a substantial delay outside the Appellant’s control, which breached the right to a hearing within a reasonable time under Article 6(1). However, it held that this delay did not constitute “special reasons” connected to the offence to justify reducing or removing the mandatory disqualification period. The Court distinguished hardship caused by delay from mitigating circumstances related to the offence.

Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal only to the extent of quashing the financial penalty imposed, leaving the conviction, costs order, and disqualification intact.

Holding and Implications

The Court’s final decision was to ALLOW THE APPEAL IN PART, specifically to quash the financial penalty imposed on the Appellant. The convictions and disqualification from driving for 12 months were upheld.

The direct effect is that while the Appellant’s financial penalty was removed due to excessive delay in the appeal process violating Article 6(1), the mandatory disqualification and conviction remain unaffected. The Court declined to expand the concept of “special reasons” in sentencing to include delays unrelated to the offence itself, thereby maintaining the statutory sentencing regime. No new precedent altering the established legal framework was set by this decision.