Duff v The Director of Public Prosecutions

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an appeal by way of case stated against a decision of a Recorder and justices sitting at the Crown Court, who dismissed an appeal against a conviction imposed by justices at a Magistrates' Court for an offence of failing to provide information contrary to section 172(3) of the Road Traffic Act 1988.

The appellant was convicted following an incident where a vehicle was recorded exceeding the speed limit. The registered keeper of the vehicle was the appellant's spouse. Notices requesting information under section 172 of the 1988 Act were sent first to the spouse and then to the appellant. The appellant completed and returned the form addressed to the spouse but did not respond to the subsequent notice addressed directly to him after seeking legal advice.

The appellant was summoned for failing to furnish information, convicted at the Magistrates' Court, and appealed to the Crown Court, where he gave uncontradicted evidence explaining his actions. The appeal was dismissed, and the case was then brought before the court on appeal by way of case stated.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether there was sufficient evidence to convict the appellant of failing to furnish information identifying the driver of the vehicle contrary to section 172(3) of the Road Traffic Act 1988.
2. Whether the dates on the information summons were erroneous and if so, whether that error was a material averment that failed to disclose a criminal offence.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• By completing and signing the form sent to his spouse, the appellant argued he had provided the requisite information, making a second request to him unnecessary.
• The instructions on the section 172(2)(a) form addressed to the spouse should not have been elevated to matters of law by the Crown Court.
• The appellant contended that the court's finding that his signed response to the spouse's notice was inadequate as a confession was Wednesbury unreasonable.
• It was argued that the charge under section 172(3) was manifestly wrong and that the proper charge should have been for speeding.
• The appellant cited case law to argue that the time limit for response began the day after service, making the dates on the summons defective and fatal to the prosecution.
• Overall, the appellant claimed the defect in the information summons was a substantial technical issue requiring strict compliance.

Respondent's Arguments

• The respondent submitted that the case was straightforward and the conviction and refusal of the appeal were plainly correct.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Lee v Wiltshire Chief Constable [1979] RTR 349	Power to decide a case on appeal without amendment if magistrates could have done so under section 123 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980.	Used to confirm the court's power to decide the case despite a minor defect in the dates on the summons.
R v Swansea Crown Court ex parte Stacey [1990] RTR 183	Similar principle as Lee v Wiltshire regarding materiality of errors in summons dates.	Supported the court's conclusion that the defect in dates was not material and did not prejudice the appellant.
University of Cambridge v Murray [1993] ICR 460	Interpretation of time periods "beginning with the day on which notice was served."	Referenced regarding correct calculation of the 28-day period for response under section 172(7)(a) of the 1988 Act.
Jones v DPP [2004] EWHC 236	Compliance with section 172(2)(a) notice by providing information in writing.	Distinguished from the present case as it involved an owner responding to a notice addressed to them, unlike the appellant's case.
Hatton v Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall [2008] EWHC 209 (Admin)	Acceptance of written admission by the driver under section 12 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988.	Referenced to illustrate circumstances where a signed admission suffices, which the court found different from the appellant's response.
Hare v Gocher [1962] 2 QB 641	Interpretation of time periods beginning "with the commencement" of a statute.	Applied analogously to confirm the correct calculation of the 28-day period under section 172(7)(a).
Dodds v Walker [1981] 1 WLR 1027	Common law rule on time limits starting the day after the specified event.	Cited by appellant but rejected by the court as inapplicable to the statutory wording in this case.
Lester v Garland	Common law principle on time limits.	Referenced but held not to apply to the statutory time period interpretation in this case.
R v Clarke and McDaid [2008] UKHL 8	Strict compliance with technical requirements in criminal procedure.	Cited by appellant to support argument on importance of strict compliance, but court did not find it persuasive here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed whether the appellant had complied with the statutory requirement to provide information under section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. It held that the request addressed to the appellant's spouse did not constitute valid service to the appellant himself, and thus did not discharge the appellant's obligation to respond to the notice addressed directly to him.

The appellant's failure to respond to the notice served on him was a clear failure under section 172(3), and his admission of non-compliance confirmed guilt.

Regarding the dates on the summons, the court applied the Criminal Procedure Rules to deem the notice served on the second business day after posting, starting the response period on 9 June 2006. The 28-day statutory period therefore ended on 6 July 2006, the date specified in the summons. The court found no material defect or prejudice from the dates stated.

The court considered relevant case law, including Lee v Wiltshire and R v Swansea Crown Court ex parte Stacey, to confirm that minor errors in the summons dates do not invalidate the offence if no prejudice results.

Finally, the court rejected the appellant's reliance on common law rules relating to time periods, holding that the statutory wording and applicable procedural rules governed the calculation of the response period.

Holding and Implications

The court answered the questions posed in the case stated as follows: the evidence was sufficient to convict the appellant of failing to furnish information under section 172(3) of the Road Traffic Act 1988, and the dates on the summons were not erroneous in a manner that invalidated the offence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The direct effect of this decision is to uphold the appellant's conviction and sentence. The court did not establish any new precedent but reaffirmed the application of existing statutory interpretation principles and procedural rules concerning service of notices and calculation of time periods under the Road Traffic Act 1988.