Brooks, R (On the Application Of) v The London Borough of Islington

Factual and Procedural Background

This claim concerns a judicial review of a decision by the Defendant, a London Borough, regarding its duty under section 188 of the Housing Act 1996 ("the Act") to secure accommodation for the Plaintiff, who had been refused an offer of a three-bedroomed house at a specified address. The Plaintiff had applied for assistance under the homelessness provisions of the Act after being evicted from her previous tenancy. The Defendant initially provided temporary hotel accommodation and later offered the three-bedroomed house, which the Plaintiff refused on grounds of location and suitability for her son’s medical needs. The Defendant then declined to make further accommodation offers and formally notified the Plaintiff that its duty under section 188 was discharged. The Plaintiff sought interim relief, which was granted by a duty judge requiring the Defendant to secure accommodation pending the judicial review. Permission for judicial review was granted on two grounds: whether the Defendant erred in law by treating its duty under section 188 as ended upon refusal of suitable accommodation, and alternatively, whether the Defendant lawfully ended the duty without allowing the Plaintiff time to reconsider the refusal. The Defendant subsequently notified the Plaintiff of its decision that it did not owe a full duty under section 193 of the Act due to intentional homelessness, ending the interim relief.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Defendant made an error of law in its decision that the duty under section 188 of the Act ended when the Plaintiff refused an offer of suitable accommodation.
2. Whether the Defendant lawfully ended its duty under section 188 without giving the Plaintiff an opportunity to reconsider her refusal or resolve the disagreement over suitability.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The duty under section 188 continues until the Defendant notifies the applicant of its decision on whether any duty is owed under the Act.
• The Defendant was obliged either to hold open the offer of accommodation or provide alternative accommodation until the duty ceased by notification.
• The Defendant acted unlawfully by deciding on 15 April 2015 that it no longer owed a duty under section 188 merely because the Plaintiff refused the offer.

Respondent's Arguments

• The duty to secure accommodation under section 188 is performed by securing the availability of suitable accommodation once.
• If the applicant refuses the offer, the authority is not in breach and is not required to make further offers.
• This interpretation aligns with the statutory language and practical realities faced by housing authorities.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p. Salem [1999] 1 AC 450	Discretion to hear public law claims that are academic between parties if there is public interest.	The court exercised discretion to hear the principal statutory construction issue despite no live dispute.
R v City of Westminster ex p. Chambers (1982) 6 H.L.R. 28	A housing authority performs its duty by making a reasonable offer of suitable accommodation; refusal does not extend duty.	Supported interpretation that performance of duty is distinct from its existence; refusal does not require further steps.
R v Wycombe District Council v Hazeltine (1993) 25 H.L.R. 313	One reasonable offer of accommodation suffices to discharge statutory duty under predecessor legislation.	Reinforced the principle that a single suitable offer discharges the duty unless circumstances change.
R v Westminster City Council ex p. Chambers (1982) 6 H.L.R. 24	See above Chambers case (same principle).	Referenced in support of duty performance by a single suitable offer.
R v Ealing London Borough Council ex p. McBain [1985] 1 W.L.R. 1351	Similar principle regarding discharge of housing duty by suitable offer.	Referenced as supporting authority for the approach to duty performance.
R v Kensington and Chelsea R.L.B.C. ex p. Kutjim (1999) 32 H.L.R. 579	Interpretation of duty under section 21 of the National Assistance Act 1948.	Court found these decisions did not assist interpretation of section 188 of the Housing Act 1996.
Khana v Southwark London Borough Council [2002] HLR 31	Interpretation of duty under section 21 of the National Assistance Act 1948.	Similarly, these decisions were not found helpful for interpreting section 188.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court distinguished between the existence of the duty under section 188 and the performance of that duty. The duty arises when the authority has reason to believe the applicant is homeless, eligible, and in priority need, and continues until the authority notifies the applicant of its decision under the Act. Performance of the duty is achieved by securing suitable accommodation, either directly or through another provider, intended to be available until notification.

If the applicant refuses the offer, the authority is not obliged to take further steps unless there is a material change of circumstances rendering the accommodation unsuitable. The court drew on precedents relating to the full duty under section 193 and its predecessors, which established that a single reasonable offer of suitable accommodation discharges the duty.

The court rejected the argument that refusal of an offer under section 188 cannot end the duty, clarifying that refusal affects performance but not the existence of the duty, which only ends upon notification. The court emphasized the practical realities of scarce accommodation resources and public funds, concluding that the interpretation requiring authorities to hold offers open or provide alternatives until notification would be inefficient and contrary to legislative intent.

The court also declined to rely on precedents from the National Assistance Act 1948, finding them inapplicable to the statutory framework of the Housing Act 1996.

In the present case, the Defendant had performed its duty by securing the offer of suitable accommodation. The Plaintiff’s refusal did not oblige the Defendant to provide further accommodation pending notification. The death of the Plaintiff’s son meant no material change of circumstances arose to revisit suitability.

Holding and Implications

The court held that the duty under section 188 of the Housing Act 1996 continues to exist until the housing authority notifies the applicant of its decision regarding whether a duty is owed under Part VII of the Act. However, the authority will have performed its duty if it has secured an offer of suitable accommodation intended to be available until such notification, subject to any material change making the accommodation unsuitable.

The duty under section 188 is discharged by a single offer of suitable accommodation; refusal by the applicant does not require the authority to take further steps.

The direct effect of this decision is that housing authorities are not required to hold accommodation offers open or provide alternative accommodation after a refusal, thereby allowing efficient management of scarce housing resources. No new precedent was set beyond the statutory interpretation of section 188, and the decision clarifies the distinction between the existence and performance of the interim duty to accommodate.