Press & Anor v REGINA

Factual and Procedural Background

An appeal was brought against the convictions of two appellants who faced an indictment containing three counts related to grievous bodily harm under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. The appellants, soldiers stationed at Bickley Barracks, Plymouth, were charged with causing grievous bodily harm with intent to two complainants, also military personnel, following an incident at a burger vendor stall in Plymouth. The incident involved a violent attack captured on CCTV, resulting in serious injuries to one complainant, including permanent blindness in one eye.

One appellant pleaded guilty to one count before trial, while both were convicted on count 1 and one appellant was convicted on count 3 after trial at Plymouth Crown Court. Sentences were imposed concurrently, ranging from four to eight years imprisonment. The appellants were granted leave to appeal on various grounds including alleged misdirections by the trial judge, issues relating to joint enterprise, and the handling of evidence concerning post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the trial judge erred in giving a qualified good character direction that undermined the credibility of one appellant and affected the safety of the verdict.
2. Whether the trial judge misdirected the jury on the issue of lies in interview and on the facts.
3. Whether the trial judge failed to properly direct the jury on the effect of intoxication and PTSD on the issue of intent.
4. Whether the trial judge gave a confused direction regarding joint enterprise, particularly in response to a jury note about the timing of intent.
5. Whether there was judicial bias or improper reference to factual material not in evidence.
6. The relevance and adequacy of expert psychiatric evidence on PTSD in relation to self-defence and intent.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant Thompson's Arguments

• The Recorder misdirected the jury regarding Thompson’s alleged lies during police interview, including the failure to identify his companion.
• The judge inaccurately summarized certain factual evidence and interview procedures.
• The qualified good character direction given was improper and unfair.
• Judicial bias was alleged based on the judge’s questioning of the expert witness and reference to material not in evidence.
• The direction on joint enterprise was inadequate and confusing.
• The jury was not properly directed on the impact of intoxication and PTSD on intent and self-defence.

Appellant Press's Arguments

• The qualified good character direction given in Thompson's case unfairly undermined Press's case due to the lack of conflict between their accounts.
• The jury may have been misled by the judge’s direction on joint enterprise, potentially convicting Press on an unsupported basis.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Grundy and others [1989] 89 Cr App R 333	Explanation of joint enterprise and liability for acts of co-defendants.	The court confirmed the accuracy of the trial judge’s directions on joint enterprise as applied to the facts.
Keane and McGrath [2010] EWCA Crim 2514	Clarification of the legal framework for self-defence under section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008.	The court applied the principles regarding subjective belief and reasonableness of force in self-defence, emphasizing jury’s role in assessing reasonableness.
B [2013] EWCA Crim 3	Limits on reliance upon deluded beliefs in criminal defences.	The court distinguished deluded beliefs from genuine but mistaken beliefs, affirming the approach to assessing reasonableness of force in self-defence.
Martin [2001] EWCA Crim 2245; [2003] QB 1	Consideration of psychiatric conditions in assessing reasonableness of force in self-defence.	The court emphasized that psychiatric conditions are generally not probative except in exceptional circumstances when assessing reasonableness.
Canns [2005] EWCA Crim 2264	Further consideration of psychiatric evidence in self-defence cases.	Supported the principle that deluded understanding due to psychiatric conditions is excluded from reasonableness assessment.
Seun Oye [2013] EWCA Crim 1725	Application of Martin and Canns principles concerning deluded beliefs and self-defence.	Confirmed that an insane delusion as to threat is excluded from consideration in assessing reasonableness of force.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court systematically addressed each ground of appeal by applying established legal principles to the facts of the case. It found that the qualified good character direction, though imperfectly structured, did not result in unfairness and was properly understood by the jury as supporting credibility but not providing a defence.

Regarding alleged misdirection on lies in interview, the court held that the judge’s direction was appropriate and that the appellant was not disadvantaged by the inclusion of certain alleged lies not specifically relied upon by the prosecution. Minor factual inaccuracies in the summing up were deemed inconsequential and not raised at trial.

The court rejected claims of judicial bias, finding that the trial judge’s questioning of the expert psychiatric witness was a legitimate attempt to clarify the scope and limits of the expert’s opinion for the jury’s benefit.

On joint enterprise, the court upheld the judge’s directions, concluding that the jury was properly instructed that intent must be present from the outset for joint enterprise liability, and that later acquired intent could not support joint enterprise. The jury’s verdicts indicated acceptance of joint enterprise as proved.

In relation to intoxication and intent, the court found the judge’s directions adequate, emphasizing that intent formed in drink remains intent and intoxication does not constitute a defence.

The court gave detailed consideration to the expert evidence on PTSD and its relevance to self-defence and intent. It applied the statutory framework under section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 and relevant case law, concluding that PTSD evidence was relevant to whether the appellant genuinely believed he was under threat and to the reasonableness of his response, but that the ultimate assessment of proportionality was objective and for the jury. The judge correctly directed the jury on these issues and no misdirection occurred.

The court also rejected the argument that a specific direction on the impact of PTSD on intent was required, finding that the jury was sufficiently informed by the evidence and summing up.

Finally, the court found no unfairness to the co-appellant arising from the qualified good character direction given to Thompson and dismissed the related appeal ground.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the appeals of both appellants, concluding that the jury’s verdicts were safe and that no miscarriage of justice occurred.

The direct effect of this decision is the affirmation of the convictions and sentences imposed at trial. No new legal precedent was established, and the decision primarily reinforces existing principles regarding joint enterprise, good character directions, the handling of expert psychiatric evidence, and the assessment of self-defence and intent in the context of intoxication and PTSD.