Saeed v Plustrade Ltd

Factual and Procedural Background

The Defendant, as lessor, appealed an order made by a Deputy High Court Judge concerning the rights of the Plaintiff, the lessee of a long lease for Flat No. 68 in a mansion block known as William Court, located in London. The dispute arose over the Plaintiff's right to park a private motor car on a forecourt area of the premises that had previously been specified by the lessor as reserved for parking.

William Court was built in the 1930s and comprised numerous flats above a commercial garage. Between 1976 and 1987, the freeholder granted 18 long leases, including the Plaintiff’s lease, which contained rights of parking on parts of the lessor’s retained property as specified from time to time by the lessor. The Plaintiff took assignment of the lease in 1985.

Over time, the freehold changed hands and the Defendants acquired the leasehold interest and control over the forecourt. The Defendants undertook refurbishment works starting in 1996, which temporarily prevented parking on the forecourt and resulted in a reduction of parking spaces. From May 1997 to August 2000, the Defendants prevented the Plaintiff from parking on the forecourt. From August 2000, the Defendants reduced the parking area to four marked spaces, one designated for disabled use, and introduced an annual permit system for those spaces.

The Plaintiff commenced proceedings in October 1999 seeking an order permitting her to park on the forecourt and claiming damages for the interference with her parking rights.

The Deputy Judge ruled in favor of the Plaintiff, declaring she had a right to park on the forecourt as specified by the lessor, that the Defendants’ reduction of parking spaces and exclusion of the Plaintiff from the forecourt constituted substantial interference with that right, and awarded damages accordingly. The Defendants appealed this order.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Defendants infringed the Plaintiff’s legal rights by preventing her from parking on the specified forecourt area between May 1997 and 1st August 2000.
2. Whether the Defendants infringed the Plaintiff’s legal rights by reducing the parking area from 1st August 2000.
3. If infringement occurred, what is the proper award of damages to the Plaintiff.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The right to park granted by the lease was subject to the lessor’s discretion to specify the parking area "from time to time," allowing the lessor to vary or withdraw the parking area entirely.
• The lease did not oblige the lessor to specify any parking spaces; the lessor could decide not to designate any parking area.
• The lessor’s right to erect new buildings on adjoining or adjacent property included the ability to build on previously designated parking areas, thus potentially extinguishing parking rights.
• The definition of "Retained Property" indicated that the parking area was not fixed and could be altered by subsequent events.
• The Defendants contended that statutory tenants had a right to park on the forecourt, which the Deputy Judge’s finding to the contrary was challenged.
• It was submitted that the reduction of parking spaces did not amount to substantial interference, especially given the offer of four spaces and the changing circumstances of tenancy and competition for parking.
• The Defendants argued the Plaintiff failed to mitigate loss by using publicly available parking spaces.
• The Defendants contended the 10% discount on rental value for competition was too low.

Appellee's Arguments

• The Plaintiff asserted a right to park on the forecourt as granted by paragraph 7 of the Second Schedule of the Lease, which could not be extinguished at the lessor’s whim.
• The Defendants’ actions from May 1997 to August 2000 constituted a total deprivation of her parking rights, and the reduction of parking spaces thereafter represented a substantial interference.
• The right to park was either an easement or a contractual right binding on the Defendants as an overriding interest.
• The Defendants’ interpretation of the lease was rejected as a derogation from grant, a principle that prohibits a grantor from frustrating the benefit conferred by a grant.
• The Plaintiff challenged the claim that statutory tenants had parking rights, with the Deputy Judge rejecting that contention.
• The Plaintiff argued that the relevant date for assessing substantial interference was the date of interference, not the date when the lease was assigned.
• The Plaintiff disputed the Defendants’ mitigation argument relating to alternative parking.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
London and Blenheim Estates Ltd v Ladbrook Retail Parks Ltd [1994] 1 WLR 31	Establishment that a right to park can constitute an easement, provided it does not amount to exclusive possession of the servient land.	The court preferred to leave open whether parking rights were easements but affirmed that the Plaintiff's rights bound the Defendants regardless of classification.
Johnston & Sons Ltd v Holland [1998] 1 EGLR 264	Doctrine of derogation from grant: a grantor must not substantially deprive the grantee of the benefit granted.	The court applied this principle to reject the Defendants’ claim that they could extinguish parking rights at will.
Harmer v Jumbil (Nigeria) Tin Areas Ltd [1921] 1 Ch 200	Explanation of the doctrine of derogation from grant as a rule of common honesty and fair dealing.	Quoted to support the principle that a grantor cannot take away the benefit granted.
Birmingham, Dudley & District Banking Co v Ross	Illustration of the principle that a grantor cannot frustrate the purpose of a grant.	Used to underline the application of derogation from grant in leasehold contexts.
British Leyland Motor Corporation Ltd v Armstrong Patents Co Ltd [1986] AC 577	Application of the derogation from grant principle to the sale of goods.	Referenced to demonstrate the broad application of the principle beyond land law.
Molton Builders Ltd v City of Westminster (1975) 30 P&CR 182	Derogation from grant as an independent rule of law restricting substantial deprivation of granted benefits.	Used to affirm that a grantor must not substantially deprive a grantee of a conferred benefit.
William Hill (Southern) Ltd v Cabras Ltd (1986) 54 P&CR 42	The court will not construe a lease so as to take away rights expressly granted in dispositive provisions.	Applied to reject the Defendants’ construction that would nullify the Plaintiff’s parking rights.
Petty v Parsons [1914] 2 Ch 653	Interference with an easement must be substantial and unjustified to be actionable.	Used to establish the test for substantial interference with rights.
Overcom Properties v Stockleigh Hall Residents Management Ltd (1988) 58 P&CR 1	Confirmation of the requirement that interference with easement rights must be substantial and unjustified.	Supported the court’s analysis of substantial interference in the present case.
Snell & Prideaux Ltd v Dutton Mirrors Ltd (1995) 1 EGLR 259	Interpreting rights granted under tenancy agreements relating to use of property.	The court rejected the Defendants’ reliance on this case to support a broad parking right for statutory tenants.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by recognizing the legal uncertainty as to whether parking rights can constitute easements but resolved that it was unnecessary to decide this issue definitively. It accepted that the Plaintiff’s rights, whether easements or contractual, bound the Defendants as overriding interests under land registration law.

The court analyzed the lease’s language, particularly paragraph 7 of the Second Schedule, which granted the right to park on parts of the retained property "as may from time to time be specified" by the lessor. While this wording allowed the lessor to vary the specified parking area, the court rejected the Defendants’ argument that this included the right to extinguish the parking rights altogether.

The court emphasized the principle of derogation from grant, which prohibits a grantor from substantially depriving a grantee of a benefit conferred by a grant. The Defendants’ complete denial of parking rights between May 1997 and August 2000 was held to constitute a clear derogation from the grant and a substantial interference with the Plaintiff’s rights.

Regarding the reduction of parking spaces from August 2000, the court applied established principles that interference with easement rights must be substantial and unjustified to be actionable. The court found the reduction from approximately 12 spaces to 4 spaces, shared among 13 lessees, to be a substantial interference.

The court considered and rejected the Defendants’ arguments concerning the rights of statutory tenants to park, concluding that no such rights existed to affect the Plaintiff’s claim.

In assessing damages, the court accepted the Deputy Judge’s approach, which valued the loss based on rental value discounted for competition, rejecting arguments that the Plaintiff had mitigated her loss or that the discount was too low.

In sum, the court affirmed the Deputy Judge’s findings that the Defendants infringed the Plaintiff’s parking rights by both excluding her parking for the specified period and by substantially reducing the parking area thereafter.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED THE APPEAL, affirming the Deputy Judge’s order that the Plaintiff has a right to park on the forecourt area as specified by the lessor and that the Defendants unlawfully interfered with this right.

The Defendants were restrained from disposing of further parking spaces or implementing the reduced parking scheme without further court order and were ordered to pay damages for the period during which the Plaintiff was excluded from parking.

The decision clarified that a lessor’s power to vary a specified parking area under a lease does not extend to extinguishing parking rights altogether without express provision. The ruling affirmed the application of the doctrine of derogation from grant in protecting lessees’ rights under leases. No new precedent was established beyond the affirmation of existing principles, and the ruling primarily affects the parties by upholding the Plaintiff’s parking rights and awarding damages accordingly.