Thompson & Anor v REGINA

Factual and Procedural Background

This judgment concerns an application brought by the Crown for leave to appeal a Crown Court judge's ruling dismissing a charge and quashing a count in an indictment pursuant to paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. The application was made under section 58 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which grants the Crown a general right of appeal concerning so-called "terminating rulings." The initial issue was whether section 58 confers jurisdiction to appeal such a dismissal.

The case originated from charges brought by the Revenue and Customs Prosecution Office (RCPO) against two individuals, referred to here as the respondents. Count 1 charged both respondents with conspiracy to cheat the Revenue related to property transactions involving a Guernsey-based company allegedly centrally managed and controlled in the UK by the respondents. The matter proceeded to the Crown Court for trial.

Before arraignment, the respondents applied under paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 to dismiss count 1 for insufficiency of evidence. The Crown Court judge granted this application, dismissing the charge and quashing the count. The Crown sought leave to appeal this dismissal under section 58 of the 2003 Act, which was refused by the Crown Court judge, leading to the present application to this court for leave to appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether section 58 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 confers jurisdiction to appeal a dismissal of a charge under paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.
2. Whether a dismissal under Schedule 3, which occurs pre-arraignment and results in the quashing of a count but not an acquittal, falls within the scope of "terminating rulings" subject to appeal under section 58.
3. The interpretation and interaction of the statutory provisions governing dismissal procedures, appeal rights, and the concept of acquittal in this context.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (RCPO) Arguments

• Section 58's language is broad and includes any "ruling" related to a trial on indictment at any applicable time, including pre-arraignment dismissals under Schedule 3.
• The dismissal under paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 is a "terminating ruling," which the Crown should be able to appeal to avoid the collapse of the prosecution case without remedy.
• Precedent decisions (Snelgrove and O) support that such dismissals are rulings "in relation to a trial on indictment," and the new appeal right under section 58 should apply.
• The existing remedy of a voluntary bill of indictment is cumbersome, and the section 58 appeal process offers a more efficient and clear mechanism to challenge dismissals.
• The absence of explicit exclusion of Schedule 3 dismissals from section 58, combined with the broad statutory definitions, supports the Crown's right of appeal.

Respondents' Arguments

• Schedule 3 dismissals occur pre-arraignment and do not amount to an acquittal, a necessary condition for an appeal under section 58.
• The statutory scheme contemplates that where a charge is dismissed under Schedule 3, the only remedy for the Crown is a voluntary bill of indictment, not an appeal under section 58.
• The Crown Prosecution Service’s literature and parliamentary materials do not list Schedule 3 dismissals as examples of "terminating rulings" subject to section 58 appeals.
• Allowing appeals under section 58 in this context would effectively amend Schedule 3's provisions silently and undermine the intended procedural framework.
• The statutory provisions regarding acquittal and appeal rights (sections 58(8), 58(12), and 61(3)) confirm that appeals are intended only where acquittal is possible, which is not the case with Schedule 3 dismissals.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Regina (Snelgrove) v. Crown Court at Woolwich [2004] EWHC 2172 (Admin), [2005] 1 WLR 3223	Held that pre-arraignment applications to dismiss charges under Schedule 3 are "matters in relation to trial on indictment" and thus excluded from judicial review jurisdiction.	The court considered Snelgrove determinative of the scope of the exclusion from judicial review but distinguished it from the interpretation of section 58 appeal rights, ultimately not extending section 58 jurisdiction to Schedule 3 dismissals.
O v. Central Criminal Court [2006] EWHC 256 (Admin)	Applied Snelgrove in the context of right of appeal provisions under the 2003 Act and rejected arguments for judicial review of dismissal applications under Schedule 3.	The court noted O’s reasoning but emphasized that it did not address the specific question of section 58 appeal jurisdiction, which was central to the present case.
R (Salubi) v Bow Street Magistrates' Court [2002] 1 WLR 3073	Parliament’s intention to speed criminal justice by enabling early dismissal of insufficient evidence charges under Schedule 3.	Used to support the purposive interpretation that the dismissal procedure is designed to avoid delay and that judicial review or appeals might undermine this purpose.
R (on the application of Westminster City Council) v. National Asylum Support Service [2002] UKHL 38, [2002] 1 WLR 2956	Discussed the status and use of explanatory notes in statutory interpretation.	The court expressed caution in relying on explanatory notes to override clear statutory language, limiting their weight in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by acknowledging the broad language of section 58 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which grants the Crown a right of appeal against "rulings" related to a trial on indictment at any applicable time, including pre-trial. The court recognized that prior decisions (Snelgrove and O) established that dismissals under paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 are rulings "in relation to a trial on indictment" for the purposes of judicial review exclusion.

However, the court carefully distinguished the judicial review context from the statutory right of appeal created by section 58. The court emphasized that a dismissal under Schedule 3 occurs before arraignment, results in dismissal of the charge and quashing of the indictment count, but critically does not amount to an acquittal. Since section 58's appeal mechanism presupposes the possibility of acquittal (as reflected in sections 58(8), 58(12), and 61(3)), the court found this to be a fundamental limitation on the scope of appeals under that section.

The court also considered the statutory scheme in Schedule 3, which explicitly provides that no further proceedings may be brought on a dismissed charge except by way of a voluntary bill of indictment. The court rejected the argument that the new appeal right under section 58 implicitly amended this provision, emphasizing the absence of any express amendment and the procedural coherence of maintaining the voluntary bill of indictment as the Crown's sole remedy in this context.

The court further noted that the Crown Prosecution Service’s own literature and parliamentary materials did not include Schedule 3 dismissals as examples of terminating rulings subject to section 58 appeals, reinforcing the view that Parliament did not intend to include such dismissals within the scope of the new appeal rights.

In sum, the court concluded that despite the broad language of section 58 and the recognized importance of the Crown's right to appeal certain rulings, the statutory framework and legislative history indicate that appeals under section 58 do not extend to dismissals under paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.

Holding and Implications

The court’s final decision was to REFUSE LEAVE TO APPEAL the Crown's application under section 58 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 against the dismissal of the charge and quashing of the indictment count under paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.

This ruling means that the Crown does not have a statutory right of appeal under section 58 against pre-arraignment dismissals under Schedule 3, and the only available remedy remains the preferment of a voluntary bill of indictment. The decision preserves the procedural scheme established by Schedule 3 and avoids an implied amendment of its provisions by the 2003 Act. The court also clarified that this judgment may be cited in future cases concerning the jurisdictional scope of section 58 appeals.