Trevelyan v Secretary Of State For Environment, Transport & Regions

Factual and Procedural Background

Approximately 20 years prior, Lancashire County Council designated a long distance footpath known as the Ribble Way, following the course of the River Ribble, based on rights of way shown on the definitive map. The existence of a right of way shown on this map is conclusively established unless successfully challenged. The Plaintiff and spouse, owners of land at Sawley Lodge since 1976, discovered evidence suggesting that bridleway 8, which crossed their land and was included on the definitive map, had been marked in error and was not a legitimate right of way. They initiated a statutory procedure in 1985 to have the bridleway deleted from the map. This lengthy process culminated in an order by the Respondent on 1 April 1999 deleting a substantial part of bridleway 8.

The Appellant, formerly Deputy Director of the Ramblers Association, appealed the Respondent’s order to the Queen's Bench Division, where the appeal was dismissed by Latham J. The Appellant now appeals with permission, raising a point of principle regarding the correct approach to deleting rights of way from the definitive map.

The case involves the statutory framework established by the National Parks and Access to Countryside Act 1949, the Countryside Act 1968, and principally the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, which governs the creation, amendment, and deletion of rights of way on definitive maps. The procedural history includes surveys and objections dating back to the early 1950s, subsequent ownership changes, and multiple applications and appeals regarding the status of bridleway 8. A local inquiry was held by an inspector appointed by the Secretary of State, who ultimately concluded that bridleway 8 did not exist as a right of way except for a short section, leading to the order challenged in this appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the inspector had the power to modify the order by substituting a footpath for the bridleway 8 rather than simply confirming or rejecting the order as made.
2. The evidential weight to be given to the inclusion of a right of way on the definitive map when considering whether it was erroneously recorded.
3. The appropriate standard and approach to determining whether a right of way shown on the definitive map should be deleted on the basis of alleged error.
4. Whether the inspector erred in principle by failing to give sufficient weight to anomalies created by the deletion of bridleway 8.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The inspector erred in concluding that he lacked power to confirm the order subject to a modification substituting a footpath for the bridleway, arguing that such modification was permissible under Schedule 15 paragraph 8(1)(b) of the 1981 Act.
• The inspector wrongly attached no evidential weight to the fact that bridleway 8 had been included on the definitive map, which should be presumed to carry significant evidential weight unless disproved.
• The inspector failed to properly consider the anomalies arising from the deletion of bridleway 8, specifically the creation of cul-de-sacs for linked footpaths and the isolated eastern section of the bridleway.
• The approach of Latham J. and the inspector to the evidential effect of the definitive map was incorrect in principle, and the decision should be quashed on these grounds.

Respondent's Arguments

• Supported the inspector’s conclusion that the inspector could not confirm the order with a modification substituting a footpath for the bridleway as this would constitute making a fundamentally different order, not a confirmation with modification.
• Argued that the definitive map’s inclusion of a right of way was evidence but not conclusive, and that the inspector was entitled to weigh all evidence including the absence of positive proof supporting the bridleway’s existence.
• Contended that the anomalies resulting from the deletion did not invalidate the inspector’s decision as he had considered them and found them outweighed by other evidence.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Rubinstein v Secretary of State for the Environment (1987) 57 P&CR 111	Section 53(3)(c)(iii) could only involve evidence relating to events after the relevant date; definitive map inclusion was conclusive.	Initially followed by the Secretary of State in dismissing the appeal; later overruled by Burrows and Simms.
R v Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte Burrows and Simms [1991] 2 QB 354	Mistakes in the definitive map can be corrected if evidence shows error; definitive map should reflect accurate rights of way.	Overruled Rubinstein and established that the definitive map is not absolutely conclusive; allowed correction of errors.
R. v. Environmental Secretary, ex parte Hood [1975] 1 QB 891	The definitive map is based on evidence available at the time, which may be lost over time.	Invoked to support the presumption that evidence existed at the time of map creation even if lost.
R. v. National Assembly for Wales, ex parte Robinson (2000) 80 P.&CR 348	Weight to be given to definitive map inclusion depends on evidence supporting the original claim.	Followed Latham J.'s approach discounting weight when no evidence of basis for inclusion was available.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed the statutory framework governing definitive maps and the deletion of rights of way, focusing on the powers of an inspector appointed under Schedule 15 of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 to confirm or modify an order deleting a right of way. The Court agreed that while the inspector had power to confirm the order with modifications, such modifications must not create fundamentally different rights of way than those in the original order. The inspector’s doubt about substituting a footpath for a bridleway deletion order was misplaced, and the Court found that the inspector should have power to modify the order in light of evidence discovered during inquiry, subject to further consultation and inquiry if necessary.

Regarding evidential weight, the Court held that inclusion of a right of way on the definitive map gives rise to a strong initial presumption of its existence, reflecting the statutory intention that the map be authoritative and conclusive. The burden lies on those seeking deletion to produce cogent evidence showing a mistake was made. The Court rejected the lower courts’ approach of discounting the evidential weight of the definitive map due to absence of surviving evidence supporting the original inclusion, holding instead that a presumption should be made that proper evidence existed at the time unless disproved.

The inspector’s conclusion that bridleway 8 did not exist as a right of way was based on a thorough examination of all evidence, including historical surveys, user evidence, and maps. The Court found no perversity in this factual conclusion and upheld it. The inspector’s acknowledgment of anomalies caused by deletion of bridleway 8 was sufficient; these did not outweigh the evidence of error in the original inclusion of the bridleway.

Holding and Implications

The Court DISMISSED THE APPEAL, affirming the decision of Latham J. that the order deleting a large part of bridleway 8 from the definitive map was lawful and properly made.

The direct effect is that the deletion order stands, confirming that bridleway 8, except for a short section, does not exist as a right of way. The Court clarified the proper approach to the evidential weight of definitive maps and the powers of inspectors to modify orders, but did not establish new precedent beyond the application of existing principles. No costs order was made against the Appellant, and leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.