THE QUEEN v Stephens & Anor

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants, hereinafter referred to as Defendant Stephens and Defendant Mujuru, faced an indictment containing 15 counts, primarily concerning injuries to a 4-month-old child, the daughter of Defendant Mujuru, named Ayesha. Although Ayesha bore Defendant Stephens' surname, she was not his biological child. Stephens had a son, Marcus, from a previous relationship, with whom he had supervised contact. Following the separation of Stephens and Marcus's mother, there were frequent disputes over access to Marcus, involving social services and law enforcement.

Between November 2002 and April 2005, Stephens assaulted Marcus causing minor injuries and later caused a serious injury to Ayesha—a spiral fracture to her arm—which neither Stephens nor Mujuru sought medical treatment for. On 9 May 2005, Stephens assaulted Marcus's mother, causing serious injuries. Subsequently, Stephens was arrested. It was then discovered that Ayesha had been left alone in Defendant Mujuru’s flat, where she was found unresponsive and later pronounced dead at the hospital.

Post mortem examinations revealed multiple injuries to Ayesha, including healed fractures and recent severe head trauma, consistent with non-accidental injury. Stephens and Mujuru were jointly indicted on charges relating to these events. Stephens pleaded guilty to certain counts and was convicted on others, including murder, and sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 20 years. Mujuru was convicted of cruelty by wilful neglect and causing or allowing the death of a child, receiving concurrent community orders.

Both defendants appealed: Mujuru challenged her conviction on the interpretation of section 5(1) of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 and evidence admissibility; Stephens appealed against the minimum term of his sentence.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the correct interpretation of "significant risk" under section 5(1) of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 requires a threshold higher than "more than minimal".
2. Whether the admission of statements made by Defendant Mujuru during police interviews in May 2005 was fair and lawful under sections 76 and 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.
3. Whether the minimum term of 20 years imposed on Defendant Stephens was manifestly excessive considering the facts and comparable case law.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant Mujuru's Arguments

• The judge erred in admitting evidence of her May 2005 interviews, as she was vulnerable, lacked legal advice, and the statements amounted to unfair confessions.
• The judge wrongly directed the jury that "significant risk" meant "more than minimal," setting the threshold too low for conviction under section 5(1) of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004.
• Renewed application to appeal the refusal of leave regarding the admission of certain witness statements.

Defendant Stephens' Arguments

• The minimum term of 20 years was disproportionate, especially given his lack of premeditation and absence of intent to kill.
• Comparison with other cases suggested a lower minimum term might be appropriate.

Prosecution's Arguments

• Defendant Stephens posed a significant risk of serious harm to Ayesha, supported by evidence of prior assaults.
• Defendant Mujuru was aware or ought to have been aware of this risk and failed to take reasonable steps to protect Ayesha.
• The term "significant" risk should be given its ordinary English meaning, consistent with case law such as Lang.
• The admission of Defendant Mujuru’s May 2005 interviews was fair as she was not suspected at the time and the interviews were conducted appropriately.
• The minimum term imposed on Stephens was justified given the aggravating factors.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Lang [2005] EWCA Crim 2864, [2006] 1 WLR 2509	Interpretation of "significant risk" in sentencing context	The court considered the ordinary meaning of "significant" and noted the different legislative context but agreed it should bear its natural meaning.
Brutus v Cozens [1973] AC 854	Interpretation of ordinary English words in statute ("insulting")	The court held that ordinary words in statutes should be given their natural meaning, and that it is a question of fact for the tribunal or jury to decide their application.
Attorney General's Reference No. 106 of 2004 (Shahajan Kabir) [2004] EWCA Crim 2751, [2005] 1 Cr.App.R.(S.) 120	Sentencing guidelines and minimum term setting for murder of a child	The court referenced this case in considering the appropriateness of the minimum term set for Stephens, distinguishing facts and aggravating factors.
Peters [2005] EWCA Crim 605, [2005] 2 Cr.App.R.(S.) 101	Mitigating effect of intention to cause grievous bodily harm versus intent to kill	The court cited this case to explain why intention to cause grievous bodily harm does not necessarily mitigate a murder sentence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court carefully examined the evidence of prior assaults by Defendant Stephens on both Marcus and Ayesha, establishing a clear pattern of violence and risk. It found that Defendant Mujuru was aware, or ought to have been aware, of this significant risk of serious harm to Ayesha and failed to take reasonable protective steps by leaving Ayesha in Stephens’ care.

Regarding the admission of statements made by Defendant Mujuru during the May 2005 interviews, the court held that at that time she was not under suspicion, the interviews were conducted fairly and sympathetically, and she was not mentally vulnerable to a degree that would render the evidence unreliable. The presence of her mother was deemed sufficient support, and the absence of legal advice did not render the evidence unfair under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

On the interpretation of "significant risk," the court distinguished the legislative context from that in Lang and concluded that the word should be given its ordinary English meaning without an artificial lowering of the threshold to "more than minimal." The judge’s direction to the jury was therefore incorrect, but this did not render the conviction unsafe given the strong evidence of risk and awareness.

In sentencing Defendant Stephens, the court acknowledged mitigating factors such as lack of premeditation and absence of intent to kill but emphasized aggravating factors including the victim's very young age, vulnerability, breach of trust, and history of violence. The court found the minimum term of 20 years appropriate and not manifestly excessive, rejecting comparisons to other cases as each must be judged on its facts.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the appeal by Defendant Mujuru against her conviction, affirming that the evidence admitted was lawful and that the jury's verdict was safe despite the judge’s erroneous direction on "significant risk."

The court also DISMISSED Defendant Stephens’ appeal against the minimum term of 20 years, upholding the sentence as proportionate to the seriousness of the offences and the aggravating circumstances.

The decision directly affects the appellants by confirming their convictions and sentences. No new precedent was established beyond clarification of the interpretation of "significant risk" in the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 context, reaffirming that ordinary English meanings apply unless otherwise indicated by statute.