REGINA v Pacurar

Factual and Procedural Background

On 22nd January 2015, the Defendant trespassed into the home of a family residing in a secluded farmhouse in Hampshire. Upon entry, the Defendant was found naked in the bedroom, engaging in sexualised behaviour, including touching his own penis and making sexually suggestive remarks. The occupants of the house, Mr. and Mrs. Park, confronted him, and police were subsequently called. The Defendant was charged with an offence of trespass with intent to commit a sexual offence contrary to section 63(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.

At trial in the Crown Court at Winchester before Judge Miller QC, the Defendant was convicted and sentenced to three-and-a-half years' imprisonment. He served the sentence and returned to his native country. The appeal before this court concerns whether the prosecution was required to specify the exact sexual offence intended in the indictment and whether the trial judge's directions to the jury were adequate. This case appears to be the first appellate consideration of the level of particularity required in charges under section 63.

Psychiatric evidence was presented from two forensic psychiatrists, who agreed the Defendant was mentally unwell at the time of the offence but disagreed on whether he formed the specific intent to commit a sexual offence. The trial judge excluded expert opinion on the ultimate issue of intent, leaving it to the jury.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the prosecution was obliged to specify the particular sexual offence intended in an indictment charging trespass with intent under section 63(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
2. Whether the trial judge's directions to the jury on the issue of intent and the particulars of the offence were sufficient and appropriate.
3. Whether the trial judge erred in excluding expert evidence on the ultimate issue of intent.
4. Whether the trial judge was correct to refuse to leave the defence of automatism to the jury.
5. Whether the judge should have directed the jury that they must unanimously agree on the specific sexual offence intended.
6. Whether the judge's summing up and directions regarding character and the Defendant's interview were adequate.
7. Whether the conviction was safe in light of the above issues.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The prosecution was required to specify the particular sexual offence intended; the failure to do so rendered the indictment defective and the conviction unsafe.
• The defence faced an impossible task without specification, given the wide range of sexual offences under Part 1 of the Act.
• The judge's directions to the jury were inadequate, failing to properly explain the necessary mens rea and allowing conviction on vague sexualised behaviour.
• The judge erred in excluding expert psychiatric evidence on the ultimate issue of intent, which the jury should have been allowed to consider.
• The defence of automatism should have been left to the jury as there was sufficient evidential basis.
• The jury should have been directed that they must unanimously agree on the specific sexual offence intended.
• The judge failed to properly direct the jury on the Defendant’s good character and credibility.
• The judge’s summing up inadequately presented the Defendant’s interview and account to the police.
• The prosecution’s questioning of expert witnesses constituted an ambush that prejudiced the defence.

Appellee's Arguments

• The words of section 63 allow for charging with intent to commit any relevant sexual offence without specifying which one.
• The indictment and particulars, supplemented by the prosecution’s case presentation, provided sufficient clarity and fairness.
• The judge’s directions adequately explained the elements of the offence and the necessary mens rea.
• Expert evidence on the ultimate issue of intent is not required; the jury is the proper fact-finder.
• There was no evidential basis for the defence of automatism, particularly given the link to self-induced cannabis use.
• The jury need not unanimously agree on the specific sexual offence intended so long as they agree the offence charged was committed.
• The directions on character and credibility were appropriate given the evidence and the Defendant’s failure to testify.
• The judge fairly summed up the evidence, including the Defendant’s interview, which was available to the jury during deliberations.
• The prosecution’s conduct was proper and did not prejudice the defence.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Courtie [1984] AC 463	Clarification that offences with different factual ingredients create multiple offences.	Used to explain the breadth of offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and the complexity of intent.
Stockwell (1993) 97 Cr.App.R 260	Experts may give opinion on the ultimate issue, with caution that the jury is not bound by it.	Appellant relied on this to argue expert evidence on intent should have been admitted; court upheld trial judge’s discretion to exclude.
Hunter and others [2015] 2 CrAppR 9	Requirement for both limbs of character direction where defendant is of good character.	Appellant argued trial judge failed to provide full character direction; court found no prejudice resulted.
R v Jones [2008] QB 460	Precedent for charging with intent to commit sexual offences without specifying exact offence.	Cited to support the approach to particulars in this case and to confirm no objection was taken to similar wording.
Brown [1984] 79 Cr App R 115	Requirement for jury unanimity on specific offence in certain circumstances (Brown direction).	Court found Brown direction not applicable to this case; jury unanimity on specific offence not required.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by acknowledging the comprehensive overhaul of sexual offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and the complexity arising from numerous offences with varying elements. Section 63 criminalises trespass with intent to commit a relevant sexual offence but does not explicitly require specification of the precise offence intended.

Applying principles of fairness and the Criminal Procedure Rules, particularly CPR 10.2, the court held that an indictment must clearly state the offence and particulars sufficient to inform the defendant of the allegations. However, where the evidence does not allow precise specification of the intended offence, a general allegation of intent to commit a sexual offence may suffice, provided the defendant is fairly informed and the trial is conducted fairly.

In this case, the prosecution supplemented the indictment with particulars and a clear presentation to the jury that narrowed the intended offences to a range between sexual assault and rape against specific members of the household. The judge’s directions ensured the jury understood the elements required, including the mens rea, and the sentencing was conducted on the least serious offence intended, which favoured the Defendant.

The court rejected the argument that the jury must unanimously agree on the specific sexual offence intended, citing the limited circumstances in which a Brown direction is required. It also upheld the trial judge’s discretion to exclude expert opinion on the ultimate issue of intent, reasoning that the jury had sufficient evidence from witnesses, the Defendant’s account, and other material to make their own determination.

The court found no evidential basis to leave the defence of automatism to the jury, particularly given the link between the Defendant’s mental state and cannabis use. It further held that any omission in the character direction did not affect the safety of the verdict, especially as the Defendant did not testify and the jury was directed on the lies told in interview.

Overall, the court concluded that the trial was conducted fairly, the Defendant was adequately informed of the charges, and the jury was properly directed. The conviction was therefore safe.

Holding and Implications

The appeal against conviction is dismissed.

The court held that the prosecution was not required to specify the exact sexual offence intended under section 63(1) where the circumstances make such specification impossible, provided the indictment and particulars fairly inform the defendant and the trial is fair. The trial judge’s directions and management of the case were appropriate, and the conviction was safe. The decision confirms that inchoate offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 may be charged with a general intent to commit a sexual offence without specifying the precise offence, establishing no new precedent but clarifying the application of existing principles. The direct effect is to uphold the Defendant’s conviction and sentence as fair and lawful.