Rhys-Harper v Relaxion Group Plc

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal against the decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT), where an appeal by Company A ("the employers") against a decision of an Employment Tribunal was allowed. The Appellant, referred to as the Employee, was employed by the employers from November 1997 until Autumn 1998. The Employee complained of sexual harassment by the manager of the workplace during her employment, but the complaint was made only after the employment had terminated. The sole issue before the Court was whether the employment tribunal had jurisdiction under section 6 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 ("the 1975 Act") to consider a claim of sexual harassment occurring during employment but complained of post-termination.

Following a disciplinary hearing on 12 October 1998 concerning alleged misconduct by the Employee, she was dismissed by letter dated 15 October 1998. An appeal against dismissal was unsuccessful. The Employee lodged her sexual harassment complaint on 9 November 1998. The employers investigated and found the allegation unsubstantiated. It was accepted that a failure to vindicate a justified complaint could amount to detriment under the Act. The EAT held the contract terminated no later than 22 October 1998, so the harassment complaint was a separate, post-termination claim.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether an employment tribunal has jurisdiction under section 6 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 to consider a sexual harassment complaint made after the termination of employment but relating to conduct during employment.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The phrase "woman employed by him" in section 6(2) of the 1975 Act should be interpreted to include former employees, allowing claims after employment ends.
• This interpretation aligns with the Equal Treatment Directive (76/207/EEC) and Article 141 of the Treaty of Rome, which aim to provide protection beyond the employment period.
• An employee may hesitate to complain during employment, so protection must extend post-termination to ensure effective remedies.
• The decision in Post Office v Adekeye under the Race Discrimination Act 1976 should not be followed for sex discrimination cases.
• The European Court of Justice decision in Coote v Granada Hospitality Ltd permits departure from Adekeye, supporting the view that protection should continue after employment ends.
• Reliance on Article 141 of the Treaty and Directive 76/207 supports a broad interpretation of protection, including post-employment complaints.

Respondent's Arguments

• The decision in Adekeye, interpreting the equivalent provision in the Race Relations Act 1976, should be followed, meaning section 6(2) applies only to current employees.
• The European Court of Justice decision in Coote was limited to victimisation related to judicial proceedings and does not extend to complaints of discrimination occurring during employment but raised post-termination.
• Community law does not require distortion of the clear wording of section 6(2) of the 1975 Act to include post-termination complaints.
• Cases under Article 141 of the Treaty, such as Garland, relate to post-retirement benefits and do not support extension to harassment complaints post-termination.
• The alleged harassment complaint made after termination is a separate act and not victimisation linked to judicial proceedings, thus outside the scope of Coote.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed the wording of section 6(2) of the 1975 Act and found it unambiguously applies to women "employed by" the employer, interpreted as current employees only. The Court relied heavily on the decision in Post Office v Adekeye, which held that similar wording in the Race Relations Act 1976 did not extend protection beyond the period of employment.

The Court considered the European Court of Justice (ECJ) decision in Coote, which addressed victimisation occurring after employment termination but related to judicial proceedings enforcing equal treatment. The Court found Coote's scope limited to victimisation linked to judicial processes and not to discrete complaints of discrimination made post-termination.

Community law principles and directives, including the Equal Treatment Directive and Article 141 of the Treaty, were examined. The Court acknowledged these instruments but concluded they do not require extending section 6(2) protection to complaints made after employment ends, especially when such extension would distort the clear statutory language.

The Court rejected the appellant's argument that harassment complaints during employment should be actionable after termination, distinguishing this from victimisation related to judicial proceedings. The Court emphasized that post-termination complaints under section 6(2) are not supported by the statute or relevant Community law.

Finally, the Court agreed with the Employment Appeal Tribunal's decision to follow Adekeye and held that section 6(2) does not cover acts or events occurring after employment termination.

Holding and Implications

The Court DISMISSED the appeal, affirming that section 6(2) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 does not confer jurisdiction on employment tribunals to consider sexual harassment complaints made after the termination of employment, even if the harassment occurred during employment.

The direct effect is that claims under section 6(2) must be brought while the complainant is still employed. No new precedent was set beyond confirming adherence to the interpretation established in Post Office v Adekeye. The decision clarifies the limits of tribunal jurisdiction in sexual discrimination claims related to timing of complaints post-employment.