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Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc

United Kingdom House of Lords
Jul 9, 2008
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Respondent, owner of the bulk carrier “The Achilleas,” time-chartered the vessel to the Appellant for “about five to seven months” at agreed daily rates. A contractual addendum fixed redelivery no later than 2 May 2004. Near the end of the charter the Appellant ordered a final voyage that overran, and the vessel was actually redelivered on 11 May 2004.

Before the overrun became apparent, the Respondent had fixed a follow-on charter with new charterers at US $39,500 per day, cancellable if the ship were not delivered by 8 May 2004. When lateness became inevitable, the Respondent renegotiated: the cancelling date was extended to 11 May but the rate fell to US $31,500 per day. The Respondent claimed the difference (US $1,364,584.37) as damages; the Appellant said damages were limited to the market/charter-rate differential for the nine-day delay (US $158,301.17).

A majority arbitral award accepted the Respondent’s figure. The Commercial Court and the Court of Appeal upheld that award. The Appellant successfully petitioned the House of Lords, whose judgment is summarised below.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, under the rule in Hadley v Baxendale, the charterer is liable for the owner’s loss of profit on a subsequent fixture caused by late redelivery.
  2. Whether foreseeability (“not unlikely”) is an external rule automatically attaching to every contract, or whether liability depends upon the loss being of a type for which the charterer can reasonably be taken to have assumed contractual responsibility.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent’s Arguments

  • Loss of the follow-on fixture was “not unlikely” once late redelivery was contemplated; therefore it falls within the first limb of Hadley v Baxendale.
  • Shipping professionals know owners routinely fix forward charters; missing such dates is a natural consequence of delay.
  • The quantum, although high, is irrelevant once the type of loss is foreseeable.

Appellant’s Arguments

  • Industry understanding limits damages to the market/charter-rate differential during the period of overrun; parties never assume liability for profits on a speculative, unknown future fixture.
  • The follow-on loss was an unquantifiable and commercially unpredictable risk, outside any responsibility reasonably undertaken.
  • Earlier case law and textbook commentary uniformly treat the market-rate approach as the orthodox measure of damages for late redelivery.

Table of Precedents Cited

PrecedentRule or Principle Cited ForApplication by the Court
Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341Foundational test of remoteness: losses arising “naturally” or in contemplation.Central framework; Lords examined whether follow-on profit fell within first limb.
C Czarnikow Ltd v Koufos (The Heron II) [1969] 1 AC 350“Not unlikely” foreseeability and distinction between contract & tort damages.Majority award relied on it; Lords re-evaluated and restricted its reach.
Torvald Klaveness A/S v Arni Maritime Corpn (The Gregos) [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1Owners’ remedies for late redelivery and measure of damages.Quoted by Lords Mustill (obiter); supported market-rate measure adopted by House.
Hyundai Merchant Marine v Gesuri Chartering (The Peonia) [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 100Market/charter-rate differential as normal damages.Treated as reflecting industry expectation, bolstering Appellant’s view.
Alma Shipping v Mantovani (The Dione) [1975] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 115Assumption that damages for late redelivery are limited to overrun period.Cited as part of uniform dicta supporting market-rate approach.
Arta Shipping v Thai Europe Tapioca (The Johnny) [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 1Same principle as The Dione.Reinforced background market understanding.
Satef-Huttenes v Paloma Tercera (The Pegase) [1981] Lloyd’s Rep 175Reasonable person test: what responsibility would be contemplated at contract date.Lords adopted its emphasis on objective assumption of risk.
South Australia Asset Management Corp v York Montague Ltd (“SAAMCO”) [1997] AC 191Scope of duty/assumption of responsibility limiting damages in negligence & contract.Analogous reasoning used to confine charterer’s liability.
Mulvenna v RBS [2003] EWCA Civ 1112Liability may be excluded despite foreseeability when commercial practice so indicates.Cited to justify exclusion of extraordinary profit loss.
Victoria Laundry v Newman Industries [1949] 2 KB 528Distinction between ordinary and “particularly lucrative” contracts.House likened follow-on charter to non-recoverable “particularly lucrative” contracts.
Monarch Steamship v Karlshamns Oljefabriker [1949] AC 196Foreseeability as question of fact; contract context controls liability.Quoted on difference between ordinary and special circumstances.
British Columbia Saw Mill Co v Nettleship (1868) LR 3 CP 499Unfair to impose liability for advantage not paid for.Supported proposition that owner received “something for nothing.”
Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Exch 850Expectation measure of damages.Lords noted that one must first define kind of loss before measuring it.
Liverpool CC v Irwin [1977] AC 239Terms implied “into all contracts” vs. particular contracts.Analogy used to illustrate market-wide limitations on damages.
Transworld Oil v North Bay (The Rio Claro) [1987] Lloyd’s Rep 173Foreseeability may include unforeseeably large loss if of foreseeable type.House distinguished: here loss was of a different type.
Jackson v RBS [2005] 1 WLR 377Similar point to The Rio Claro.Cited in discussion of inclusive/exclusive foreseeability principle.
Cory v Thames Ironworks (1868) LR 3 QB 181Damages limited to what naturally flows in ordinary course.Used to oppose recovery of extraordinary trading loss.
Horne v Midland Railway (1872) LR 7 CP 583“Natural and ordinary consequences” test.Quoted in historical survey of remoteness.
Banco de Portugal v Waterlow & Sons [1932] AC 452Approved full passage from Hadley v Baxendale.Cited to explain classic rule.
James Finlay & Co v Kwik Hoo Tong [1929] 1 KB 400Example of commercial surprise influencing legal development.Used illustratively by Judge Walker in separate opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Delivering the leading speech, Judge Hoffmann recast contractual remoteness as a question of assumed responsibility. All contractual liability is voluntarily undertaken; therefore a party is answerable only for losses that reasonable contracting parties in that market would regard as part of the bargain.

The House observed that:

  • Long-standing shipping dicta (The Dione, The Johnny, The Peonia) and textbook commentary uniformly treat damages for late redelivery as limited to the market/charter-rate differential.
  • Industry participants could not quantify, and would not price, the risk of losing an unknown, potentially lengthy and lucrative follow-on fixture; imposing that risk “gives the other party something for nothing.”
  • The majority arbitrators erred in treating the “not unlikely” foreseeability test as an inflexible external rule. Foreseeability is only evidence of assumption; it is not itself conclusive.
  • Applying the objective test in The Pegase, a reasonable charterer would not, at contract formation, contemplate bearing liability for such an extraordinary loss, especially when the owner could protect itself by refusing an illegitimate last voyage or negotiating express terms.
  • Earlier decisions limiting liability for market downturns (SAAMCO, Mulvenna) illustrate that foreseeability can operate exclusively: a foreseeable loss still falls outside the scope of duty where the risk was not assumed.

Accordingly, the loss of profit on the Cargill fixture was held to be of a different kind from the ordinary loss of use contemplated by both parties. Damages were therefore confined to the market/charter-rate differential for the nine-day overrun.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed. The Appellant is liable only for US $158,301.17, representing the difference between the market rate and the charter rate during the period of late redelivery. The Respondent cannot recover the US $1.36 million loss of profit on the subsequent charter.

Implications: The House reaffirmed that contractual damages are bounded by the loss-allocation reasonably assumed within the relevant market. The decision restores commercial certainty for time-charter parties by confirming that, absent express agreement, late-redelivery damages are ordinarily limited to the market/charter-rate differential. It also signals a broader shift: foreseeability is subordinate to the parties’ objective allocation of risk, an approach likely to influence remoteness analysis in other commercial contexts.