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Hurst, R (on the application of) v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolist
United Kingdom House of Lords
Mar 28, 2007
Smart Summary (Beta)
Factual and Procedural Background
The Respondent’s son (the “Deceased”) was stabbed to death by a neighbour (“Third Party”) on 25 May 2000 in The City. Prior complaints about the Third Party’s violent behaviour had been made to The Police Force and The Council. An inquest was opened and immediately adjourned because the Third Party was charged with murder. After the Third Party’s later conviction for manslaughter, the Respondent asked The Coroner to resume the inquest under section 16(3) of the Coroners Act 1988 in order to examine alleged failings by The Police Force and The Council. By letter dated 19 November 2002, The Coroner declined. The Divisional Court ordered resumption; the Court of Appeal upheld that order. The Appellant (Commissioner of The Police Force) appealed to the House of Lords, contending that The Coroner’s refusal was lawful.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 requires sections 11 and 16 of the Coroners Act 1988 to be read so that an inquest into a pre-October 2000 death must satisfy the investigative requirements of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
- Whether, irrespective of the Human Rights Act, The Coroner was obliged to take the United Kingdom’s international obligations under Article 2 into account when deciding whether to resume the inquest.
- If the inquest were resumed, what substantive scope (a “Jamieson” versus “Middleton” inquiry) would section 11(5)(b)(ii) require.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The Human Rights Act is not retrospective; under In re McKerr the Article 2 procedural duty applies only to deaths on or after 2 October 2000, so section 3 cannot expand the statutory scope of this inquest.
- Domestic coronial law, as interpreted in Jamieson, limits an inquest to determining “by what means” the Deceased died; alleged systemic failings are beyond that scope for pre-Act deaths.
- International obligations are not a mandatory consideration when exercising the discretionary power under section 16(3).
- Section 22(4) of the Human Rights Act does not permit the Respondent to invoke Convention rights in these circumstances because an inquest is not “proceedings brought by” a public authority against her.
Respondent’s Arguments
- Section 3 should be used to construe section 11(5)(b)(ii) compatibly with Article 2 regardless of the Deceased’s date of death, thereby requiring a “Middleton-type” inquest.
- Even if section 3 is unavailable, The Coroner was irrational in refusing to resume the inquest because international law obligations under Article 2 demanded a wider investigation.
- Alternatively, the approach adopted in Middleton has, by common-law development, become the general standard for all inquests.
- Section 22(4) and section 7(1)(b) of the Human Rights Act allow reliance on Convention rights because an inquest is “instigated by” a public authority.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| R v Coroner for North Humberside & Scunthorpe, Ex p Jamieson [1995] QB 1 | Inquest verdict limited to determining “by what means” the death occurred. | Treated as the controlling domestic law standard for pre-Act deaths, distinguishing “Jamieson” from “Middleton” inquests. |
| R (Middleton) v West Somerset Coroner [2004] 2 AC 182 | Under section 3 HRA, “how” can be read as “by what means and in what circumstances” where Article 2 applies. | Held inapplicable because Article 2 obligations do not arise domestically for a 2000 death. |
| In re McKerr [2004] 1 WLR 807 | Human Rights Act not retrospective; Article 2 procedural duty arises only for deaths after 2 Oct 2000. | Formed backbone of the majority’s conclusion that section 3 could not assist the Respondent. |
| McCann v United Kingdom (1995) 21 EHRR 97 | First recognition of the Article 2 investigative obligation. | Cited as background to the nature of the international duty. |
| Environment Agency v Empress Car Co [1999] 2 AC 22 | Causation principles where third-party acts intervene. | Referenced in discussion of whether police failures were too remote. |
| Reeves v Commissioner of Police [2000] 1 AC 360 | Further analysis of causation and state responsibility. | Used to question remoteness of police conduct. |
| Osman v United Kingdom (1998) 29 EHRR 245 | Positive obligation to protect life under Article 2. | Illustrated the breadth of issues a “Middleton” inquest would examine. |
| R v Inner West London Coroner, Ex p Dallaglio [1994] 4 All ER 139 | Scope of inquiry is wider than verdict. | Cited to show investigative value even where verdict is limited. |
| R v Southwark Coroner, Ex p Hicks [1987] 1 WLR 1624 | Broad interpretation of “how.” | Relied upon by dissent to argue inquiry could cover police conduct. |
| R v South London Coroner, Ex p Thompson (1982) 126 SJ 625 | Inquisitorial nature of inquests. | Supported the view that wide factual investigation is permissible. |
| Wilson v First County Trust (No 2) [2004] 1 AC 816 | Interpretation principles under the Human Rights Act. | Quoted to support consistent reading of “Convention rights” in sections 3 and 6. |
| R v Secretary of State for the Home Dept, Ex p Brind [1991] 1 AC 696 | Decision-makers not obliged to conform to unincorporated treaties. | Majority relied on this to reject a mandatory duty to resume based on Article 2. |
| R v Secretary of State for Transport, Ex p Factortame [1990] 2 AC 85 | Domestic statutes disapplied where incompatible with EU law. | Used as analogy to show context-specific interpretive obligations. |
| Imperial Chemical Industries plc v Colmer (No 2) [1999] 1 WLR 2035 | Marleasing principle: differential interpretation depending on EU involvement. | Cited to support non-uniform application of “Middleton” construction. |
| Gingi v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2002] 1 CMLR 587 | Same principle as above. | Reinforced selective application of expansive readings. |
| Pearson v Inner London North Coroner [2005] EWHC 833 (Admin) | Rejected section 3 argument in a pre-Act death. | Approved by the majority as persuasive precedent. |
| Walthamstow Coroner, Ex p Rubenstein (1982) | Early authority on meaning of “how.” | Historical context for the settled domestic meaning. |
| Rantzen v Mirror Group Newspapers [1994] QB 670 | Relevance of international standards when exercising discretion. | Supported minority view that Article 2 values were a legitimate guide. |
| R v Lord Saville of Newdigate, Ex p A [2000] 1 WLR 1855 | International obligations as discretionary guide. | Cited by minority to justify reconsideration. |
| CREEDNZ Inc v Governor General [1981] 1 NZLR 172 | When a factor is “obviously material” to discretion. | Informed debate on whether Article 2 must be considered. |
| In re Findlay [1985] 1 AC 318 | Approval of the above principle. | Referenced in assessing mandatory considerations. |
| R v Lyons [2003] 1 AC 976 | Optional consideration of unincorporated treaties. | Majority relied on its permissive, not mandatory, stance. |
| R v Chief Immigration Officer, Ex p Salamat Bibi [1976] 1 WLR 979; Fernandes v Secretary of State [1981] Imm AR 1; Chundawadra v IAT [1988] Imm AR 161 | Series confirming Brind principle. | Cited collectively on discretionary regard to treaties. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Majority (Judge Brown, Judge Rodger, Judge Brown, and Judge Bingham concurring):
- The Human Rights Act is not retrospective; thus the Article 2 procedural obligation is not a “Convention right” enforceable in domestic law for a death preceding 2 October 2000 (McKerr).
- Because section 6 is not engaged, section 3 cannot be invoked to recast section 11; the phrases “the Convention rights” in both sections must bear the same limited meaning.
- Attempts to re-interpret section 11 through common-law development or international-law conformity would circumvent McKerr and undermine settled authority in Jamieson.
- International obligations are considerations The Coroner may, but is not required to, take into account (Brind; Lyons). Therefore non-resumption was not irrational merely because Article 2 was not satisfied.
- Section 22(4) does not aid the Respondent; an inquest is not “proceedings brought by” a public authority against her.
Minority (Judge Hale and Judge Mance):
- Although no enforceable Article 2 right existed, the values underpinning Article 2 were “obviously material.” The Coroner erred in concluding that criminal proceedings had already explored all relevant matters.
- A resumed inquest, even on a “Jamieson” footing, could still investigate events leading to the death and permit a Rule 43 report, serving a public interest.
- The refusal to resume was therefore irrational or should at least be reconsidered in light of these factors.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED.
The House of Lords (by majority) upheld The Coroner’s decision not to resume the inquest. The ruling confirms that:
- Article 2 investigative duties under the Human Rights Act arise only for deaths occurring on or after 2 October 2000.
- Section 3 cannot be used to expand domestic statutory duties where the underlying Convention right is not applicable.
- Decision-makers are not legally compelled to comply with unincorporated treaty obligations, though they may choose to do so.
Practically, families of pre-Act deaths cannot compel a “Middleton-style” inquest to examine systemic failings, limiting their recourse to the narrower “Jamieson” framework unless the coroner voluntarily widens the inquiry. The judgment sets no new precedent but reinforces the temporal limits of the Human Rights Act and preserves the traditional scope of inquests for pre-2000 deaths.
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