Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Barker v. Corus (UK) Plc

United Kingdom House of Lords
May 3, 2006
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The judgment consolidates three appeals concerning workers who contracted mesothelioma after exposure to asbestos dust during multiple periods of employment. In each case the victim had been exposed to significant quantities of asbestos by more than one employer. One appeal (brought on behalf of the estate of “Decedent A”) involved three periods of exposure: two while employed by solvent companies (“Company A” and “Company B”) and a later period when Decedent A was self-employed. The other two appeals concerned deceased shipyard workers who had been exposed by a succession of employers, many of which are now insolvent or uninsured. At first instance and in the Court of Appeal the defendants were held liable on a joint-and-several basis under the causal rule stated in Plaintiff v Company C (“the Fairchild exception”). The defendants then appealed to the House of Lords, contending that the scope of the exception was too widely drawn and that, even if liability subsisted, it should be several only.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Fairchild exception applies when one or more exposures to asbestos were lawful or were attributable to the claimant’s own conduct rather than to any breach of duty by a defendant.
  2. Whether a defendant who is liable under the Fairchild exception is responsible for the whole of the disease (joint and several liability) or only for an aliquot share that reflects its contribution to the risk of mesothelioma (several liability).

Arguments of the Parties

Claimants’ Arguments

  • The Fairchild rule should apply as long as a defendant’s breach of duty materially increased the risk of mesothelioma, irrespective of other lawful exposures or the claimant’s own conduct.
  • Mesothelioma is an indivisible injury; therefore orthodox principles require all liable defendants to be jointly and severally responsible for full damages.

Defendants’ Arguments

  • The Fairchild exception should not apply where the claimant’s own conduct or non-tortious exposures may have caused the disease.
  • If liability is imposed, it should be limited to each defendant’s proportionate contribution to the overall risk, especially because many tortfeasors or their insurers are now insolvent, leaving solvent defendants unfairly bearing the entire loss.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2003] 1 AC 32 Established that a defendant who materially increases the risk of mesothelioma may be liable even though causation cannot be proved on the balance of probabilities. Used as the foundation; Court refined its limits and the consequences of liability.
McGhee v National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1 Equated material increase in risk with material contribution to injury. Relied on to justify extending the exception even where some exposures were lawful.
Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] AC 1074 Drew a distinction where different agents could have caused the harm. Court reaffirmed that Fairchild applies only where the same causal agent (asbestos) is involved.
Gregg v Scott [2005] 2 AC 176 Rejected recovery for mere loss of a chance in ordinary clinical-negligence cases. Cited to emphasise that the Fairchild rule is exceptional and should not be widened generally.
Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613 Liability where tortious dust exposure materially contributed to disease. Used as historical context for development of risk-based liability.
Dingle v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1961] 2 QB 162 Traditional rule that concurrent tortfeasors causing indivisible harm are jointly and severally liable. Considered but distinguished; Court decided the traditional rule should not govern Fairchild cases.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Scope of the Exception. The Law Lords held that the Fairchild principle is not confined to scenarios where every exposure was tortious. The critical factor is whether each defendant’s breach materially increased the risk of mesothelioma by the same causal mechanism (asbestos fibres). Therefore the presence of lawful exposures, or exposures attributable to the claimant, does not by itself remove the case from the exception.

2. Nature of the Damage. The majority rejected the view that defendants must be treated as having caused the disease. Instead, the actionable damage in a Fairchild case is the creation of a quantifiable risk that mesothelioma would occur. Because risk is infinitely divisible, liability can be apportioned without conceptual difficulty even though the disease itself is indivisible.

3. Fairness and Policy. Joint and several liability would make a solvent defendant the de facto guarantor for insolvent or untraceable wrongdoers and for exposures created by the claimant. The Court considered this unfair when liability is imposed on an exceptional basis that presupposes the defendant may not in fact have caused the disease. Proportionate liability more accurately reflects each defendant’s contribution and mitigates the “rough justice” inherent in the exception.

4. Apportionment Method. Damages must now be assessed by reference to each defendant’s share of the overall risk. Duration, intensity and type of asbestos exposure are relevant metrics, though detailed methodology was left to the parties and lower courts.

5. Distinction Maintained. The Court reaffirmed that the exception remains limited to single-agent cases like asbestos-induced mesothelioma and does not extend to situations involving multiple distinct causal agents.

Holding and Implications

The appeals were allowed in part. The previous awards of joint-and-several damages were set aside. Each case was remitted to the trial courts to reassess damages on a several basis, proportionate to the risk created by each defendant’s breach of duty.

Implications: The decision extends the Fairchild exception to include cases with lawful or self-induced exposures but simultaneously limits defendants’ financial exposure by introducing risk-based apportionment. Claimants will no longer recover full damages from a single solvent defendant; instead, compensation will track each defendant’s contribution to risk. The ruling therefore recalibrates the balance between claimant protection and fairness to defendants, without creating a broad precedent for risk-based claims outside the single-agent context.