Farley v. Child Support Agency & Anor

Factual and Procedural Background

The case concerns the enforcement mechanism created by the Child Support Act 1991 (“the 1991 Act”). On 15 July 2003 the Appellant (the Secretary of State) applied to The City Magistrates’ Court for a liability order against the Respondent, alleging arrears of child support maintenance totalling approximately £32,640 (later said to be about £28,135). The Respondent, a self-employed non-resident parent, accepted that three maintenance assessments dated in November and December 2002 were unpaid but contended that those assessments were themselves unlawful.

The magistrates held that, under section 33(4) of the 1991 Act, they had no jurisdiction to question the validity of the assessments and therefore made the liability order. The Respondent appealed by way of case stated. A judge of the Administrative Court affirmed the magistrates’ ruling. The Court of Appeal initially reversed that decision but later set it aside on procedural grounds, substituted judicial review, and quashed the liability order. The Appellant then appealed to the House of Lords (now the Supreme Court).

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether section 33(4) of the Child Support Act 1991 prevents a magistrates’ court, on an application for a liability order, from investigating the legality or validity of the underlying maintenance assessment.
2. If the magistrates’ jurisdiction is so limited, whether the statutory scheme nonetheless provides an effective alternative mechanism by which a non-resident parent can challenge the Secretary of State’s jurisdiction to make the assessment.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

• Section 33(4) explicitly removes the magistrates’ power to investigate any aspect of the maintenance assessment; their role is confined to verifying the identity of the liable person and that the payments are unpaid.
• The statutory framework offers other routes—specifically review and appeal rights under sections 18 and 20 of the 1991 Act (as originally enacted) and, in later versions, appeal to a tribunal—by which jurisdictional challenges can be raised.
• Allowing magistrates a parallel jurisdiction would undermine the speed and efficiency objectives of the child support scheme.

Respondent’s Arguments

• The assessments were void because (a) a pre-1993 written maintenance agreement existed, precluding a section 4 application, and (b) no evidence showed that the person with care was in receipt of a prescribed benefit, defeating a section 6 application.
• Because no effective statutory appeal existed at the relevant time (the 1998 version of section 20 limited appeals to amount and start date only), magistrates must retain the power to test the Secretary of State’s jurisdiction; otherwise there is an unlawful ouster of judicial review.
• Section 33(4) should therefore be read narrowly to permit the magistrates’ court to determine whether the Respondent is a “liable person”.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Judge [Nicholls] delivered the leading opinion. He found the text of section 33(4) “admits of only one interpretation”: a magistrates’ court must assume that the maintenance assessment is lawful and cannot probe its validity. The magistrates’ role is limited to confirming (a) that the assessment concerns the defendant and (b) that payments are due and unpaid.

The House reasoned that:

• It would be “surprising” to allow jurisdictional challenges at the enforcement stage; challenges should arise earlier and the statute indeed supplies mechanisms for them.
• The original 1991 Act created a review and appeal structure (sections 18 and 20) enabling non-resident parents to contest the Secretary of State’s jurisdiction before a Child Support Appeal Tribunal. Therefore section 33(4) does not function as an unconstitutional ouster clause.
• The 1998 amendments removed some appeal rights but did not retroactively enlarge magistrates’ jurisdiction; any deficiency during that interim was a matter for judicial review, not for section 33 proceedings.
• Previous contrary positions, including the concession in Harmon, stemmed from confusion and do not alter the proper construction of the statute.
• Where an appeal against the assessment is actually pending, magistrates retain a discretionary power under section 54 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 to adjourn if immediate enforcement would be oppressive.

Holding and Implications

Held: Section 33(4) bars magistrates from examining the legality of a maintenance assessment; the liability order was validly made. The Court of Appeal’s judgment granting judicial review was set aside and the Respondent’s challenge dismissed.

Implications: The decision confirms that jurisdictional challenges to child-support assessments must be pursued through the statutory review/appeal structure or by judicial review in the High Court, not before magistrates at the enforcement stage. The ruling safeguards the efficiency of the child-support collection system while recognising magistrates’ discretion to adjourn where active appeals make enforcement oppressive. No new precedent was set beyond clarifying the allocation of jurisdiction within the statutory scheme.