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Martin v Watson
Factual and Procedural Background
The Plaintiff and the Defendant were next-door neighbours in The City. After years of acrimony, the Defendant repeatedly alleged that the Plaintiff indecently exposed himself. On 20 July 1989 the Defendant informed a police constable (Officer A) that the Plaintiff had appeared naked over the garden fence and behaved indecently. The next day Detective Constable (Officer B) recorded a full witness statement in which the Defendant confirmed her willingness to testify. On 27 July Officer B, accompanied by the Defendant, obtained an arrest warrant. The Plaintiff was arrested on 9 August and charged, but the Crown Prosecution Service offered no evidence and he was discharged the following day.
The Plaintiff sued the Defendant in The State County Court for malicious prosecution. Judge Goodman found all four elements of the tort proven and awarded £3,500 damages on 13 July 1992. The Court of Appeal (by majority) set that judgment aside on 21 January 1994, holding that the Defendant was not the “prosecutor” because she had not signed the charge sheet. The Plaintiff obtained leave to appeal to the House of Lords, which delivered the present decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, on the facts, the Defendant “prosecuted” the Plaintiff by setting the law in motion, despite not having signed the charge sheet.
- More broadly, under what circumstances a person who supplies false information to the police is liable for the tort of malicious prosecution when the police formally lay the charge.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The Defendant’s knowingly false statement was the sole basis for the charge; therefore she procured and instigated the prosecution.
- Where a complainant’s evidence is indispensable, the police exercise no real independent discretion and the complainant is in substance the prosecutor.
- All four elements of malicious prosecution (initiation, termination in favour, lack of reasonable cause, and malice) were established by Judge Goodman and not overturned on appeal except as to initiation.
Defendant's Arguments
- Because neither the information nor the charge sheet was signed by the Defendant, she did not “prosecute” the Plaintiff in law.
- Public-policy considerations favour protecting citizens who report crimes; imposing liability would deter genuine complainants, especially in sexual offence cases.
- Other remedies (perjury, wasting police time) sufficiently guard against false complaints, making civil liability unnecessary.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Pandit Gaya Parshad Tewari v. Sardar Bhagat Singh (1908) 24 T.L.R. 884 | A complainant who knowingly gives false information that leads police to prosecute is liable even if not the formal prosecutor. | Adopted as authoritative support that instigation through falsehood suffices for liability. |
| Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd. v. Brain (1935) 53 C.L.R. 343 | Those who mislead or prejudice the discretion of the actual prosecutor are joint wrong-doers. | Cited to demonstrate that dishonestly influencing police attracts liability. |
| Watters v. Pacific Delivery Service Ltd. (1963) 42 D.L.R. (2d) 661 | Instigation through deliberate deception renders an informant liable notwithstanding that the police swore the information. | Relied on as a Canadian example aligning with the Plaintiff’s position. |
| Commercial Union Assurance Co. of N.Z. Ltd. v. Lamont [1989] 3 N.Z.L.R. 187 | A person may be deemed the prosecutor if false evidence “virtually compels” police to act. | Quoted for its analytical framework and “core requirement” of procuring state power. |
| Fitzjohn v. Mackinder (1861) 9 C.B.(N.S.) 505 | Signing or laying an information ordinarily makes one the prosecutor, even if ordered to do so by a judge. | Used illustratively to show that technical formalities do not always determine liability. |
| Danby v. Beardsley (1880) 43 L.T. 603 | Mere truthful reporting, absent malice or direction to arrest, does not amount to prosecution. | Distinguished; unlike Danby, the Defendant’s report was malicious and knowingly false. |
| Roy v. Prior [1971] A.C. 470 | Witness immunity does not bar actions alleging abuse of process. | Rejected the Defendant’s reliance on witness-immunity analogies. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The House confirmed that English law imposes liability where an individual maliciously provides false information that effectively procures a prosecution. Drawing on Commonwealth, New Zealand and Canadian authority, the Lords held that when the complainant’s evidence is the sine qua non of prosecution, police discretion is illusory; the complainant is the real prosecutor.
Judge Goodman’s factual findings were accepted: the Defendant’s repeated, baseless accusations demonstrated a determined intent “to set the law in motion.” Officer B’s inability to exercise independent judgment, given the absence of corroborating evidence, was inferred. The appellate majority’s focus on who signed the charge sheet was characterised as an overly technical view that ignored substance in favour of form.
The Lords also dismissed policy objections. Genuine informants remain protected because the Plaintiff still must prove both malice and lack of reasonable cause. Denying liability would leave innocent defendants without compensation for arrest, detention, and trial occasioned by malicious falsehoods.
Holding and Implications
Appeal allowed; the judgment of Judge Goodman awarding £3,500 to the Plaintiff is restored.
Immediate consequences include costs orders against the Defendant (and, in the House of Lords, against the legal aid fund). More broadly, the decision affirms that individuals who maliciously furnish false information to police can be liable for malicious prosecution even when they do not sign the charging document, thereby placing substantive responsibility above procedural formality.
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