Sliogeris v REGINA

Factual and Procedural Background

On 24th July 2014, in the Crown Court at Norwich before Judge Holt, the Appellant was convicted of murder (count 1) and of acts tending and intended to pervert the course of justice (count 2). The following day, the Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 210 months for the murder charge, and 15 months concurrent for the second count. The Appellant appealed against the murder conviction with leave of a single judge. Three co-accused were involved: two were acquitted and discharged, while one co-defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 16 years.

On 11th November 2013, the body of the deceased was discovered in the communal stairwell of a residential building. The post mortem revealed the deceased suffered approximately 80 injuries from a sustained and brutal attack involving kicking, punching, blunt weapon strikes, and a knife cut. The cause of death was a serious head injury resulting in internal brain bleeding.

The prosecution alleged that the four defendants jointly attacked the deceased in the Appellant's flat with intent to kill or cause serious injury. The only direct eyewitness evidence came from a close friend of the Appellant, who described seeing the victim on the floor bleeding and the Appellant instructing others to "clean it, tidy up and leave".

The Appellant and one co-defendant each blamed the other for the violence, with both denying sole responsibility. The other two co-defendants claimed to have left before the violence began.

The evidence against the Appellant was circumstantial, including telephone records showing recent contact with the deceased, the Appellant's failure to call for help during the incident, injuries to the Appellant consistent with involvement, and forensic evidence linking the Appellant's slippers to the assault. The Appellant gave explanations for these facts only at trial, which the prosecution argued were fabricated to meet forensic evidence.

The appeal concerns the admissibility of an out-of-court statement allegedly made by one co-defendant to his landlord, implicating the Appellant as the attacker. The landlord's testimony was equivocal and the statement was hearsay, raising issues about whether it should be admitted under evidential rules.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the out-of-court statement by a co-defendant implicating the Appellant constituted a confession admissible under section 76A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE).
2. Whether the statement could be admitted under the hearsay exception in section 114(1)(d) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 as being in the interests of justice.
3. Whether the trial judge erred in admitting the evidence and whether its admission rendered the Appellant’s conviction unsafe.
4. The proper approach to the assessment of reliability of hearsay evidence under section 114(2) by the trial judge.
5. Whether, if admitted under section 76A, the confession could be used against all defendants or only in favour of the co-defendant who sought its admission.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The statement by the co-defendant did not properly qualify as a confession under section 82 of PACE and thus should not have been admitted under section 76A.
• Even if admissible under section 76A, the jury should have been directed to use the statement only in favour of the co-defendant and not against the Appellant.
• The trial judge erred in his application of section 114, particularly by confusing the identity of the maker of the statement and failing to properly assess the reliability of both the maker of the statement and the witness who relayed it.
• The evidence was so unreliable and of minimal benefit to the co-defendant that it should have been excluded as not being in the interests of justice.

Prosecution's Arguments

• The statement by the co-defendant admitting presence at the scene was a partial confession under section 82 and admissible under section 76A.
• The statement was relevant and important evidence relating to who attacked the deceased and was properly admitted in the interests of justice under section 114.
• Although the trial judge made a minor error regarding the identity of the maker of the statement, the overall decision to admit the evidence was within the proper exercise of judicial discretion.
• The case law supports the admission of such evidence where it assists a co-defendant’s defence and does not unfairly prejudice others.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
R v Myers (Melanie) [1998] AC 224	Allows a co-defendant's confession to be used in favour of another co-defendant but not against him.	Referenced to explain the statutory basis of section 76A and its scope regarding confessions.
R v Y [2008] 1 WLR 1683	Confirms hearsay statements, including confessions, may be admissible under section 114(1)(d) if in the interests of justice.	Supported the proposition that confessions can be admitted under hearsay exceptions and the factors to consider under section 114(2).
McLean [2007] EWCA Crim 219; [2008] 1 Cr. App. R. 11	Distinguishes between confessions and exculpatory out-of-court accusations; confirms section 76A does not apply to exculpatory statements.	Used to conclude that the statement identifying the Appellant as the attacker was not a confession under section 76A and thus inadmissible on that basis.
Finch [2007] EWCA Crim 36; [2007] 1 Cr. App. R. 36	Clarifies the definition of confession under section 82 and the distinction between partial confessions and other statements made simultaneously.	Supported the analysis distinguishing admissions of presence from exculpatory accusations.
Nazir [2009] EWCA Crim 213	Examples of classic cut-throat defences where confessions can be used by co-defendants under section 76A.	Distinguished from the present case as the statement here was not a confession admitting sole responsibility.
Musone [2007] EWCA Crim 1237; [2007] 2 Cr. App. R. 29	Trial judge must assess reliability of hearsay evidence maker under section 114(2)(e) and (f); cannot defer entirely to the jury.	Applied to find the trial judge erred in deferring reliability assessment to the jury but ultimately satisfied reliability was capable of being accepted.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first examined whether the out-of-court statement by the co-defendant qualified as a confession under section 82 of PACE and thus admissible under section 76A. It accepted that the admission of presence at the scene was a partial confession, but the statement identifying the Appellant as the attacker was exculpatory and logically distinct. Following precedent, notably McLean, the court held that such an exculpatory accusation is not a confession and therefore section 76A did not apply to that part of the statement.

The court then considered admissibility under the hearsay exception in section 114(1)(d) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which permits hearsay if in the interests of justice. The trial judge had considered the statutory factors in section 114(2), including probative value, importance, circumstances of the statement, and reliability of both the maker and the witness testifying. Although the judge erred by confusing the identity of the maker and by deferring reliability assessment to the jury, the appellate court found the judge had identified sufficient factors to conclude the evidence was potentially reliable and important to the co-defendant's case.

The court emphasized that the application was by a co-defendant seeking to exculpate himself by implicating the Appellant, making the evidence potentially significant and justifying its admission. The court noted the trial judge properly directed the jury on the caution required when considering untested hearsay evidence. The appellate court concluded that despite minor errors, the trial judge’s decision to admit the evidence was within the range of reasonable judicial discretion.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed.

The court held that the trial judge was entitled to admit the out-of-court statement under the hearsay exception in section 114(1)(d) as it was in the interests of justice to do so, and that the statement did not constitute a confession under section 76A for the purposes of admitting it as evidence against the Appellant. The minor errors identified in the trial judge’s assessment did not render the verdict unsafe. The decision affirms the proper application of hearsay rules in complex multi-defendant trials and clarifies the distinction between confessions and exculpatory accusations in co-defendant statements. No new precedent was established beyond the application of existing principles, and the direct effect is that the Appellant’s conviction stands.