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Lawlor v Sandvik Mining & Construction Mobile Crushers and Screens Ltd
Factual and Procedural Background
The appeal concerns the determination of the proper law applicable to a commercial agency agreement made between the parties around 1994 or 1995 and terminated by the Defendant in 2009. The issue arises under the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990, governed by the Rome Convention, which applies to contracts made after 1991 and before 17 December 2009. The trial judge held that Spanish law was the proper law of the contract, rejecting the Plaintiff's argument that there was an implied choice of English law. The Plaintiff, an Irish citizen, was initially employed by Company A in the UK and later became a sales agent mainly operating in Spain. The agency agreement was informal and unwritten, and the Plaintiff claimed compensation for termination under the Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations 1993. The question of the applicable law was ordered to be decided as a preliminary issue. The Plaintiff appeals the rejection of an implied choice of English law, while the Defendant contends that the contract is governed by the law most closely connected, namely Spanish law.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the parties made an implied choice of English law to govern the commercial agency agreement under Article 3 of the Rome Convention.
- In the absence of such choice, whether Spanish law is the proper law of the contract under Article 4 of the Rome Convention as the law most closely connected to the agreement.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The judge erred by requiring actual consideration and discussion of the choice of law to conclude an implied choice had been made.
- The judge was incorrect to reject the English law approach to finding an implied term governing the contract.
- The fact that the Plaintiff's original employment contract was probably governed by English law should lead to the inference that the agency contract was also implicitly governed by English law in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
Respondent's Arguments
- The judge's approach was correct and consistent with the Rome Convention, which differs materially from English common law.
- Article 3 requires a clear demonstration of a positive choice of law, either express or implied, which was not met in this case.
- The evidence regarding the formation of the agency was vague and insufficient to establish a positive choice of English law.
- If English law applied to the employment contract, this was under default rules rather than by positive choice.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| R v International Trustee for the Protection of Bond Holders Aktiengesellschaft [1937] AC 500 | Proper law of contract is the law intended by parties, ascertained from contract terms or circumstances. | Reaffirmed the principle that intention expressed or presumed governs the contract's proper law. |
| Amin Rasheed Corporation v Kuwait Insurance Co [1984] AC 50 | Distinction between express choice, inferred choice, and closest connection tests for proper law. | Confirmed that in absence of express choice, intention may be inferred or closest connection applied; relevant to applying Rome Convention. |
| Samcrete Egypt v Land Rover Exports Limited [2002] CLC 53 | Emphasized international character and uniform interpretation of Rome Convention. | Supported adherence to uniform application of the Convention rather than common law principles. |
| Iran Continental Shelf Oil Co v IRI International Corp [2004] 2 CLC 696 | Uniformity in interpretation of the Rome Convention. | Reinforced the need for consistent application of the Convention’s rules. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the application of Articles 3 and 4 of the Rome Convention regarding the choice of law in contractual relations. Article 3 prioritizes party autonomy, requiring that a choice of law be expressed or demonstrated with reasonable certainty by contract terms or circumstances. The court noted that the language change in the Rome 1 Regulation did not alter this standard. The judge accepted that if a choice had been made, it would likely have been English law, consistent with the Defendant’s general practice and common commercial sense.
However, the judge found that the evidence was too vague and inconsistent to demonstrate such a choice with reasonable certainty. The agency agreement was informal, unwritten, and the Plaintiff’s accounts were improbable and unsupported. The Plaintiff’s main base was Spain, and most sales occurred there, supporting the application of Spanish law under Article 4 as the law most closely connected to the contract.
The court emphasized that the burden of proof lies on the party asserting an implied choice, which must be established objectively and to a high standard. Evidence of post-contract negotiations was not relevant to the original intention. The court rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that the employment contract’s probable English law governance implied the same for the agency contract, noting the different nature and circumstances of the contracts.
The court also highlighted the distinction under the Convention between inferred intention (Article 3) and closest connection (Article 4), which is more rigid than under common law, reinforcing the need for clear demonstration of choice.
Holding and Implications
The court DISMISSED the Plaintiff’s appeal, upholding the trial judge’s decision that Spanish law governs the commercial agency agreement under Article 4 of the Rome Convention.
The direct effect is that the Plaintiff’s claim for compensation will be assessed under Spanish law rather than English law, which may reduce the claim’s value. No new precedent was established; the decision confirms the strict application of the Rome Convention’s distinction between implied choice and closest connection tests for determining the proper law of contracts.
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