Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

MS GVV CONSTRUCTIONS PVT LTD MANAGING DIRECTOR v. THE UNION OF INDIA

Supreme Court Of India
Sep 8, 2026
Smart Summary (Beta)

M/s. GVV Constructions Private Limited v. Union of India & Others

Supreme Court of India, Civil Appellate Jurisdiction; judgment delivered by Alok Aradhe, J. on 8 September 2026. [1][2][3][4]

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, a private company engaged in construction and infrastructure works, successfully bid for railway track-doubling and associated works tendered by South Central Railway. A formal contract executed on 30 November 2017 prescribed 23 October 2018 as the completion date. [5][6][7]

On 10 June 2022, the contract was terminated under Clause 62 of the Indian Railways Standard General Conditions of Contract (“GCC”). The appellant’s performance guarantee and security were forfeited, and it was denied compensation for any loss. [8]

The appellant challenged the termination through a writ petition, alleging non-compliance with the GCC and seeking implementation of Clause 17. The Single Judge dismissed the petition because serious and complicated factual questions were unsuitable for adjudication under Article 226, while observing that the appellant could raise its defences in arbitration; nevertheless, the Single Judge also found no irregularity in the termination. [9][10]

On appeal, the Division Bench set aside the Single Judge’s finding validating the termination because it was unsupported by reasons and could prejudice adjudication by the Arbitral Tribunal or another forum. It permitted the appellant to raise all claims before the Tribunal and directed the Tribunal to decide them strictly according to the contract and without being influenced by judicial observations. [11][12]

A former Supreme Court judge was subsequently appointed Sole Arbitrator. Proceedings commenced on 20 January 2026, and the Tribunal framed twelve issues, including the validity of termination and whether any claims were time-barred, constituted “excepted matters,” or were otherwise non-arbitrable. [13]

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Division Bench’s direction that the Arbitrator decide the appellant’s claims strictly according to the contractual terms exceeded the scope of judicial review under Article 226 and impinged upon the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. [14][15]
  2. Whether the question that the termination dispute falls within the GCC’s “excepted matters” clause must be determined in the first instance by the Arbitral Tribunal. [16][17]

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • The delay in completing the work was not attributable to the appellant, and the contract was terminated illegally. [18]
  • Because the respondents had previously asserted that arbitration was an effective alternative remedy, they could not subsequently deny the Tribunal’s authority to decide the termination dispute. [18]
  • The legality of termination was directly and intrinsically connected with the other issues before the Tribunal and therefore should also be decided by it. [19]
  • The Division Bench’s direction improperly restricted the Tribunal and was said to be contrary to ABS Marine Services v. Andaman and Nicobar Administration. [19]

Respondents’ Arguments

  • Referring the validity of termination to arbitration would violate Clause 63 of the GCC, which had been accepted by both parties. [20]
  • Excluding termination from arbitration did not leave the appellant without a remedy because a civil court was the designated forum for “excepted matters.” [20]
  • ABS Marine Services was distinguishable because its contractual clause differed from the GCC provisions in this case. [21][22]
  • The Tribunal lacked jurisdiction over “excepted matters,” and the Division Bench’s judgment required no interference. The respondents relied on General Manager, Northern Railway and Another v. Sarvesh Chopra and Harsha Constructions v. Union of India and Others. [22][23]

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
ABS Marine Services v. Andaman and Nicobar Administration, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 460 Relied upon by the appellant to challenge the restriction placed upon arbitral adjudication. Held inapplicable because Clause 3.20 in that case excluded both court jurisdiction and arbitration, whereas Clause 63 here excludes only “excepted matters” from arbitration. [19][24][25]
General Manager, Northern Railway and Another v. Sarvesh Chopra, (2002) 4 SCC 45 Relied upon by the respondents concerning the exclusion of “excepted matters” from arbitration. Found unhelpful because it concerned Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, while the 1996 Act represents a decisive departure from that regime. [22][26][25]
Harsha Constructions v. Union of India and Others, (2014) 9 SCC 246 Relied upon by the respondents in support of their position on “excepted matters.” The opinion records the respondents’ reliance but contains no separate discussion applying this precedent. [23][27]
Chloro Controls India Pvt. Ltd. v. Severn Trent Water Purification Inc. & Ors., (2013) 1 SCC 641 The 1996 Act is modelled on the UNCITRAL Model Law and seeks conformity with the UNCITRAL framework and relevant international conventions. Used to explain the statutory context favouring limited judicial intervention in arbitration. [28][29][30]
Konkan Railway Corpn. Ltd. & Ors. v. Mehul Construction Co., (2000) 7 SCC 201 Originally characterised appointment under Section 11(6) as administrative and left contested questions to the Tribunal under Section 16. Discussed as the first phase in the evolution toward a narrower referral-court role. [31][32]
Konkan Railway Corpn. Ltd. v. Rani Construction (P) Ltd., (2002) 2 SCC 388 Reaffirmed that the Section 11(6) appointment power was administrative. Included in the Court’s historical survey of judicial scrutiny at the referral stage. [31][33]
SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. and Another, (2005) 8 SCC 618 Held that the Section 11 appointment power is judicial and requires examination of matters including the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. Identified as overruling the earlier Konkan Railway approach; its wider scrutiny was later legislatively curtailed. [31][34][35][36]
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Boghara Polyfab (P) Ltd., (2009) 1 SCC 267 Classified Section 11 issues and treated questions concerning claims excluded from arbitration as matters for the Tribunal. Supported leaving “excepted matters” questions to arbitral determination, although its broader referral-stage scrutiny was later curtailed by Section 11(6A). [37][38][39][36]
Duro Felguera, S.A. v. Gangavaram Port Ltd., (2017) 9 SCC 729 Under Section 11(6A), the referral court examines only whether an arbitration agreement exists. Supported the restricted scope of judicial scrutiny at the appointment stage. [35][40]
Mayavati Trading (P) Ltd. v. Pradyuat Deb Burman, (2019) 8 SCC 714 Held that Section 11(6A) legislatively overruled the wider scrutiny contemplated in SBP & Co. and Boghara Polyfab. Reinforced that jurisdictional and arbitrability questions generally remain for the Tribunal. [35][36][41]
Vidya Drolia and Others v. Durga Trading Corporation, (2021) 2 SCC 1 A court should refuse reference only when non-existence, invalidity, or non-arbitrability is manifest and ex facie certain; otherwise, “when in doubt, do refer.” The Court relied on this “eye of the needle” standard to emphasize minimal pre-arbitral judicial interference. [42][43][44]
Uttarakhand Purv Sainik Kalyan Nigam Ltd. v. Northern Coal Field Ltd., (2020) 2 SCC 455 Limitation, as a mixed question of fact and law connected with Section 16 jurisdiction, is ordinarily for the Tribunal. Cited as a consistent application of restricted judicial scrutiny. [44][45]
In Re: Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements and the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, (2024) 6 SCC 1 Insufficient stamping is a curable evidentiary matter for the Tribunal. Cited as further confirmation that preliminary objections generally should not obstruct arbitral determination. [44][46]
N.N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd., (2023) 7 SCC 1 Earlier authority concerning the effect of insufficient stamping. Noted as overruled by the seven-Judge Bench in In Re: Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements and the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. [44][47]
SBI General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Krish Spinning, (2024) 12 SCC 1 Section 11(6A) permits only prima facie examination of an arbitration agreement’s existence, while Section 16 empowers the Tribunal to rule on jurisdiction. Relied upon to distinguish limited judicial “examination” from the Tribunal’s authority to “rule” on jurisdiction. [48][49][50][51][52]
Office for Alternative Architecture v. Ircon Infrastructure and Services Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1098 Reiterated the limited scope of referral-court scrutiny. Cited as reaffirming the approach stated in SBI General Insurance Company Ltd. [53][54][55]

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Clauses 63 and 64 of the GCC exclude specified “excepted matters” from arbitration and make the relevant Railway authority’s decisions final and binding. However, their combined effect does not exclude the jurisdiction of courts to examine the validity of decisions concerning such matters. [56][57][58][59][60]

Sections 5 and 16 of the 1996 Act embody limited judicial intervention and the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz. Section 16 empowers the Tribunal to rule upon its own jurisdiction, including objections concerning the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. [61][62]

The Court’s survey of the case law showed a progressively narrower conception of the referral court’s role. The prevailing standard confines judicial scrutiny to a prima facie examination and leaves contested questions of jurisdiction and arbitrability to the Tribunal. [63][31][64][35][44][51]

Accordingly, whether a claim is covered by an “excepted matters” clause lies within the Tribunal’s competence under Section 16. A court exercising Article 226 jurisdiction has even less basis to decide that question, particularly where it has declined to examine the merits because they involve complicated factual disputes. [65]

The Division Bench’s direction that claims be decided strictly according to the contract could restrict the scope of the Arbitrator’s inquiry and interfere with the power to determine jurisdiction over the termination dispute. A writ appellate court could not prescribe in advance how that jurisdictional inquiry should be conducted. [66][16][17]

The Division Bench also should not have made the disputed observation because the arbitrability of the termination dispute was not an issue before it. Whether termination is wholly or partly an “excepted matter,” and what alternative remedy may remain, must be decided by the Arbitrator in the first instance. [16][17]

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISPOSED OF. The Supreme Court clarified that the Division Bench’s direction requiring the Arbitrator to decide claims according to the contract must not be construed as restricting the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute concerning termination of the contract. [67][68]

The Tribunal remains free under Section 16 to determine whether the termination dispute is arbitrable or falls within the contractual “excepted matters” clause. The Supreme Court expressed no opinion on the merits of the dispute. [16][67]

No costs were awarded, and all pending applications were disposed of. [68][69]

Show all summary ...

2026 INSC 976

1

[REPORTABLE]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 7338 OF 2026) M/s. GVV Constructions

Private Limited … Appellant

Versus

The Union of India & Ors. … Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Alok Aradhe, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal takes exception to the judgment dated 16.12.2025 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad.

FACTS

3. The facts leading to the filing of the present appeal may be stated briefly. The appellant is a private limited company and is engaged in construction and infrastructure works. On 21.02.2017, South Central Railway namely, respondent no. 2 invited tenders for the work of "Doubling of track between Guntur-Guntakal Section- Earthwork in formation including blanketing to GE: 0014

1

2

specifications, construction of bridges, RUBs for LCs and other miscellaneous works…." ('Work'). In response to the aforesaid tender, the appellant submitted its bid. The appellant's bid was accepted, and on 30.11.2017, a formal Contract Agreement was executed stipulating the due date of completion of the Work as

23.10.2018.

4. On 10.06.2022, the said contract was terminated under Clause 62 of Indian Railways Standard General Conditions of Contract ('GCC') and the performance guarantee and security furnished by the appellant were also forfeited. Further, the appellant was held to be disentitled to any compensation for any loss.

5. The appellant sought quashing of the aforesaid order of termination in a writ petition inter alia on the ground that the same is in contravention of the procedure laid down under GCC and sought a consequential direction to respondents to follow Clause 17 of the GCC. The learned Single Judge by an order dated 18.10.2022, dismissed the writ petition inter alia on the ground that serious and complicated questions of fact were not amenable to adjudication under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In paragraph 35 of the order, the learned Single Judge further held that since the appellant had already invoked the

3

arbitration clause by filing an arbitration petition it could take all its defences before the Arbitral Tribunal. However, it was also recorded as a finding that there existed no irregularity in the order of termination of contract.

6. Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred an appeal. The Division Bench of the High Court vide its judgment dated 16.12.2025, held that the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge that the contract of the appellant had been validly terminated, was without assigning any reason. It was further held that if the validity of the order of termination of contract is upheld, there would be no scope left for the Arbitral Tribunal or any other forum to decide the dispute in favour of the appellant. The Division Bench accordingly set aside the finding contained in paragraph 35 of the order of the learned Single Judge which stated that there exists no irregularity in termination of the contract of the appellant. The appellant was granted the liberty to raise all its claims before the Arbitral Tribunal, which in turn was granted the liberty to decide the claims of the appellant strictly in accordance with the terms of the contract agreed upon between the parties. The Division Bench clarified that the Arbitral Tribunal shall take a decision in accordance with law

4

without being influenced by the observations made either by it or by the learned Single Judge.

7. In pursuance of the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court, a former judge of this Court was appointed as the Sole Arbitrator and arbitration proceedings commenced on 20.01.2026. The Arbitral Tribunal framed twelve issues including the issue of the validity of the order of termination dated 10.06.2022 and the question whether any claims are barred by limitation or fall under "excepted matters" or are not otherwise arbitrable.

SUBMISSIONS

8. Mr. Gaurav Agarwal, learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that the reasons for delay in completion of the Work were not attributable to the appellant. It was contended that the contract was illegally terminated. It was pointed out that respondents themselves admitted in paragraph 1 of the counter affidavit filed in the writ petition, that the same is not maintainable, as appellant has an effective and alternative remedy of arbitration. Therefore, the respondents cannot now turn around and dispute that the issue of termination of contract cannot be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal. It was urged that the

5

only grievance of the appellant in the present appeal pertains to the direction issued by the Division Bench to the Arbitral Tribunal to decide all claims of the appellant in accordance with the terms of the contract agreed upon by the parties. It was contended that the issue of the illegal termination of the contract is directly and intrinsically linked with all other issues pending before the Arbitral Tribunal and, therefore, it should be permitted to decide the issue of termination of contract as well. It was submitted that the impugned direction is contrary to the decision of this Court in ABS Marine Services v. Andaman and Nicobar Administration1.

9. Mr. Vikramjit Banerjee, learned Additional Solicitor General, submitted that appellant by seeking to submit the issue of validity of termination of contract to arbitration is acting in direct violation of Clause 63 of GCC which was signed and accepted by both the parties. It was further submitted that exclusion of validity of termination of the contract from the scope of arbitration does not prevent the appellant from approaching the civil court which is the designated forum for "excepted matters".

It was contended that the reliance placed on the decision of this

1 2026 SCC OnLine SC 460.

6

Court in ABS Marine Services (supra), is misplaced as the clauses in GCC are different from the Clause struck down by this Court in the said decision. It was urged that the Arbitral Tribunal has no jurisdiction over "excepted matters" under the GCC and the impugned judgment does not call for any interference in this appeal. In support of the aforesaid submissions, reliance has been placed on the decisions of this Court in General Manager, Northern Railway and Another2 v. Sarvesh Chopra and

Harsha Constructions v. Union of India and Others3.

ANALYSIS

10. We have carefully considered the rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the respective parties and have perused the record.

ISSUE

11. The solitary issue which arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the observation of the Division Bench that "the Arbitrator is at liberty to decide the claim of the appellant strictly in accordance with the terms of the contract agreed upon between the parties", travels beyond the scope of the jurisdiction of a court exercising power of judicial review under Article 226 of

2 (2002) 4 SCC 45.

3 (2014) 9 SCC 246.

7

the Constitution of India and impinges upon the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ('Act').

RELEVANT CLAUSES OF THE AGREEMENT

12. Before proceeding to deal with the issue, it is apposite to take note of Clause 63 and relevant parts of Clause 64 of the GCC :-

"63. Matters Finally Determined By The Railway: All disputes and differences of any kind whatsoever arising out of or in connection with the contract, whether during the progress of the work or after its completion and whether before or after the determination of the contract, shall be referred by the contractor to the GM and the GM shall, within 120 days after receipt of the contractor's representation, make and notify decisions on all matters referred to by the contractor in writing provided that matters for which provision has been made in Clauses 8, 18, 22(5), 39, 43(2), 45(a), 55, 55-A(5), 57, 57A, 61(1), 61(2) and 62(1) to (xiii)(B) of Standard General Conditions of Contract or in any Clause of the Special Conditions of the Contract shall be deemed as 'excepted matters' (matters not arbitrable) and decisions of the Railway authority, thereon shall be final and binding on the contractor; provided further that 'excepted matters' shall stand specifically excluded from the purview of the Arbitration Clause. 64.(1) Demand for Arbitration

8

64.(1)(i) In the event of any dispute or difference between the parties hereto as to the construction or operation of this contract, or the respective rights and liability of the parties on any matter in question, dispute or difference on any account or as to the withholding by the Railway of any certificate to which the contractor may claim to be entitled to, or if the Railway fails to make a decision within 120 days, then and in any such case, but except in any of the "excepted matters" referred to in Clause 63 of these conditions, the contractor, after 120 days but within 180 days of his presenting his final claim on disputed matters shall demand in writing that the dispute or difference be referred to arbitration.

64.(1)(ii) The demand for arbitration shall specify the matters which are in question, or subject of the dispute or difference as also the amount of claim item-wise. Only such dispute(s) or difference(s) in respect of which the demand has been made, together with counter claims or set off, given by the Railway, shall be referred to arbitration and other matters shall not be including in the reference."

Thus, a conjoint reading of Clause 63 and relevant part of Clause 64 of the GCC, makes it clear that Clause 63 only excludes the excepted matters from the purview of the Arbitration Clause but does not exclude the jurisdiction of the Court of Law to examine the validity of the decision taken in respect of excepted matters.

THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996

13. The Act is modelled on the UNCITRAL Model Law and is intended to bring the domestic as well as International Commercial

9

Arbitration in consonance with the UNCITRAL Model, the New York Convention and the Geneva Convention, as has been held by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Chloro Controls India Pvt. Ltd. v. Severn Trent Water Purification Inc. & Ors.4

Section 5 of the Act prescribes the extent of judicial intervention and begins with a non-obstante clause and mandates that "no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this part". Section 16(1) of the Act empowers the Arbitral Tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction "including ruling on any objections with respect to existence or validity of the arbitration agreement".

Section 16 incorporates the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz, which lies at the foundation of the Act and makes a decisive departure from the preceding statutory regime contained in the Arbitration Act, 1940.

PERMISSIBLE EXTENT OF JUDICIAL SCRUTINY PRIOR OR

AT THE STAGE OF REFERENCE OF DISPUTE

14. The extent of judicial scrutiny permissible even at the stage anterior to appointment of an Arbitrator or at the stage of appointment of an Arbitrator under Section 11 of the Act has travelled through four distinct phases each marking a

4 (2013) 1 SCC 641.

10

progressively narrower conception of the Court's role, culminating in the position that holds the field today. In Konkan Railway Corpn. Ltd. & Ors. v. Mehul Construction Co.5, reaffirmed by a Constitution Bench in Konkan Railway Corpn. Ltd. v. Rani Construction (P) Ltd.6, this Court characterised the power of appointment under Section 11(6) as purely administrative, leaving every contested question, including the existence of the agreement and arbitrability, to the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16. The aforesaid view was overruled by a seven-Judge Bench in SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering. Ltd. and Another7, wherein it was held the power to be judicial, requiring the court, at the referral stage, to decide, amongst other things, the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. This view was refined in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Boghara Polyfab

(P) Ltd.8, which classified the issues arising on a Section 11 application into three categories, of which "Category III" issues, namely whether the claim made falls within the arbitration clause, illustratively including "a matter which is reserved for the final decision of a departmental authority and excepted or

5 (2000) 7 SCC 201.

6 (2002) 2 SCC 388.

7 (2005) 8 SCC 618.

8 (2009) 1 SCC 267.

11

excluded from arbitration", were held to be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal alone, and not by the referral court.

15. The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, on the basis of the recommendations contained in the 246thReport of the Law Commission of India, inserted Section 11(6A)9in the Act, by which the scope of examination by the Court,

"notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court", is confined, at the stage of appointment, to the existence of the arbitration agreement. In Duro Felguera, S.A. v. Gangavaram Port Ltd.10, this Court applied the amended provision literally, holding that the referral court is only required to examine "if an arbitration agreement exists, nothing more, nothing less". A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Mayavati Trading (P) Ltd. v. Pradyuat Deb Burman11, held that Section 11(6A) legislatively overruled the wider scrutiny contemplated by SBP & Co. and

Boghara Polyfab (supra).

16. Another three-Judge Bench of this Court in Vidya Drolia and Others v. Durga Trading Corporation12, harmonised the standard of review under Sections 8 and 11 of the Act and held

9 Sub-section (6A) omitted by Act 33 of 2019 , sec 3(v) [Date of enforcement yet to be notified.]

10 (2017) 9 SCC 729.

11 (2019) 8 SCC 714.

12 (2021) 2 SCC 1.

12

that a court should decline reference only where it is manifestly and ex facie certain that the arbitration agreement is non- existent, invalid, or that the dispute is non-arbitrable; short of that, the governing maxim is "when in doubt, do refer." This "eye of the needle" standard has since been applied consistently, in subsequent decisions by this Court in Uttarakhand Purv Sainik Kalyan Nigam Ltd. v. Northern Coal Field Ltd.13 (holding that limitation, being a mixed question of fact and law bound up with the Tribunal's Section 16 jurisdiction, is ordinarily for the Arbitral Tribunal) and in In Re: Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements and the Indian Stamp Act, 189914 (holding by a seven-Judge Bench, that even insufficiency of stamping is a curable, evidentiary question for the Tribunal, and thus overruling N.N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd.)15.

17. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in SBI General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Krish Spinning16, in paragraph 114 held as follows,

"The use of the term "examination" under Section 11(6-

A) as distinguished from the use of the term "rule"

13 (2020) 2 SCC 455.

14 (2024) 6 SCC 1.

15 (2023) 7 SCC 1 (overruled).

16 (2024) 12 SCC 1.

13

under Section 16 implies that the scope of enquiry under Section 11(6-A) is limited to a prima facie scrutiny of the existence of the arbitration agreement, and does not include a contested or laborious enquiry, which is left for the Arbitral Tribunal to "rule" under Section 16. The prima facie view on existence of the arbitration agreement taken by the Referral Court does not bind either the Arbitral Tribunal or the Court enforcing the arbitral award."

This view was reiterated by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in

Office for Alternative Architecture v. Ircon Infrastructure and Services Ltd.17

18. What emerges from the foregoing survey is that, under the Act, the question whether a particular claim is covered by, or falls outside, an "excepted matters" clause of a works contract is a matter squarely within the competence of the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16, and not a question for a court exercising even the wider, appointment-stage jurisdiction under Section 11, much less for a court exercising the discretionary jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution, whose very engagement with the merits of the dispute, in the present case, was declined on the ground that it involved complicated questions of fact.

17 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1098.

14

19. If a court exercising the power of appointment under Section 11(6A) has no jurisdiction to enter upon, still less to pre- determine, the touchstone by reference to which the Arbitral Tribunal is to adjudicate a claim said to fall within an "excepted matters" clause, a writ appellate court, whose task was confined to testing the correctness of the learned Single Judge's disposal of a writ petition impugning a termination notice, had, by parity of reasoning and a fortiori, no such jurisdiction. The direction that the Arbitrator "is at liberty to decide the claim of the appellant strictly in accordance with the terms of the contract agreed upon between the parties", whatever the intention behind it, has the inevitable effect of circumscribing the width of the Arbitrator's enquiry, including his authority under Section 16 to rule upon the scope of his own jurisdiction over the dispute relating to termination.

20. Whether the dispute regarding termination is, in whole or in part, an "excepted matter" outside the Arbitrator's jurisdiction, and, if so, what remedy survives to the appellant in that behalf, are questions that Section 16 of the Act commits to the Arbitrator in the first instance. It was not open to the Division Bench, in the exercise of its writ appellate jurisdiction, to prescribe in advance

15

the manner of, or to place constraints upon, that adjudication. For yet another reason, the Division Bench ought not to have made such an observation as the issue of arbitrability of termination of agreement was not an issue before it. Accordingly, the issue is answered.

21. Insofar as reliance placed by the appellant on ABS Marine Services (supra) is concerned, suffice it to say that same has no application to the fact situation of the case, as Clauses 3.20 of the said case and 63 of GCC in the instant case are differently worded. Clause 3.20 in ABS Marine Services (supra) ousts the jurisdiction of any court of law and prohibits arbitration proceedings as well, whereas in the instant case, Clause 63 does not bar the jurisdiction of the court but only puts the excepted matters beyond the scope of arbitration. As far as the reliance placed by the respondents on General Manager Northern

Railway (supra) is concerned, same is of no assistance to them in the facts of the present case for the reason, that in the said case, this Court dealt with Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and the provisions of the Act make a decisive departure from the previous statutory regime.

16

CONCLUSION

22. For the foregoing reasons, it is clarified that the direction issued by the Division Bench to the Arbitrator to decide all claims of the appellant strictly in accordance with the terms of the contract agreed upon between the parties shall not be construed to impinge upon the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal, to adjudicate the dispute with regard to termination of contract. It is clarified that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case.

23. In the result, the appeal is disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.

24. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

……………..……………………………….J.

[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA]

…….…………………………………………J.

[ALOK ARADHE]

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 08, 2026.