MIR HUSSAIN AND 51 ORS. v. THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 8 ORS

3. The facts are not in dispute. The appellants claim to be residents of different villages situated within or adjoining the areas comprising the Barapani, Lutumai, Kaki and other Reserve Forests in the district of Nagaon.

4. Their case is that they and their predecessors have been residing in these areas for decades and have established permanent dwellings, cultivated lands, and developed sources of livelihood thereon.

5. The foundation of their claim is that, following earlier eviction operations undertaken in the year 1970, certain displaced families were permitted by the Forest Department to undertake cultivation and temporary residence under the Taungya system. According to the appellants, original Taungya settlers were allotted land for plantation activities and habitation, and many of the present occupants derive their position either as descendants of such settlers or through transfer, inheritance or long uninterrupted occupation.

6. To substantiate this assertion, reliance has been placed upon Taungya certificates, communications exchange between Governmental Authorities, Departmental Letters, Telegrams, Electoral Rolls, Certificates issued by Panchayat Authorities, Annual Pattas, Land Revenue Receipts and similar documents. It is contended that these materials demonstrate recognition of their occupation by the State and establish either an accrued legal right or at least a legitimate expectation that their possession would not be disturbed.

7. The appellants further submit that over the years, public infrastructure has developed in the concerned areas, including school buildings and roads; that local Administrative Authorities have recognised the settlements for several purposes and that Governmental conduct over an extended period evidences acceptance of their occupation. They, therefore, contend that the impugned action of the Forest Authorities is arbitrary, contrary to past Governmental conduct and violative of principles of fairness.

8. The controversy has a long, protracted history of litigation.

9. Upon the issuance of eviction notices in 2025, several affected persons approached this court by filing writ petitions challenging the forest department's proposed action.

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10. In some of these Writ proceedings, the petitioners were granted liberty to submit representations to the competent authorities, together with documents in support of their claims.

11. In subsequent proceedings, this court directed that the claim of the occupants be verified afresh and that an opportunity be afforded to them to participate in the process and produce all relevant materials before any final decision affecting their occupation was taken. Orders passed eventually came under consideration before the Supreme Court in

Abdul Khalek vs. State of Assam & Ors., reported in 2026 SCC Online SC 184.

12. In Abdul Khalek (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court underscored the imperative of preserving and protecting reserve forest while ensuring that no coercive action is taken without adherence to the fair procedure. The court directed the State to undertake a scientific and coordinated verification of the land under occupation through an appropriate mechanism, to afford the affected persons an opportunity to produce documents and raise their claim, to examine whether they possess any legally recognisable right or protection under the applicable law, and thereafter pass a reasoned order before proceeding further.

The Supreme Court also accepted the procedure for carrying out such an exercise, to be fair.

The emphasis of the Supreme Court was thus on procedural fairness and the accurate identification of the status of the land and its occupants, without diluting the statutory regime governing reserve forests or creating substantive rights in favour of a person unable to establish lawful rights/ entitlements.

13. Thus, the Supreme Court, while disposing of the aforesaid writ petition, emphasised the need to uphold the rule of law and protect forest lands while simultaneously assuring that persons facing eviction are afforded procedural safeguards and an opportunity to establish such rights, if any, as may be available to them.

14. Pursuant to the observations and directions issued by the Supreme Court, the Government of Assam constituted Committees comprising officers of the Forest and

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Revenue Departments to undertake a comprehensive verification exercise. The Committees were entrusted with examining the relevant records, identifying the precise location of the lands under occupation, verifying whether such lands fell within the notified Reserve Forest and considering the materials produced by the occupants before the appropriate speaking order was passed. Thereafter, notices were issued to the appellants individually, representations were invited, Forest and Revenue Officials undertook joint verification, and respective Speaking Orders were passed, recording, inter alia, that the lands under occupation fell within the notified Reserve Forest and that no legally cognizable documents conferring right, title or authority over such lands had been produced by the occupants.

15. It is these all Speaking Orders which were assailed before the learned Single Judge and upon dismissal of the Writ petitions have given rise to the present appeals.

16. The principal submission advanced by Mr. A. R. Bhuyan, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, is that the authorities have proceeded on an erroneous assumption that they are land encroachers upon reserved forest land.

17. According to them, their occupation has historical roots traceable to Governmental decisions made in 1970, pursuant to which displaced families were accommodated under the Taungya system. It is contended that various certificates, Governmental communications and departmental records relied upon by them establish official recognition of such occupation and negate the allegation of unlawful entry. It is further submitted that many of the present occupants have succeeded in the interest of the original Taungya settlers and therefore, possess rights which the State cannot ignore.

18. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellants has also relied upon Electoral Rolls, Aadhaar Cards, Voter Identity Cards, Ration Cards, Electricity Connections, Panchayat Records, Annual Pattas and Revenue Receipts to contend that multiple organs of the State have consistently recognised the settlements and extended civic and administrative facilities to the occupants. It is argued that such conduct creates a legitimate expectation that the occupants would either be regularised or, at the very least, not be summarily evicted.

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19. The learned Senior Counsel further contends that the verification exercise undertaken pursuant to the directions of the Supreme Court in Abdul Khalek (supra)

was not conducted in the manner contemplated by law, and the authorities failed to appreciate the historical documents and evidence produced by them.

20. According to them, the Speaking Orders have been passed mechanically without proper consideration of the individual facts and circumstances of each case.

21. Mr. Bhuyan, learned Senior Counsel has also argued that several families have resided in the areas for generations and that the balance between environmental concerns and human habitation ought to be struck in a manner that protects settled communities from displacement, particularly when their occupation is asserted to have originated under Governmental arrangements.

22. Per contra, Mr. P.N. Goswami, learned Senior counsel, appearing for the State, contends that the lands in question indisputably form part of duly notified Reserve Forests and that no legally enforceable right has ever been created in favour of the appellants or their predecessors.

23. According to Mr. Goswami, the Taungya arrangements relied upon by the appellants were purely temporary administrative measures intended to facilitate plantation activities. They did not create permanent heritable or transferable rights over forest land. It is further submitted that public documents such as Aadhaar Cards, Electoral Rolls, Ration Cards, Electricity Bill or Certificates issued by local authorities neither create nor recognise title and cannot override statutory notifications constituting Reserved Forests. The respondents also contend that after the enactment of the Forests (Conservation) Act 1980, no settlement or diversion of forest land can be recognised except in accordance with the statutory mandate.

24. The State asserts that the procedure directed by the Supreme Court has been scrupulously followed and that committees comprising Forest and Revenue Officials carried out joint verification using scientific methods; that opportunities were afforded to every occupant to produce documents, and that reasoned Speaking Orders were

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passed after due consideration of all materials placed before the authorities.

25. The learned Single Judge undertook an extensive examination of the pleadings, the statutory framework governing Reserved Forests, the historical documents relied upon by the parties, and the directions issued by the Supreme Court in Abdul Khalek (supra).

The learned Single Judge framed principal questions as to whether the authority had complied with the procedural safeguards envisaged by the Supreme Court in

Abdul Khalek (supra) and whether the petitioners had established any legally enforceable right to remain within the reserved forests. Upon consideration of the materials of record, the learned Single Judge concluded that the verification exercise undertaken by the committees satisfied the procedural safeguards contemplated by the Supreme Court, rejecting the challenge to the procedural validity of the exercise.

26. On merit of the claims, the learned Single Judge held that the appellants had failed to produce any document conferring title or any legally enforceable right over the lands in question.

The court observed that documents such as Aadhar Cards, Voter Identity Cards, Electoral Rolls, Ration Cards, Electricity Connections and similar records may establish identity or residence but do not create proprietary rights over forest land.

27. Likewise, the Taungya Certificates and contemporaneous Governmental communications were construed as reflecting temporary administrative arrangements and not confined to permanent, heritable or transferable rights.

28. The learned Single Judge further held that neither long possession nor equitable considerations could prevail against the Statutory Scheme governing reserve forests and the constitutional obligation of the State to protect them. Accordingly, the writ petitions were dismissed.

29. We have bestowed our anxious considerations on the challenge mounted by the appellants and also independently examined the materials placed before us. Let us now

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deal with contentions raised before us, under the following headings:

I. The Constitution of the Committees and verification:

30. The materials on the records indicate that, pursuant to the directions issued by the Supreme Court, as recorded hereinabove, with a purpose to ensure that the determination was not founded merely on departmental assertions but upon a coordinated exercise involving both technical and revenue authorities, the verification exercise was carried out.

31. The verification exercise was designed to ascertain the precise location of the lands under occupation, correlate the same with the notified boundaries of the Reserve Forest, examine the documentary materials produced by the occupants and place the competent authority in a position to pass a reasoned order based upon objective criteria.

32. We find nothing on record to indicate that the Constitution of the Committees or the exercise undertaken by them was contrary to the directions issued by the Supreme Court or otherwise tainted by arbitrariness. Mere dissatisfaction with the outcome of the verification cannot by itself render the process invalid.

II. Opportunity to the Appellants:

33. We have also noticed that notices were issued to the appellants individually, requiring them to place their objections and supporting materials before the competent authority. Pursuant thereto, representations were submitted by the appellants, documents relied upon by them were taken on record, and thereafter the impugned speaking orders came to be passed.

34. The principles of natural justice do not insist upon any rigid or ritualistic formula. What they require is a fair opportunity to know the case sought to be made against a person

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and an adequate opportunity to respond thereto. The doctrine is one of fairness.

35. In the present case, the appellants were aware of the allegations made against them, were informed that authorities considered their occupation to fall within the notified Reserve Forests, were invited to produce all documents in support of their claims, and, in fact, the appellants availed themselves of such opportunity.

36. There is nothing to indicate that the material documents sought to be produced were refused consideration or that appellants were denied participation in the process.

III. Requirement of Individual Considerations:

37. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that authorities mechanically rejected all claims without proper appreciation of the distinct factual backgrounds of individual occupants does not persuade us.

38. A reading of the Speaking Orders indicates that the authorities examined the claims projected by the prospective occupants, noticed the categories of documents relied upon by them and recorded reasons for concluding that such materials did not establish any legally enforceable right over the lands in question.

39. It is undoubtedly desirable that administrative orders with civil consequences contain adequate reasons. Equally, the law does not require prolixity or elaborate adjudicatory discussion akin to a judicial judgment.

The reasons need only disclosure of due application of mind to the issues arising for consideration, and indicate why the authority has accepted or rejected contentions advanced before it.

40. Tested on the above principles, the speaking orders cannot be characterised as cryptic or non-speaking merely because they do not deal separately with every document or every submission advanced by the appellants.

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IV. Scientific Verification and Identification of Boundaries:

41. One of the principal grievances advanced before us concerns the methodology adopted for identifying whether the lands under occupation fall within the notified reserve forest. The learned Senior counsel for the appellants also contends that the digitised or GIS- based map relied upon by the authorities has no statutory sanctity and therefore could not have been used for determining that the appellants occupy land within reserve forests.

42. We find no merit in the submission.

43. The learned Single Judge has noted that the authorities undertook verification through the joint participation of Forest and Revenue Officials and employed scientific methods, including modern survey techniques and geospatial identification, to correlate the lands under occupation with the notified forest boundaries. The record further indicates that such exercise was undertaken pursuant to the procedural framework that has evolved and been accepted by the Supreme Court in Abdul Khalek (supra).

44. The records available reveal that the legal basis for identifying the reserve forest is the original Gazette Notification and the boundary description contained therein. The digitised map does not create or alter those boundaries; it merely represents them in a modern geospatial format to facilitate accurate on-the-ground identification.

45. The methodology adopted by the State shows that the digital map is prepared by reading the original notification together with the accompanying sketch map and survey of Indian Toposheets, georeferencing them with orthorectified satellite imagery (OSI), and thereafter undertaking field verification using DGPS/DGNSS (Differential Global Navigation Satellite System).

46. The coordinates of boundary pillars and the encroachments were physically verified and integrated into the final GIS map. We have also perused the maps produced by way of additional affidavit before the learned Single Judge, which are part of the record, and which clearly show the encroached areas along with the boundary, with GPS

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coordinates.

47. Thus, the electronic map is not the primary source of title or boundary determination but a scientific aid for implementing and visualising the boundaries already established by statutory notification. The appellants have produced no alternative materials, nor have they suggested any error in the methodology or conclusions reached therefrom.

48. The use of modern technology to identify and verify pre-existing notified boundaries cannot be faulted merely because the original notifications predate such technology. On the contrary, geo-referencing and DGPS-based verification enhance precision and transparency while remaining faithful to the original legal records. In any event, the impugned findings do not rest solely upon the digitised map.

They are supported by gazette notifications, the boundary schedule, Survey of India records, georeferenced overlays, and field verification undertaken by the competent authorities. The GIS map is therefore only one component of the evidentiary exercise and not the sole foundation of the decision. The appellants have not placed before us any convincing technical material demonstrating that the methodology itself was fundamentally flawed or that conclusions reached through such exercise are demonstratively erroneous. Bald assertions questioning the correctness of the survey, unsupported by cogent evidence, cannot displace the findings recorded through an official verification undertaken by the Competent Authority.

Significantly, no alternative survey of comparable evidentiary value has been produced by the appellants to establish that the lands occupied by them lie outside the notified boundaries of the Reserve Forest.

49. We accordingly reject the challenge to the validity or evidentiary use of the digitised map and hold that authorities were justified in relying upon the GIS-based exercise, read in conjunction with original statutory records and the field verification for identifying the location of the reserve forest boundaries and the alleged encroachments.

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V. Onus of Proof:

50. The argument that the onus of proof lies upon the Forest Department to prove that the lands are situated within the Reserve Forest, and they have failed to discharge the same, also does not find favour with us.

51. The answer to the said argument lies in the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in

Abdul Khalek (supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court has, in no uncertain terms, clarified that the Committee shall give the appellants an opportunity to adduce evidence to show that they have the right to occupy the land which is in their possession and that if it is found that there is an encroachment in the reserved forest area, action for removal therefrom shall be taken.

VI. Any prejudice resulting from such procedure adopted:

52. It is equally well settled that an alleged procedural irregularity would justify interference only when prejudice is shown to have resulted therefrom.

53. In the present case, despite repeated opportunities before the learned Single Judge, the appellants have not been able to point out any material document of title or legally cognizable right which remains excluded from consideration or which, if considered, would have altered the ultimate conclusion.

54. The grievance of the appellants, therefore, is directed more against the substantive findings recorded by the authorities than against any denial of opportunity.

55. Thus, after having independently evaluated the entire material on record, we concur with the conclusion reached by the learned Single Judge that the procedure adopted by the authorities substantially conforms to the safeguards emphasised by the Supreme Court in Abdul Khalek (supra) and satisfies the requirements of fairness and natural justice.

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56. This, however, does not conclude the controversy.

VII. Whether Any Enforceable Rights are Available to The Appellants:

57. The more fundamental question remains whether the materials relied upon by the appellants, particularly the Taungya arrangement, Governmental Correspondence, Identity Documents, Panchayat Records, Annual Pattas, and other allied documents, confirm any legally enforceable right to continue in occupation of the lands forming part of the Notified Reserve Forest. We now proceed to examine that question.

58. This controversy must be approached by maintaining a clear distinction between proof of occupation and proof of legal entitlement.

A person may establish that he has been residing upon a particular parcel of land for several years or even decades. Still, that fact by itself does not answer the juridical question.

The real question for determination is whether such an occupation is sanctioned by law or capable of defeating statutory rights vested in the State under the Forest Conservation Act.

59. The appellants have undoubtedly produced numerous documents indicating residence, identity and long association with the localities concerned. The decisive question, however, is whether those materials create, recognise, or evidence any right in law to continue in occupation of lands admittedly forming part of the notified reserve forest.

VIII. Status of the Land:

60. It is not seriously disputed before us that the lands identified in the Speaking Orders fall within the geographical limits of a duly notified reserve forest.

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The appellants have not challenged the validity of the notifications constituting the reserve forest, nor have they established that the lands occupied by them were lawfully excluded therefrom.

61. Once an area stands notified as a reserve forest in accordance with law, the legal incidence flowing from such notification necessarily attaches to the land. Rights inconsistent with such notification cannot thereafter be assumed or inferred merely from prolonged occupation or administrative inaction.

Any person asserting a continuing right over such land must establish the same by reference to a legally recognised source.

62. In the present case, despite elaborate submissions, the appellants have not produced any statutory grant, settlement order or instrument recognised by law conferring upon them or their predecessors an enforceable property or possessory right over the reserve forest.

IX.Taungya Arrangements and Their Legal Effect:

63. Considerable emphasis has been placed on the Taungya system and the 1970s documents relating thereto.

64. It is argued that those arrangements constituted governmental recognition of the occupants and conferred rights that could be transmitted to successors.

65. We are unable to accept such a submission.

66. The materials relied upon indicate, at the highest, that certain displaced persons were permitted to undertake plantation activities or were temporarily accommodated under the Taungya system.

Such arrangements were essentially administrative measures intended to facilitate forestry operations and rehabilitation in a limited context.

They cannot, in the absence of clear statutory authority, be constituted as grants creating a permanent, heritable or transferable interest in forest land.

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Equally significant is the absence of any material demonstrating that the competent authority intended to alienate reserve forest land or permanently divest the state of its rights therein.

Neither the language of the communications relied upon by the appellants nor the surrounding circumstances support such interference.

We are therefore in respectful agreement with the conclusions of the learned Single Judge that the Taungya documents relied upon by the appellants do not confer title or any legally enforceable right to continue in occupation of the reserve forest.

X.Claims derived from Original Taungya Settlers:

67. Several appellants seek to distinguish themselves by asserting that although they may not be original Taungya settlers, they have acquired possession through purchase, gift, inheritance or other private arrangements from persons who allegedly held Taungya rights.

Such derivative claims cannot be accepted for more than one reason. In the first place, no person can ordinarily transfer a better title than he himself possesses.

In view of the determination made hereinabove as regards Taungya arrangements, no subsequent private transaction could enlarge or improve the legal status of such claimants.

Secondly, many of the documents relied on in support of such transfers are unregistered private arrangements or informal transactions, which, even otherwise, cannot operate to convey the rights in the reserve forest.

XI.Governmental correspondences and Internal communications:

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68. The appellants have also relied upon various letters, telegrams and communications exchanged between Governmental authorities during different periods proposing their settlements.

Though these documents reveal issues of accommodation/settlements of families and managing forest settlements, such internal administrative communications or recommendations cannot be equated with a statutory order creating legal rights in favour of private individuals.

Executive correspondence often records proposals, suggestions or temporary arrangements intended for administrative purposes. However, unless translated into a formal decision by the competent authority in accordance with law, such correspondence cannot be treated as conferring enforceable rights.

XII. Public Documents relied upon by the Appellants:

69. Coming to the great reliance that has been placed on Aadhar Cards, Voter Identity Cards, Electoral Rolls, Ration Cards, Electricity Connections, Panchayat Certificates and similar documents, we are of the opinion that such cards may establish identity, facilitate participation in the electoral process, serve the public distribution system, facilitate supply of power, certifies residence or administrative particulars, however, none of these documents is intended to operate as an instrument of title or confirmed proprietary rights over immovable properties.

To hold otherwise would permit administrative convenience to override statutory prohibitions and would indirectly convert welfare documentation into instruments of title, a proposition unsupported by any principle of law.

XIII.Panchayat Notifications and Local Administration:

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70. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants has tremendously urged that the lands in question have been included within the territorial limits of Gaon Panchayat, constituted under Section 5 of the Panchayat Act 1994, and that the impugned speaking orders are vitiated for having failed to deal with this aspect specifically.

71. We are unable to accept the submission.

72. Section 5 of the Panchayat Act empowers the State Government to declare different local areas comprising Revenue Villages, etc., including Forest Villages, to be a Gaon Panchayat.

73. The State Government in Abdul Khalek (supra) took a specific stand before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that Lawful occupation within Forest Village, in such areas notified, must be independently established through the Jamabandi Register maintained by the Forest Department or through rights recognised under the Forest Rights Act 2006, and that unauthorised occupants within a Gaon Panchayat remain liable to be evicted in accordance with law. Such a procedural mechanism was accepted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Abdul Khalek (supra) as conforming to the principles of fairness and due process.

74. We are also of the considered opinion that even assuming that a notification under Section 5 of the Assam Panchayat Act, 1994 was issued declaring Gaon Panchayat within territorial limits, which forms part of a reserve forest, such notification cannot either expressly or by implication amount to de-reservation, diversion or regularisation of forest land.

75. Any such notification or even statutory action having the effect of permitting non-forest use of reserve forest land or recognising a right inconsistent with its protected status would necessarily have to satisfy the requirement of the Forest Conversion Act, 1980. In the absence of any such approval contemplated under the Central Legislation, no notification constituting a Gaon Panchayat can be construed as confining proprietary or occupancy rights over reserve forest land.

No such approval of the Central Government under the Forest Conservation Act,

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1980, is admittedly available in the present case.

76. For the aforesaid reason, the contention of the appellants that the Notification issued under Section 5 of the Panchayat Act did not identify the respective villages as forest villages, where the appellants are allegedly residing, itself satisfies that they are possessing lands outside the reserved forest, and also cannot be accepted.

XIV.Claim Under Forest Rights Act'2006:

77. The plea founded upon the Forest Rights Act, 2006, in our opinion, is equally misconceived.

78. The said enactment does not create a general right in every person residing in or near the forest to continue in occupation thereof. Recognition of rights under the Forest Rights Act, 2006, operates within the statutory framework created by Parliament and only in favour of persons who satisfy the conditions prescribed therein.

79. The Act cannot be construed as authorising wholesale regularisation of encroachment or as impliedly overriding the safeguards embodied in the Forest Conservation Act, 1980, unless rights are duly recognised in accordance with the procedure established under the Act, 2006.

No person can invoke it as a shield against eviction from reserve forest land merely based on long occupation or inclusion within a Gaon Panchayat. The stand of the State before the Hon'ble Supreme Court as regards the requirement of incorporation of name in the Jamabandi maintained by the Forest Department is relatable to the recognition of such rights by the Forest Department.

80. In the present case, no such materials are admittedly available. No material has also been placed by the appellants to even remotely suggest that the appellants are forest- dwelling scheduled tribes and/ or other traditional forest dwellers to satisfy the eligibility conditions prescribed by the Act, 2006.

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81. Mere residence within a forest area or inclusion of a settlement within a Gaon Panchayat is, therefore, insufficient to attract the protection of the Forest Rights Act. A claimant must establish that it falls within the categories recognised by the Act and that the statutory process culminating in recognition of such rights has been duly completed.

82. The appellants have not demonstrated that any such rights have been recognised in their favour. Indeed, the State affidavit placed before the Supreme Court specifically contended that unauthorised occupants residing within Gaon Panchayat areas that fall within reserve forests remain liable to eviction. Such a stand of the state was held to be procedurally fair by the Hon'ble Apex Court.

83. In this backdrop, the omission of the speaking order to separately discuss the plea based upon inclusion within a Gaon Panchayat does not occasion any prejudice.

XV.Claim based on Annual Pattas, Revenue Receipts and Similar Materials:

84. Certain appellants have also relied upon annual pattas, land revenue receipts and similar documents.

85. An annual patta, by its very nature, does not confer absolute transferable rights, though it confers inheritable rights. However, such a patta is always subject to the statutory competence of the authority issuing it and the nature of the land concerned.

86. Admittedly, the Revenue Authorities have no jurisdiction, sanction, or authority under law to issue an annual patta inside a reserve forest. Thus, where the underlying land forms part of a reserve forest and no lawful authority exists for such occupation, such issuance of an annual patta or payment of land revenue does not advance the appellant's case.

XVI. Long Possession and Legitimate Expectation:

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87. The arguments on legitimate expectation, long occupation, and the authorities' acquiescence in such occupation by extending public facilities also don't find our favour.

88. We are of the opinion that a long possession is undoubtedly a relevant factual circumstance. Nevertheless, the mere passage of time cannot, by itself, create legal rights over Reserve Forest land contrary to the Conservation Act.

89. Administrative tolerance, delay in evicting encroachers or enforcement of civic amenities cannot amount to recognition of proprietary rights over protected forest land.

90. Therefore, the doctrine of Legitimate Expectation is to of no help to the appellants. Such expectations must arise from a clear representation made by the competent authority acting within the bounds of law. It cannot be founded upon administrative inaction, temporary indulgence or conduct contrary to statutory provisions under the conservation or preservation of forest land.

More importantly, no principle of Legitimate Expectation or promissory estoppels can compel the State to act in derogation of legislation enacted for the protection of the forest or prevent the discharge of constitutional obligations cast upon public authorities.

XVII. Rehabilitation and Humanitarian Considerations:

91. After having answered the disputes relating to procedural impropriety and right of the petitioners, the remaining question that concerns this Court is the submissions regarding rehabilitation and humanitarian considerations, and whether any equitable relief can nevertheless be granted.

92. These questions shall now be examined.

93. Learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon Olga Tellis Vs Bombay Municipal Corporation reported in AIR 1986 SC 180, Sudama Singh & Ors. vs. Government of Delhi and Another reported in 2010 168 DLT 218 and Orissa Mining Corporation vs.

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The Ministry of Environment & Forest reported in (2013) 6 SCC 476 to contend that long settled occupation cannot be displaced without due regard to their livelihood, habitation and rehabilitation right.

94. In our opinion, it requires a balancing of two Constitutional imperatives: on the one hand, the State's obligation to arrest the indiscriminate diversion of forest land and ensure that such lands are preserved in the public interest, and, on the other hand, the right under Article 21.

95. Olga Tellis (supra) recognised the importance of livelihood and procedural fairness but did not hold that long occupation of public land matures into a legal right or immunises an encroachment from removal in accordance with law.

At the same time, the Legislative scheme of the Conservation Act, 1980, makes it abundantly clear that the forest land cannot be diverted for non-forest purposes, nor can rights inconsistent with its protected status be recognised, except in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law.

96. Likewise, Sudama Singh (supra) was rendered in the context of urban settlements and emphasised the need to consider rehabilitation before eviction. The decision does not lay down that rehabilitation concerns can override statutory restrictions governing reserve forest or create proprietary rights where none otherwise exist.

97. The decision in Orissa Mining Corporation (supra) concerns rights claimed under the Forest Rights Act, 2006 and the requirement that such claims be examined through a statutory process. The judgment does not extend protection to every occupant of forest land, irrespective of eligibility under the Act,2006.

As recorded hereinabove, the appellants have failed to demonstrate recognition of any right under the Forest Rights Act, 2006.

98. These decisions undoubtedly emphasised fairness and rehabilitation where applicable, and protection of rights recognised by law. None of them, however, supports the proposition that long occupation of reserved forest land without there being any legally recognised right can defeat the statutory and Constitutional obligation to protect the

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forest. We therefore find the reliance placed on the said authorities misplaced.

99. While having determined so, we are not oblivious to the fact that many of the appellants claim to have lived in the concerned areas for several decades and that eviction may entail hardship for them and their families. The materials on record also indicate that some settlements have existed for long periods and that civic facilities have gradually been extended to such areas.

100. These considerations undoubtedly call for sensitivity and human governance. However, even genuine hardship cannot by itself create a legal right over reserved forest land where none exists.

101. Courts are concerned with adjudicating rights recognised by law and cannot confer proprietary interest in reserved forest land merely on equitable considerations. At the same time, the existence or absence of a legal right does not preclude the executive from considering rehabilitation measures in appropriate cases. Questions relating to location, rehabilitation or formulation of suitable policy lie primarily within the domain of government, subject to Constitutional and Statutory limitations.

102. Therefore, while approving the course of action provided by the learned Single Judge as regards rehabilitation, we clarify that the dismissal of the appellant's claim to remain in occupation of the Reserved Forest shall not be construed as preventing the State from extending the benefit of any rehabilitation policy, scheme or executive decision that may otherwise apply to any eligible person.

103. For the foregoing discussions and reasons, all the appeals are accordingly dismissed.

104. The common judgment and order dated 08.06.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge is affirmed, albeit for the reasons recorded hereinabove.

Impugned Speaking Orders passed by the competitive authorities are upheld. However, for ends of justice, and taking note of the ensuing monsoon season in the state

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of Assam, the time limit provided by the learned single judge is extended to 45 days from today.

105. There shall be no order as to costs.

106. While parting with records, it is provided that, if any policy or scheme of rehabilitation, relocation or assistance framed by the competent government is otherwise applicable to any individual appellant, it shall be open to such persons to seek consideration thereunder, and competent authorities may examine such claims on their own merits in accordance with the governing policy and law.

JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE

Comparing Assistant

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