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J AND K ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION AGENCY v. RASH BUILDERS INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED

Supreme Court Of India
Apr 15, 2026
Smart Summary (Beta)

Supreme Court of India – Civil Appellate Jurisdiction

Case: J&K Economic Reconstruction Agency v. Rash Builders India Private Limited (2026 INSC 368)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, Jammu and Kashmir Economic Reconstruction Agency (JKERA), a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1941, engaged the respondent contractor for execution of four road infrastructure projects in the State of Jammu & Kashmir under agreements dated 31.03.2008. Disputes arose regarding contractual claims, leading the respondent to invoke arbitration (notice dated 18.04.2014) and to file four applications under Section 11 of the Jammu & Kashmir Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 before the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar. The High Court appointed a sole arbitrator on 30.07.2015; this Court modified that appointment on 07.12.2015 and appointed Justice S.S. Nijjar (former Judge of the Supreme Court) as sole arbitrator.

By order dated 26.03.2016, the arbitral tribunal (with parties’ consent) fixed Srinagar as the seat and New Delhi as the venue. After the demise of the sole arbitrator, the High Court appointed Justice Amitava Roy under Sections 14 and 15 of the Act on 17.09.2021. The arbitral award was delivered on 15.01.2024 at New Delhi, and the appellant’s Section 33 applications were decided on 12.03.2024.

The appellant filed a Section 34 petition before the High Court at Srinagar challenging the award (and the Section 33 order) insofar as it related to the Shahdra Project. The respondent objected to territorial jurisdiction. By order dated 08.07.2024, the High Court returned the Section 34 petition holding that, since proceedings were conducted and the award was rendered at New Delhi, courts at New Delhi alone had jurisdiction. The present appeal challenged that return order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, despite an express designation of Srinagar as the seat of arbitration, the conduct of proceedings and rendering of the award at New Delhi conferred supervisory jurisdiction on courts at New Delhi for a Section 34 challenge.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The tribunal’s order dated 26.03.2016 (by consent) fixed Srinagar as the seat and New Delhi as the venue; the seat could be altered only by mutual agreement.
  • Where seat and venue differ, the seat determines supervisory jurisdiction; therefore, only courts at Srinagar had jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The appellant had also approached the High Court of Delhi under Section 34 and thereafter filed the Special Leave Petition.
  • The award recorded New Delhi as the place of arbitration “for all intents and purposes,” and the parties may alter the seat by mutual consent; thus, the appeal should be dismissed.
  • Reliance was placed on Supreme Court decisions (listed below in the precedents table).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Inox Renewables Ltd. v. Jayesh Electricals Ltd.; (2023) 3 SCC 733 Referred to by the respondent among decisions on seat/venue and jurisdictional consequences. Cited as part of the jurisprudential backdrop; the Court resolved jurisdiction primarily on the expressly agreed seat (Srinagar).
BBR (India) Private Limited v. S.P. Singla Constructions Private Limited; (2023) 1 SCC 693 Referred to regarding seat being determinative of exclusive supervisory jurisdiction. Used as supporting authority for the proposition that the designated seat confers exclusive jurisdiction.
BGS SGS SOMA JV v. NHPC Ltd.; (2020) 4 SCC 234 Seat designation operates as an exclusive jurisdiction clause; once seat is designated, courts at the seat have exclusive jurisdiction. Applied to conclude that Srinagar, being the designated seat, alone had supervisory jurisdiction, regardless of hearings/award at New Delhi.
Mankastu Impex (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Airvisual Ltd.; (2020) 5 SCC 399 Affirmation of seat/venue distinction and the primacy of seat for jurisdiction. Reinforced the principle that venue or place of award does not displace an agreed seat.
Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. (2 012 ) 9 SCC 552. Constitution Bench recognition that arbitration is anchored to the chosen seat; Section 20 of the 1996 Act reflects party autonomy; hearings may be held elsewhere for convenience. Supported the analytical framework distinguishing juridical seat (jurisdiction/curial law) from venue (convenience).
Enercon (India) Ltd. & Ors. v. Enercon GMBH & Anr.; (2014) 5 SCC 1. Seat is the juridical home; clear designation must be given effect; in ambiguity, determine seat via “closest and most intimate connection” (drawing on English jurisprudence). Bolstered the Court’s approach that express seat (Srinagar) governs; additionally, surrounding connections pointed to Srinagar.
Naviera Amazonica Peruana S.A. v. Compania Internacional de Seguros del Peru (1988) 1 Lloyd's Rep 116 (CA). “Closest and most intimate connection” test to identify seat where not expressly designated. Invoked as part of the summary of principles and also noted as supporting Srinagar given the contracts/works/arbitral initiation in J&K.
Indus Mobile Distribution Pvt. Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.; (2017) 7 SCC 678 Designation of seat akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause; “subject-matter of arbitration” in Section 2(1)(e) concerns supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitral process. Applied to hold that the seat (Srinagar) vests exclusive supervisory jurisdiction for proceedings including Section 34 challenges.
Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHPC Ltd. & Anr.; (2020) 4 SCC 310 Once seat is designated, only courts where the seat is located have jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others. Supported the conclusion that New Delhi courts could not assume jurisdiction merely because hearings occurred or award was signed there.
Arif Azam Co. Ltd. v. Micromax Informatics FZE; (2025) 9 SCC 750. Reaffirmation that seat is the judicial anchor determining applicable law and supervisory jurisdiction. Reinforced the Court’s insistence on legal certainty and party autonomy through adherence to the agreed seat.
Shashoua v. Sharma 2009 EWHC 9 57 (COMM). “Shashoua principle”: in appropriate cases, venue may be construed as seat where agreement/circumstances indicate such intention. Not directly applied to change the result because the seat (Srinagar) was expressly designated; cited in summarising general principles.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court reiterated the settled doctrinal distinction between the seat (juridical home/legal place of arbitration) and the venue (a convenient location for hearings). Drawing on prior decisions, it emphasized that the seat determines the curial law and identifies the court exercising supervisory jurisdiction over arbitral proceedings; designation of a seat functions like an exclusive jurisdiction clause, excluding all other courts, even if part of the cause of action arises elsewhere.

Applying these principles, the Court found that the tribunal’s order dated 26.03.2016 expressly recorded that, by agreement of the parties, the seat of arbitration shall be Srinagar and the venue shall be New Delhi. The Court held that once the seat is fixed, it remains so unless altered by an express agreement. The Court rejected the respondent’s contention that a recital in the award naming New Delhi as the place of arbitration could determine the seat, stating that seat is governed by party agreement, not by a “stray recital” in the award.

The Court further observed that surrounding circumstances also supported Srinagar as the juridical seat: the contracts were executed in Jammu & Kashmir, works were to be carried out there, arbitration was initiated in the State, and the High Court at Srinagar appointed the arbitrator(s). These factors, including the “closest and most intimate connection” test, anchored the arbitration at Srinagar.

Finally, the Court held that the High Court erred by treating the place of conducting proceedings and rendering the award (New Delhi) as determinative of jurisdiction. Upholding such an approach would undermine the concept of juridical seat, inject uncertainty, and run contrary to party autonomy and legal certainty underlying arbitration law.

Holding and Implications

ALLOWED: The Supreme Court quashed and set aside the High Court’s order dated 08.07.2024 returning the appellant’s Section 34 petition. It held that, Srinagar being the designated seat, courts at Srinagar alone have jurisdiction to entertain and decide the Section 34 challenge. The Section 34 proceeding before the High Court at Srinagar was restored, and the High Court was directed to decide it on merits with due expedition; no order as to costs.

Implications: The immediate effect is restoration of the appellant’s Section 34 challenge (as to the Shahdra Project) before the Srinagar court. The Court noted that, after the impugned order, the appellant had filed four Section 34 petitions before the High Court of Delhi; the appellant was permitted to withdraw the Delhi petition relating to the Shahdra Project, and the fate of the remaining three Delhi petitions was stated to “abide by” this decision. The opinion applies existing seat/venue jurisprudence to correct a jurisdictional error; it does not state that it sets any new precedent.

Show all summary ...

2026 INSC 368

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No. OF 2026 (@ SLP (C) No. OF 2026) (@ DIARY No.44792 OF 2025) J&K ECONOMIC

RECONSTRUCTION AGENCY ... APPELLANT

VERSUS

RASH BUILDERS INDIA

PRIVATE LIMITED … RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

ALOK ARADHE, J.

1. Delay condoned.

2. Leave granted.

3. The present appeal presents an occasion to revisit the settled distinction between the seat and venue of arbitration, and consequent determination of supervisory jurisdiction of the courts. The appeal arises from an order directing return of a petition under Section 34 of Jammu & Kashmir Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 (Act).

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FACTS: -

4. The facts giving rise to the present appeal are undisputed and may be briefly stated. The appellant, Jammu and Kashmir Economic Reconstruction Agency (JKERA) is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1941 functioning as a special purpose vehicle for execution of externally aided infrastructure projects. The respondent is a contractor engaged by the appellant for execution of four infrastructure road projects namely, (i) Kralgund-Ashpora- Qaziabad Road Project (Kralgund Project) (ii) Handwara- Zachaldara-Waddur Road Project (Handwara Project) (iii) Hubdipora-Kadar-Qaimoh Road Project (Hubdipora Project) and

(iv) Shahdra-Kamalkote Road Project (Shahdra Project) in the State of Jammu & Kashmir. The agreements between the parties were executed on 31.03.2008.

5. Disputes having arisen between the parties regarding the contractual claims, the respondent invoked the arbitration, by issuing a notice on 18.04.2014, in terms of Arbitration clause contained in the agreements. The respondent thereafter filed four separate applications on 12.06.2014 under Section 11 of

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the Act before the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar (High Court) for appointment of sole arbitrator for each project. By an order dated 30.07.2015, the High Court, appointed Mr. Javed Ahmad Kawoosa, former District and Sessions Judge as sole arbitrator.

6. The appellant challenged the said order by filing Civil Appeal Nos.14167-14170 of 2015. By an order dated 07.12.2015, this Court, having regard to the value of the contracts, modified the High Court order and appointed Mr. Justice S.S. Nijjar, former Judge of this Court as the sole arbitrator in substitution of the previously appointed arbitrator.

7. By an order dated 26.03.2016, the Arbitral Tribunal, with the consent of the parties fixed Srinagar as seat of arbitration and New Delhi as the venue. Upon the demise of sole arbitrator, on 26.03.2021, the High Court in exercise of powers under Sections 14 and 15 of the Act vide order dated 17.09.2021 appointed Mr. Justice Amitava Roy, a former Judge of this Court, as the sole arbitrator to continue proceedings from the stage left by the previous arbitrator. The arbitral award was delivered on 15.01.2024 at New Delhi. The applications under

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Section 33 of the Act filed by the appellant, were subsequently decided by an order dated 12.03.2024.

8. The appellant filed a petition under Section 34 of the Act before the High Court seeking to set aside the arbitral award dated 15.01.2024 and order dated 12.03.2024 in so far it related to Shahdra Project. The respondent raised a preliminary objection regarding the territorial jurisdiction.

9. By an order dated 08.07.2024, the High Court returned the petition, holding that since the arbitration proceedings were conducted and the award was rendered at New Delhi, the courts at New Delhi alone had jurisdiction. SUBMISSIONS: -

10. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that by an order dated 26.03.2016, with the consent of the parties, the arbitrator had fixed the seat of arbitration at Srinagar and the same could be altered only by mutual agreement. It is submitted that where the seat and venue differ, the seat determines the supervisory jurisdiction, hence the courts at Srinagar alone possess jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act.

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11. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that appellant had also approached High Court of Delhi by filing petitions under Section 34 of the Act and thereafter has filed the Special Leave Petition. It is contended that arbitral award recorded New Delhi as the place of arbitration for all intents and purposes, and parties may alter seat by mutual consent. Therefore, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. In support of the aforesaid submissions, reliance has been placed on the decisions of this Court1. CASE LAW AND THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES: -

12. The distinction between the seat and venue of arbitration though, firmly embedded in arbitral jurisprudence, continues to give rise to jurisdictional errors. The present appeal exemplifies one such instance, necessitating judicial correction. The core issue is whether, despite an express designation of Srinagar as seat of arbitration, the conduct of proceedings and rendering of the award at New Delhi would confer jurisdiction upon courts at New Delhi. In order to answer this question, it

1 Inox Renewables Ltd. v. Jayesh Electricals Ltd.; (2023) 3 SCC 733, BBR (India) Private Limited v. S.P. Singla Constructions Private Limited; (2023) 1 SCC 693, BGS SGS SOMA JV v. NHPC Ltd.; (2020) 4 SCC 234 and Mankastu Impex (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Airvisual Ltd.; (2020) 5 SCC 399

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becomes necessary to revisit the well-settled principles governing the concept of juridical seat of arbitration.

13. A Constitution Bench of this Court2, recognised that arbitration is anchored to the seat or place chosen by the parties, and that the law of that seat governs the arbitration. It was observed that Section 20 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 embodies party autonomy in the choice of seat, while also permitting, under sub-section (3), the holding of hearings at a place convenient to the parties. The distinction is both deliberate and doctrinal: while the seat determines jurisdiction and applicable law, the venue is merely a matter of convenience for conducting proceedings.

14. A two-Judge Bench of this Court3while placing reliance on the

"closest and most intimate connection" test involved in English jurisprudence4, held that seat of arbitration is juridical home of arbitration and where the agreement of the parties is clear, such designation must be given full effect. Even in cases of ambiguity, the seat is to be determined by identifying the place

2 Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. (2 012 ) 9 SCC 552.

3 Enercon (India) Ltd. & Ors. v. Enercon GMBH & Anr.; (2014) 5 SCC 1.

4 Naviera Amazonica Peruana S.A. v. Compania Internacional de Seguros del Peru (1988) 1 Lloyd's Rep 116 (CA).

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with the closest and most intimate connection to the arbitration.

15. Another two-Judge Bench of this Court5authoritatively expounded the concept of the "juridical seat" and held that the designation of a seat of arbitration is akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause. It was observed that the expression

"subject-matter of arbitration" in Section 2(1)(e) of the Act is not to be confused with the subject-matter of the suit, but rather refers to the process of dispute resolution, thereby identifying the court which exercises supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings. It was further held that once a seat is designated, it operates as the centre of gravity of the arbitration and vests exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of that place for all matters arising out of the arbitration, including challenges to the arbitral award. The designation of a seat, therefore, is not a matter of mere form, but carries with it significant legal consequences.

16. The aforesaid principle has been affirmed by a three-Judge Bench of this Court6and it has been held that the moment the seat is designated, it operates as an exclusive jurisdiction

5 Indus Mobile Distribution Pvt. Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.; (2017) 7 SCC 678

6 BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC Ltd.; (supra)

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clause, irrespective of whether any part of the cause of action has arisen there. Arbitration law, in this respect, departs from the Code of Civil Procedure, permitting parties to choose a neutral seat which may have no connection with the underlying dispute, yet vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Courts of that place.

17. A three-Judge Bench of this Court7held that once the seat of arbitration is designated, such clause becomes the exclusive jurisdiction clause as a result of which only the courts where the seat is located would have jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. Recently, another three-Judge Bench of this Court8reaffirmed the principle that seat remains the judicial anchor, determining both the applicable law and the supervisory jurisdiction.

18. Thus, the principles governing the distinction between the seat and venue of the arbitration, and the jurisdictional consequences that follow, may be summarised as under: -

(i) The seat of arbitration constitutes the juridical home or legal place of arbitration. It determines the curial law

7 Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHPC Ltd. & Anr.; (2020) 4 SCC 310; See also: Mankastu Impex Pvt. Ltd. v. Airvisual Ltd. (supra) and BBR (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. S.P. Singla Constructions Pvt. Ltd. (supra).

8 Arif Azam Co. Ltd. v. Micromax Informatics FZE; (2025) 9 SCC 750.

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governing the arbitral process and identifies the Court having supervisory control over the arbitration.

(ii) Once the seat is designated by agreement of the parties, the courts of that place alone have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain all proceedings arising out of the arbitration, including challenges to the award. The designation of the seat operates akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause, excluding all other courts - even those where the cause of action may have arisen.

(iii) The venue is merely a geographical location chosen for convenience for holding hearings, examination of witnesses, or meetings of the arbitral tribunal. It does not confer jurisdiction and does not, by itself, alter or determine the seat. The arbitral tribunal is free to conduct proceedings at locations different from the seat without affecting the juridical seat.

(iv) The mere fact that arbitral proceedings are conducted or the award is rendered at a particular place does not confer jurisdiction on courts of that place if it is different from the designated seat. The seat remains fixed unless expressly altered by agreement of the parties.

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(v) Where the seat is not expressly designated, courts determine it by applying:

(a) the closest and most intimate connection test, identifying the place most closely connected with the arbitration (based on the Naviera Amazonica principle); and

(b) in appropriate cases, construing the venue as the seat where the agreement and surrounding circumstances indicate such intention (as reflected in the Shashoua principle9).

(vi) The intention of the parties, as discerned from the arbitration agreement and surrounding circumstances, is the paramount factor in determining the seat. Once such intention is expressed-either expressly or by necessary implication-it must be given full effect by Courts. APPLICATION TO FACTS: -

19. In the backdrop of aforesaid well-settled legal principles, we may advert to the facts of the case in hand. In the instant case, the sole arbitrator by an order dated 26.03.2016 had fixed the seat of arbitration as Srinagar and venue of

9 Shashoua v. Sharma 2009 EWHC 9 57 (COMM).

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arbitration as New Delhi. The relevant extract of the order dated 26.03.2016 reads as under: -

"…In the order dated 16.01.2016 the direction that the seat of arbitration shall be Srinagar and that the venue shall be New Delhi has been inadvertently omitted. Please note that on agreement of the parties seat of Arbitration shall be at Srinagar and Venue shall be at New Delhi."

20. In the present case, not only have the parties expressly agreed upon Srinagar as seat of arbitration, but even the surrounding circumstances reinforce this conclusion. The contracts are executed in the State of Jammu & Kashmir and the works were to be carried out within the said State. The arbitration proceedings were initiated in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the High Court had appointed the arbitrator. These factors as well as the 'closest and most intimate connection test' unmistakably anchors the arbitration at Srinagar.

21. The contention of the respondent that arbitral award records New Delhi as place of arbitration and is therefore determinative of the seat cannot be accepted. The seat of arbitration is governed by the agreement of the parties and not by any stray recital in the award. Once the seat of arbitration is fixed, it

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remains immutable unless altered by an express agreement. In the absence of any agreement, the designation of Srinagar as seat of the arbitration continues to hold the field.

22. The High Court ought to have appreciated that Srinagar was consciously designated as the seat of arbitration. Once such a designation was made, the legal consequence that inexorably follows is that courts at Srinagar alone would have supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitral proceeding. The mere fact that arbitral tribunal for reasons of convenience, conducted proceeding at New Delhi or rendered the award at that place does not and cannot, alter the juridical seat of arbitration

23. The approach adopted by the High Court, if upheld, would have the effect of rendering the concept of juridical seat otiose, and would introduce uncertainty in arbitration proceeding by allowing the place of hearing or the place where the award is signed to determine the jurisdiction. Such a consequence would be contrary to principles of party autonomy and legal certainty that underly the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

1996.

CONCLUSION: -

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24. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned order returning the application filed by the appellant under Section 34 of the Act cannot be sustained. The court at Srinagar being the court of seat of arbitration, alone possesses the jurisdiction to entertain and decide the challenge to the arbitral award. It was stated at the Bar that after the impugned order, the appellant had filed four separate petitions under Section 34 of the Act before High Court of Delhi. Needless to state that the appellant shall be at liberty to withdraw the petition under Section 34 of the Act relating to Shahdra Project and the fate of remaining three petitions shall abide by this decision.

25. In the result, impugned order dated 08.07.2024 passed by the High Court is quashed and set aside. The proceeding under Section 34 of the Act shall stand restored. The High Court shall consider and decide the same on its own merits, with due expedition. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.

…..…….……………….………….……….J.

[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA]

…..…….……………….………….……….J.

[ALOK ARADHE]

NEW DELHI;

APRIL 15, 2026.

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