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ROSHINI DEVI v. THE STATE OF TELANGANA

Supreme Court Of India
Jan 8, 2026
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Case Summary: Roshini Devi v. The State of Telangana & Others, 2026 INSC 41

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, Roshini Devi, is the daughter of the detenu, Aruna Bai alias Anguri Bai. The detenu was subjected to preventive detention by an order dated 10.03.2025 passed by the Collector and District Magistrate, Hyderabad, under Section 3(2) of the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot-Leggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders [Land-Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertiliser Offenders, Food Adulteration Offenders, Fake Document Offenders, Scheduled Commodities Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders and White Collar or Financial Offenders] Act, 1986 (“the Act of 1986”).

The grounds of detention referred to the criminal history of the detenu, including: (i) Crime No.243/2024 dated 16.09.2024 under Section 8(c) read with Section 20(b)(ii)(b) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, at Prohibition and Excise Station Dhoolpet, Hyderabad; (ii) Crime No.270/2024 dated 12.12.2024 under similar provisions, in which she was arrested and remanded to judicial custody; and (iii) Crime No.42/2024 dated 17.12.2024, registered under similar provisions while she was already in judicial custody, in the course of which “Ganja” was seized from her. On this basis, she was treated as a “drug offender” under Section 2(f) of the Act of 1986.

The detaining authority noted that the detenu had applied for bail in Crime Nos.243/2024 and 270/2024, apprehended that she would continue illegal activities if released, and opined that proceedings under ordinary law had no deterrent effect, rendering preventive detention necessary “as a last resort” in the interest of the public at large. The detention order was approved on 15.03.2025 under Section 3(3) of the Act of 1986 by the General Administration Department and confirmed on 15.04.2025.

The detenu’s daughter challenged the detention by filing Writ Petition No.12443 of 2025 before the High Court of Telangana. A Division Bench of the High Court, by judgment dated 28.10.2025, declined to interfere, holding that the detenu’s repeated and well-planned actions created a presumption of threat and alarm among the public regarding their health and justified the subjective satisfaction recorded by the detaining authority.

Aggrieved by the dismissal of the writ petition, the appellant approached the Supreme Court of India by way of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.18223 of 2025. Leave was granted, and the matter was heard as a criminal appeal, culminating in the present judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the preventive detention order dated 10.03.2025 under Section 3(2) of the Act of 1986 was validly made on the basis of three criminal cases under the NDPS Act and the apprehension that the detenu might continue similar activities if released on bail.
  2. Whether there was sufficient material to record satisfaction that the detenu was “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” within the meaning of Section 2(a) read with Section 3(1) of the Act of 1986, as distinct from activities affecting only “law and order.”
  3. Whether preventive detention under the Act of 1986 could legitimately be used as an alternative to, or substitute for, seeking cancellation of bail in pending criminal cases, in the absence of any allegation of breach of bail conditions.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • There was no material to justify satisfaction that the detenu had acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order as required by Section 2(a) of the Act of 1986. Mere classification of the detenu as a “drug offender” under Section 2(f) was insufficient to warrant preventive detention.
  • The detenu had already been enlarged on bail in Crime No.243/2024, and it could not be assumed that the conditions imposed while granting bail were inadequate to prevent further offences.
  • The detention order was effectively passed as an alternative to cancellation of bail, rather than by resort to the ordinary criminal process. It improperly relied only on the detenu’s prior criminal history, without particular instances showing conduct prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
  • Even accepting the alleged involvement in the NDPS offences, the acts at best related to maintenance of “law and order” and did not rise to the level of affecting “public order.”
  • To support these contentions, reliance was placed on Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu1, contending that in the absence of relevant material indicating acts prejudicial to public order, the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority was vitiated and the detention order was unsustainable.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • The respondents contended that the detenu clearly fell within the definition of “drug offender” in Section 2(f) of the Act of 1986. Her continuing involvement in dealing in Ganja, evidenced by the multiple crimes registered against her, justified the conclusion that her activities adversely affected maintenance of public order.
  • The detenu’s repeated illegal acts showed that the provisions of ordinary criminal law were insufficient to deter her, making preventive detention appropriate and necessary.
  • It was submitted that the detaining authority had properly recorded subjective satisfaction that there was a likelihood of breach of public order, and thus the detention order should not be interfered with.
  • The respondents relied on Pesala Nookaraju v. Government of Andhra Pradesh & Others2, to argue that once such subjective satisfaction about likely breach of public order is recorded, courts should ordinarily refrain from interfering with the preventive detention order.
  • The respondents also referred to an affidavit dated 07.01.2026 filed on behalf of the Special Officer In-charge, Government of Telangana, along with accompanying documents, to support their case.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2011 INSC 267 Cited by the appellant to support the contention that mere criminal history and apprehension about future offences on grant of bail are insufficient grounds for preventive detention, in the absence of specific material showing conduct prejudicial to public order. The decision is referred to as supporting the appellant’s submission that the detention order lacked the requisite foundation of material indicating prejudice to public order. The Court’s ultimate conclusion, that mere apprehension of future offences upon release on bail is not sufficient to justify detention, is consistent with the reliance placed on this authority.
Pesala Nookaraju v. Government of Andhra Pradesh & Others, 2023 INSC 734 Cited by the respondents for the proposition that where the detaining authority has recorded subjective satisfaction regarding the likelihood of breach of public order, a detention order under preventive detention law need not be interfered with. The case is mentioned as part of the respondents’ submissions to justify non-interference with the detention. The Supreme Court, however, set aside the detention in the present matter, thereby not accepting that mere recording of satisfaction, without adequate supporting material, sufficed.
Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana & Others, 2023 INSC 788 The Court reiterated that: (i) the detaining authority must ensure that no extraneous factors or personal predilections influence the detention order; (ii) preventive detention laws, being stringent, cannot be used to circumvent or overreach judicial orders granting bail; and (iii) when ordinary criminal law provides sufficient means to address the situation, resort to preventive detention, an extraordinary measure, is unwarranted. The Court quoted paragraphs 49–52 of this decision, drawing a parallel between the language used by the detaining authority in that case and in the present detention order. It concluded that the observations here similarly reflected an intention “to detain at any cost,” without recourse to appropriate steps like cancellation of bail. Relying on Ameena Begum, the Court held that mere dissatisfaction with bail orders or apprehension of future offences cannot justify resort to preventive detention when ordinary criminal remedies are available.
Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14 Quoted for the principle that preventive detention is a “hard law” which must be strictly construed; liberty cannot be jeopardised unless the case falls squarely within the statute. Preventive detention law should not be used merely to “clip the wings” of an accused in a criminal prosecution or to keep a person in custody where bail may otherwise be granted, unless there is material satisfying the statutory requirements. Great caution is necessary when detention is based on the same charges for which the accused has been enlarged on bail. The Court used this authority, as reproduced in the judgment, to emphasise that the Act of 1986, being an extraordinary statute, cannot be invoked simply because the State fears that an accused released on bail may reoffend. Applying this principle, it held that mere apprehension regarding future conduct on bail did not meet the strict statutory standard for preventive detention, reinforcing the conclusion that the detention order was unsustainable.

Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court, after hearing counsel and perusing the material, held that the preventive detention order was liable to be set aside. It scrutinised both the factual basis of the order and the statutory requirements under the Act of 1986.

First, the Court noted that the detention order rested essentially on three crimes registered against the detenu in 2024 (on 16.09.2024, 12.12.2024, and 17.12.2024). It emphasised that, pursuant to Crime No.270/2024 (12.12.2024), the detenu had been arrested and remained in judicial custody when Crime No.42/2024 (17.12.2024) was registered. The detaining authority proceeded on the premise that, if the detenu were released on bail, she would likely indulge in serious offences and therefore concluded that cases under ordinary law had no deterrent effect on her “prejudicial activities.”

The Court observed that the detention order expressly relied on the detenu’s past conduct from 2016 to 2023 and her alleged failure to “mend” her behaviour after being released on bail during that period, as well as the three offences committed in 2024. The relevant passage from the detention order, reproduced in the judgment, showed that the authority, after referring to bail petitions and orders, stated a strong belief that if the detenu were again released on bail she would resume unlawful activities of peddling Ganja, and therefore, “unless you are detained by an appropriate order of detention as a last resort, in the interest of public at large,” she would continue such activities.

From this language, the Supreme Court inferred that the detaining authority “intended to detain the mother of the appellant at any cost” and that prior conduct over several years was used as a general justification. The Court pointed out that if the authority believed that the detenu had violated bail conditions, the appropriate recourse would have been to initiate steps for cancellation of bail. No such steps were taken.

In this context, the Court relied upon its decision in Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana & Others, where it had cautioned that detaining authorities must ensure that detention orders do not manifest consideration of extraneous factors or reflect resentment at bail being granted. The quoted passages from Ameena Begum highlighted that preventive detention laws should not be invoked to avoid or oust judicial scrutiny, or to overreach courts that have granted bail, especially where no application for cancellation of bail had been moved and no violation of bail conditions alleged. The Court drew an analogy between the reasoning condemned in Ameena Begum and the reasoning used in the present detention order.

Further, by quoting Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, the Court reaffirmed that preventive detention is a stringent measure to be strictly construed, and must not be used merely “to clip the wings of an accused” in ordinary criminal proceedings or to keep a person detained in situations where bail may otherwise be granted. The Court emphasised that when a person has been enlarged on bail by a competent criminal court, “great caution should be exercised” in scrutinising a preventive detention order based on the very same charges.

On this foundation, the Supreme Court held that “mere apprehension on the part of the detaining authority that in the event of the detenu being released on bail, she was likely to indulge in similar crimes that would be prejudicial to maintenance of public order would not be a sufficient ground to order her preventive detention.”

The Court then examined the statutory framework under the Act of 1986. Section 3(1) enables the Government to make an order of preventive detention if satisfied that a drug offender ought to be prevented from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Section 2(a) defines the expression “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.” The Explanation to Section 2(a) states that if any activities of the person cause or are calculated to cause harm, danger, or alarm, or a feeling of insecurity among the general public or a section thereof, or if a grave widespread danger to life or public health is likely to be caused, then such activities justify exercise of the detention power.

Applying this definition, the Court found that the detention order did not indicate how the maintenance of public order was actually affected or likely to be affected by the detenu’s activities. It stressed that mere reproduction of statutory expressions drawn from Section 2(a) in the detention order is not enough; the order must show that the detaining authority recorded a genuine subjective satisfaction, supported by material, that the activities in question fell within the statutory description.

The Court reiterated the “fine distinction between ‘law and order’ and ‘public order’.” It held that the mere registration of three offences, by itself, does not necessarily bear on maintenance of public order. For the Act of 1986 to be invoked, there must be material demonstrating that the narcotic drug dealt with by the detenu was, in fact, dangerous to public health in the sense contemplated by the statute, such as causing grave widespread danger to life or public health. The judgment expressly notes that such material was “missing in the order of detention.”

In sum, the Supreme Court concluded that the preventive detention order was grounded primarily in apprehension about possible future offences on release from custody and in the detaining authority’s desire to detain the detenu in spite of the availability of ordinary criminal law measures. This failed to satisfy the strict statutory conditions of the Act of 1986 relating to prejudicial impact on public order and amounted to an impermissible use of preventive detention as a substitute for the ordinary criminal process and potential proceedings for cancellation of bail.

Holding and Implications

The Supreme Court held that the detention order dated 10.03.2025 was unsustainable in law. It found that the order lacked adequate material to show that the detenu’s activities were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order within the meaning of the Act of 1986, and that it improperly relied on mere apprehension of future offences upon release on bail, without resort to ordinary remedies such as cancellation of bail.

The Court therefore QUASHED AND SET ASIDE the preventive detention order dated 10.03.2025. It also QUASHED the impugned judgment dated 28.10.2025 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court in Writ Petition No.1244 of 2025. The Court directed that the detenu be RELEASED FORTHWITH, if she was not required in any other proceedings. The appeal was ALLOWED, with parties left to bear their own costs.

In terms of implications, the decision directly affects the parties by securing the release of the detenu from preventive detention under the Act of 1986. At the doctrinal level, the judgment restates and applies existing principles that: (i) mere apprehension of future crimes upon grant of bail is not, by itself, sufficient to justify preventive detention; (ii) preventive detention cannot be used as an alternative to ordinary criminal procedures such as seeking cancellation of bail; and (iii) there must be clear, cogent material showing that the detenu’s activities are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, as distinct from impacting mere law and order. The opinion does not expressly indicate any broader or novel rule beyond this application of established principles.

Show all summary ...

2026 INSC 41 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

(@ SLP (CRL.) NO.18223 OF 2025)

ROSHINI DEVI APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF TELANGANA

AND OTHERS RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

ATUL S. CHANDURKAR, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The appellant who is the daughter of the detenu- Aruna Bai alias Anguri Bai is aggrieved by the order of detention dated 10.03.2025 passed by the Collector and District Magistrate, Hyderabad under Section 3(2) of the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot- Leggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders [Land-Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertiliser Offenders,

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Food Adulteration Offenders, Fake Document Offenders, Scheduled Commodities Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders and White Collar or Financial Offenders] Act, 1986 (for short, the Act of 1986). She approached the High Court of Telangana by preferring Writ Petition No.12443 of 2025 for challenging the aforesaid order. The Division Bench of the High Court however refused to interfere with the order of detention and dismissed the said writ petition on 28.10.2025. Being aggrieved, the appellant has preferred the present appeal.

3. The grounds of detention as referred to in the order of detention dated 10.03.2025 indicate consideration of the criminal history of the detenu. There is reference to Crime No. 243/ 2024 dated 16.09.2024 registered under Section 8 (c) read with Section 20 (b) (ii) (b) of the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 at the Prohibition and Excise Station Dhoolpet, District Hyderabad. There is also reference to Crime No.270/2024

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dated 12.12.2024 registered against the detenu under similar provisions as in the first crime. The detenu came to be arrested on 12.12.2024 and while she was in judicial custody, Crime No.42/2024 under similar provisions came to be registered at the same Police Station on 17.12.2024. "Ganja" came to be seized from the detenu in this process. The detenu was found to be a

"drug offender" under Section 2 (f) of the Act of 1986 and by observing that ill-effects of Ganja were harmful and injurious public health, power conferred by Section 3 (2) of the Act of 1986 came to be exercised. The Collector and District Magistrate was also of the view that the detenu had moved an application for grant of bail in Crime Nos. 243/2024 and 270/2024 which were pending. He apprehended that if the detenu succeeded in obtaining bail, she would continue to engage in illegal activities. The proceedings registered against her under the ordinary law had no deterrent effect and hence it was found necessary to detain her as a last resort in interest of public at large. On this basis, the order of detention

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came to be passed on 10.03.2025. Approval to the aforesaid order came to be granted under Section 3(3) of the Act of 1986 by the General Administration Department on 15.03.2025. Thereafter on 15.04.2025, the order of detention came to be confirmed.

4. The High Court was of the view that the repeated and well planned actions of the detenu were sufficient to raise the presumption of threat and alarm amongst the general public regarding their health which was the primary criteria for maintaining peace as well as law and order in society. It found that there was no reason to interfere with the subjective satisfaction record by the detaining authority and that the order of detention did not suffer from any irregularity warranting interference. On these findings the High Court declined to interfere with the order of detention.

5. Mr. Ravi Shankar Jandhyala, learned Senior Advocate for the appellant submitted that in absence of any material for recording satisfaction that the detenu had acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of

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public order as required by Section 2 (a) of the Act of 1986, the detenu could not have been preventively detained. Merely because the detenu was found to be a

"drug offender" under Section 2 (f) of the Act of 1986, there was no justification for passing the order of detention. The detenu had been enlarged on bail in Crime No.243 of 2024 and it could not be said that the conditions imposed while enlarging her were insufficient to prevent the detenu from committing any further offence. The order of detention was passed merely as an alternative to cancellation of bail. It was further submitted that merely by referring to the previous criminal history attributed to the detenu, the order of detention had been passed. In absence of any specific instance/s indicating the conduct of the detenu to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, there was no basis to direct her detention. Even if it was accepted that the detenu was involved in the offences as alleged, it could not be said that the same affected maintenance of public order. At the highest, the activities could be

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termed to be prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order. To substantiate the grounds as urged, reliance was placed on the decision in Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu1. It was thus submitted that in absence of relevant material on the basis of which subjective satisfaction could have been recorded by the detaining authority indicating the acts of the detenu to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, the order of detention was unsustainable. It was liable to be set aside.

6. Mr. Kumar Vaibhaw, learned counsel appearing for the respondents supported the order of detention. It was urged that the detenu was a drug offender within the meaning of Section 2 (f) of the Act of 1986. Considering her continuing involvement in dealing with Ganja which was evident from the crimes registered against her, the detaining authority was justified in coming to the conclusion that the detenu's activities adversely affected the maintenance of public order. Her continued illegal acts indicated that the provisions of ordinary law were insufficient so as to deter her from continuing such illegal

1 201 1 INSC 267

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acts in dealing with narcotic drugs. Her continuous acts were therefore rightly found to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The learned counsel referred to the affidavit dated 07.01.2026 filed on behalf of the Special Officer In-charge, Government of Telangana as well as the documents filed along with it. The learned counsel referred to the decision in Pesala Nookaraju v. Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.2to urge that since the order of detention had been passed after recording subjective satisfaction that there was likelihood of breach of public order, no interference with the same was called for. It was thus submitted that the appeal was liable to be dismissed.

7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the documentary material on record we are satisfied that the order of preventive detention is liable to be set aside.

8. The order of detention merely refers to three crimes registered against the detenu on 16.09.2024, 12.12.2024 and 17.12.2024. It may be noted that pursuant to Crime

2 2 02 3 INSC 734

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No.270/2024 dated 12.12.2024, the detenu had been arrested and was in judicial custody when Crime No.42/2024 dated 17.12.2024 came to be registered. On the premise that if the detenu was released on bail she was likely to indulge in serious offences, the detaining authority proceeded to record that it was satisfied that cases registered against her under the ordinary law had no deterrent effect in preventing her prejudicial activities. Whether the conditions imposed while enlarging the detenu on bail in the earlier offences were insufficient to prevent her from indulging in similar offences has not been adverted to. It would be profitable to refer to the reason for detention as recorded by the Detaining Authority in the detention order. The relevant portion thereof reads as under:

"I am aware that you were arrested on 12- 12-2024 in Crime No.270/2024 dated 12-12- 2024 and 243/2024 dated 16-09-2024 of Prohibition & Excise Station Dhoolpest and Crime No.42/2024 dated 17/12/2024 (produced before the Hon'ble Court through P.T. Warrant) of Excise Station Narayanguda Hyderabad and in Judicial Custody at Special Prison for Women Hyderabad at

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Chenchalguda. Subsequently, you have moved bail petition before the Hon'ble Sessions Court in Crime No. 243/2024 and 270/2024 vide Crl M.P. No. 695/2025 and 696/2025 Dt 11-02-2025 and granted bail. You have also filed bail petition in Crime No. 42/2024 vide Crl. M.P. No. 370/2025 and is pending before the Hon'ble Sessions Judge for orders, hence still in judicial custody. Considering entire material, including the bail petitions and the orders passed therein, I apprehend that if you succeed in obtaining bail and you being released on bail in due course, keeping in view that on the earlier occasions during the period 2016 to 2023, though you were released on bail, but did not mend your habitual nature of committing similar offences and again in the recent past during the year 2024 you have committed (3) more similar offences, I strongly believe though you are in judicial custody in Cr.No.42/2024 and your bail petition is pending, in case of being granted bail in the said case and after your release on bail you would again resort to similar unlawful activities of peddling of Ganja, and keeping in view your antecedents and considering the ill effects of Ganja on the public health and particularly youth and students and its impact on the society and having satisfied that the cases registered against you under the ordinary law have no deterrent effect in preventing your prejudicial activities, I strongly believe that you are not amenable to ordinary law, unless you are detained by an

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appropriate order of detention as a last resort, in the interest of public at large. It is imperative to prevent you from acting in any manner prejudicial to maintenance of Public Order, I feel that recourse to normal law would involve considerable time and may not be effective deterrent in preventing you from indulging in further activities prejudicial to maintenance of public order in and around Hyderabad District."

From the aforesaid observations, it is clear that the Detaining Authority intended to detain the mother of the appellant at any cost. Her conduct during the period from 2016 to 2023 has been kept in mind. If the Detaining Authority was of the view that the detenu had violated any conditions of bail, steps for cancellation of her liberty could have been taken. That has not been done here.

9. In this regard, we may refer to the decision of this Court in Ameena Begum v. the State of Telangana and Others3, wherein the effect of extraneous factors weighing in the mind of the Detaining Authority while passing an order of detention has been considered. Incidentally, the order of detention therein was also

3 2023 INSC 788

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passed under the Act of 1986. It has been observed in paragraphs 49 to 52 as under: -

"……..At the same time, the detaining authority ought to ensure that the order does not manifest consideration of extraneous factors. The detaining authority must be cautious and circumspect that no extra or additional word or sentence finds place in the order of detention, which evinces the human factor - his mindset of either acting with personal predilection by invoking the stringent preventive detention laws to avoid or oust judicial scrutiny, given the restrictions of judicial review in such cases, or as an authority charged with the notion of overreaching the courts, chagrined and frustrated by orders granting bail to the detenu despite stiff opposition raised by the State and thereby failing in the attempt to keep the detenu behind bars.

50. What we have expressed above is best exemplified by the observations of the Commissioner in the Detention Order under challenge, which are considered appropriate to be quoted. Therein, the Commissioner inter alia stated as follows:

"The proposed detenu and his associate are notorious offenders and rowdy sheeters….

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The proposed detenu was surrendered before the Hon'ble Court in Cr.No.35/2023 of Falaknuma PS and the Hon'ble Magistrate remanded him to judicial custody, he moved bail petitions in Cr.Nos. 18/2023 of Golconda PS and 35/2023 of Falaknuma PS. The prosecution has filed suitable counters strongly opposing the grant of bail to him, but the Hon'ble Magistrate granted bail to him in both the cases and ordered for his release. Subsequently, he was released from judicial remand on bail.

As seen from his past criminal history, background and antecedents and also his habitual nature of committing crimes one after the other and his efforts to come out of the prison, I strongly believe that if such a habitual criminal is set free, his activities would not be safe to the society and there is an imminent possibility of his committing similar offences by violating the bail conditions in one of the cases, which would be detrimental to public order, unless he is preventively detained from doing so by an appropriate order of detention."

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With respect to the stage of proceedings in the offences which form its basis, the Detention Order states that despite being contested by the State, bail has been granted to the Detenu in Crimes No. 4 and 5. Insofar as grant of bail to the Detenu is concerned, the Commissioner states that:

"I strongly believe that if such a habitual criminal is set free his activities would not be safe to the society and there is an imminent possibility of his committing similar offences by violating the bail conditions in one of the cases, which would be detrimental to public order, unless he is preventively detained from doing so by an appropriate order of detention."

51. We are of the opinion that the aforesaid excerpts from the Detention Order lay bare the Commissioner's attempt to transgress his jurisdiction and to pass an order of detention, which cannot be construed as an order validly made under the Act. The quoted observations are reflective of the intention to detain the Detenu at any cost without resorting to due procedure. It is neither the case of the respondents that the Detenu had not complied with the terms of the notice issued under section 41-A of the Cr. PC, nor has it been alleged that the conditions of bail had been violated by the Detenu. It is pertinent to note that in the three criminal

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proceedings where the Detenu had been released on bail, no applications for cancellation of bail had been moved by the State. In the light of the same, the provisions of the Act, which is an extraordinary statute, should not have been resorted to when ordinary criminal law provided sufficient means to address the apprehensions leading to the impugned Detention Order. There may have existed sufficient grounds to appeal against the bail orders, but the

circumstances did not warrant the circumvention of ordinary criminal procedure to resort to an extraordinary measure of the law of preventive detention.

52. In Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar4, Hon'ble E.S. Venkataramiah, J. (as the Chief Justice then was) observed:

32. ...It is well settled that the law of preventive detention is a hard law and therefore it should be strictly construed. Care should be taken that the liberty of a person is not jeopardised unless his case falls squarely within the four corners of the relevant law. The law of

preventive detention should not be used merely to clip the wings of an accused who is involved in a

criminal prosecution. It is not intended for the purpose of keeping a man under detention when under

4 (1984 ) 3 SCC 14

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ordinary criminal law it may not be possible to resist the issue of orders of bail, unless the material available is such as would satisfy the requirements of the legal provisions authorising such detention. When a person is enlarged on bail by a competent criminal court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinising the validity of an order of preventive detention which is based on the very same charge which is to be tried by the criminal court."

(underlining ours, for emphasis)"

Thus, mere apprehension on the part of the detaining authority that in the event of the detenu being released on bail, she was likely to indulge in similar crimes that would be prejudicial to maintenance of public order would not be a sufficient ground to order her preventive detention.

10. Section 3 (1) of the Act of 1986 enables the Government, if it is satisfied that a drug offender ought to be prevented from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order to make an order of preventive detention. The expression "acting in any

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manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order"

has been defined by Section 2(a) of the Act 1986. As per the Explanation to the said provision, if any of the activities of the person concerned causes or is calculated to cause any harm, danger or alarm or a feeling of insecurity among the general public or a section thereof or in case of a grave widespread danger to life or public health is likely to be caused, such power can be exercised. The order of detention does not indicate in what manner the maintenance of public order was either adversely affected or was likely to be adversely affected so as to detain the detenu. Mere reproduction of the expressions mentioned in Section 2(a) of the Act of 1986 in the order of detention would not be sufficient. The detention order ought to indicate the recording of subjective satisfaction by the detaining authority in that regard. It is well settled that there is a fine distinction between "law and order" and "public order". Mere registration of three offences by itself would not have any bearing on the maintenance of public order

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unless there is material to show that the narcotic drug dealt with by the detenu was in fact dangerous to public health under the Act of 1986. This material is found to be missing in the order of detention.

11. For aforesaid reasons, we find that the order of detention dated 10.03.2025 to be unsustainable. It is accordingly quashed and set aside. Consequently, the impugned judgment dated 28.10.2025 in Writ Petition No. 1244 of 2025 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is also quashed. The detenu be released forthwith if not required in any other proceedings. The appeal is allowed in aforesaid terms leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

………………………..J.

[ J.K. MAHESHWARI ]

…..………………………..J.

[ATUL S. CHANDURKAR]

NEW DELHI,

JANUARY 08, 2026.

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