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RAHIL v. STATE(GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI)

Supreme Court Of India
Jun 25, 2025
Smart Summary (Beta)

Case Summary: Rahil & Anr. v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

Factual and Procedural Background

The case arises from a property dispute concerning premises No. 15/1, Jaipur Estate, Nizamuddin, New Delhi. Co-accused Suraiya had entered into an agreement with the deceased, Shakeel ur Rehman, to purchase this property. Before the sale deed was executed, on 6 April 2003, the deceased began constructing a boundary wall on the property.

Suraiya and her associates opposed the construction, leading to a quarrel. During this altercation, Suraiya threatened to kill the deceased. The matter was reported to the police and was amicably settled there. At about 7:30 p.m. on the same day, Suraiya allegedly telephoned the deceased on his landline and called him to her residence. Thereafter, the deceased went missing and could not be traced despite efforts.

On 7 April 2003 at 7:15 a.m., the deceased’s brother, Aniq ur Rehman (PW3), lodged a missing report (DD entry No. 27A, Ex. PW3/B) at Police Station Hazrat Nizamuddin. Later that day, at 5:30 p.m., PW3 filed a written complaint, which was treated as an FIR under Sections 365/34 IPC against Suraiya, her brother Mohd. Fazal, and the present appellants Rahil and Noor Ahmed (Suraiya’s son and husband).

During investigation, Mohd. Fazal and one Mohan Seth were arrested on 13 April 2003. On the basis of their disclosure statements, the decomposed body of the deceased was recovered near Haridwar. The postmortem doctor, PW9 Dr. Pradeep Kumar, opined that the cause of death was asphyxia resulting from strangulation, occurring 3 to 5 days prior to examination.

In the trial, charges were framed against Suraiya, Mohd. Fazal, Mohan Seth, and the appellants under Sections 120B and 302/34 read with 120B IPC. Additionally, Mohd. Fazal and Mohan Seth were charged under Section 201/34 IPC. The prosecution examined 25 witnesses and produced several documents.

The trial court convicted Suraiya and Mohd. Fazal under Section 302/34 IPC, and convicted Mohd. Fazal and Mohan Seth under Section 201/34 IPC. The present appellants, Noor Ahmed and Rahil, were acquitted of all charges.

Suraiya, Mohd. Fazal and Mohan Seth filed appeals against their convictions. The State simultaneously appealed to the High Court, challenging the acquittal of the present appellants. By a common judgment, the High Court:

  • Upheld Suraiya’s conviction for murder under Section 302/34 IPC.
  • Reversed the trial court’s acquittal of Noor Ahmed and Rahil, and convicted them under Section 302/34 IPC along with Suraiya.
  • Acquitted Mohd. Fazal of the charge of murder, in part on the basis that he was not shown to be present at the premises, but upheld his and Mohan Seth’s convictions under Section 201 IPC.

The appellants and Suraiya challenged the High Court judgment before the Supreme Court. During the pendency of the proceedings, Suraiya died and her appeal abated. No appeal was filed against the High Court’s acquittal of Mohd. Fazal on the murder charge. The Supreme Court, therefore, confined itself to the appeals of Rahil and Noor Ahmed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in an appeal against acquittal, the High Court was justified in overturning the trial court’s acquittal of the appellants under Section 302/34 IPC, having regard to the settled standard that such interference is permissible only when the acquittal is perverse or against the weight of evidence.
  2. Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased actually went to Suraiya’s residence on the evening of 6 April 2003 and that the appellants were present there and participated in his murder, so as to sustain their conviction based solely on circumstantial evidence.
  3. Whether the High Court could presume the presence of the appellants in the house merely because they were Suraiya’s husband and son and inmates of the house, and on that basis draw an adverse inference against them under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, despite gaps in the prosecution’s primary evidence.
  4. Whether call detail records (CDRs) and other electronic records concerning Rahil, produced without a certificate under Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act, were admissible in evidence; and, even assuming admissibility, whether single-tower cell location data and telephonic exchanges with co-accused could reliably establish Rahil’s presence at the place of occurrence or his involvement in a conspiracy to murder.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The High Court erred in reversing a well-reasoned acquittal by the trial court on the basis of vague surmises and speculative inferences rather than solid evidence.
  • Suspicion, however strong, cannot substitute for proof. The prosecution’s case against the appellants rested on conjectures rather than demonstrated participation in the murder.

Respondent-State's Arguments

  • The trial court’s findings acquitting the appellants were perverse and contrary to the weight of the evidence on record.
  • Prosecution witnesses PW3, PW4, and PW6 unequivocally deposed that the deceased received a phone call and went to Suraiya’s house, where the appellants, being her son and husband, would naturally be present.
  • No plea of alibi was taken by the appellants to suggest that they were elsewhere at the critical time.
  • Call detail records showed active phone communication between Rahil and Mohd. Fazal on the night of 6 April 2003, and the tower location data indicated that Rahil’s phone was in the Nizamuddin area, thereby supporting his presence near the place of occurrence.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Guru Dutt Pathak v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 6 SCC 116 Summarises principles governing appeals against acquittal: the appellate court should not interfere with an acquittal unless the finding is wholly perverse or against the weight of evidence; where the trial court’s view is reasonable and plausible, the presumption of innocence is strengthened and interference should be slow. Used as the governing standard to assess whether the High Court was justified in reversing the trial court’s acquittal of the appellants. The Supreme Court evaluated the High Court’s conclusions “from this perspective” and found that interference was unwarranted.
Tahsildar Singh & Another v. State of U.P., 1959 SCC OnLine SC 17 (para 25) Holds that omission of a material fact in the FIR or in a previous statement to the police can amount to a contradiction when a witness later introduces that fact in court. Applied to PW3’s statement that he accompanied the deceased to Suraiya’s residence, a fact not mentioned in either the missing report or the FIR. The Court treated this omission as a contradiction, undermining the credibility of the in-court embellishment.
Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, (1974) 3 SCC 704 (para 10) Recognises that material embellishments or afterthoughts introduced for the first time in court cast doubt on a witness’s credibility. Cited to reinforce that PW3’s newly introduced claim of accompanying the deceased to Suraiya’s house appeared to be an afterthought and therefore unreliable.
Mulak Raj v. State of Haryana, (1996) 7 SCC 308 (para 22) Holds that even where a dead body is recovered from a house, the mere fact that a person is an inmate of the house is not by itself sufficient to sustain a conviction. Invoked to reject the High Court’s reasoning that, because the appellants were inmates of Suraiya’s house, they must have been present and involved in the crime. The Supreme Court held that such a presumption was speculative and impermissible.
State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600 Held that computer printouts are a form of secondary evidence and may be admitted on mere production, without the mandatory requirement of a certificate under Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act. Referred to as the then-prevailing law at the time of trial and initial appellate proceedings, to anticipate the argument that CDRs admitted without a Section 65-B certificate should not later be treated as inadmissible. The Court later noted that this view was overruled by a larger bench.
Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473 Held that Section 65-B of the Evidence Act provides a special procedure for admissibility of electronic records, mandating a certificate under Section 65-B(4) as a condition for admitting computer-generated secondary evidence such as printouts. Treated as laying down the correct rule, subsequently affirmed by a larger bench. The Supreme Court applied this rule, in conjunction with later authorities, to hold that the CDRs and related electronic records in this case were inadmissible without the requisite Section 65-B(4) certificate.
Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2018) 2 SCC 801 Expressed doubt about the mandatory nature of the Section 65-B(4) certificate requirement laid down in Anvar P.V. Cited as part of the doctrinal history of electronic evidence. The Court noted that the view in Shafhi Mohammad was later overruled by the three-judge bench in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar.
Sonu v. State of Haryana, (2017) 8 SCC 570 Held that the ratio in Anvar P.V. should apply prospectively unless, during trial, the defence had objected to the admission of computer-generated printouts without a Section 65-B(4) certificate. Also observed that if an objection is raised to CDRs being marked without a certificate and the prosecution does not cure the defect at the relevant stage, the document becomes inadmissible. The Court recognised the prospective-application aspect but emphasised that, in this case, the appellants had objected at trial to the admissibility of the CDRs. Since the prosecution failed to supply the required certificate despite this objection, the CDRs were held inadmissible.
Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1 A three-judge bench that overruled Navjot Sandhu and Shafhi Mohammad, affirmed Anvar P.V., and held that production of a certificate under Section 65-B(4) is a condition precedent for admissibility of computer-generated secondary evidence; such requirement cannot be met by oral testimony alone. Relied on as the authoritative statement of law on electronic evidence. The Court noted that Khotkar did not confine its operation prospectively and used it, alongside Anvar P.V., to declare the CDRs and related records in this case inadmissible due to lack of certification.
Mohd. Arif Alias Ashfaq v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 3 SCC 654 In a review petition in a death penalty case, the Court retrospectively applied the principles in Anvar P.V. and Arjun Panditrao Khotkar to proceedings that had earlier followed Navjot Sandhu, and eschewed CDRs lacking a Section 65-B(4) certificate. Cited to show that this Court has retrospectively applied the Anvar/Khotkar regime and excluded uncertified electronic records even in cases decided under the earlier Navjot Sandhu approach. Used as support for excluding the CDRs in the present case despite the timeline of previous decisions.
Sundar @ Sundarrajan v. State by Inspector of Police, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 310 Adopted a view similar to Mohd. Arif on the treatment of electronic evidence without proper certification under Section 65-B(4). Referred to reinforce the approach of excluding uncertified secondary electronic evidence and applying the Anvar/Khotkar framework.
Bechuram Bag v. State of West Bengal, 2023 SCC OnLine Cal 419 (para 52) Cited (with reference to technical literature) for the proposition that the operational range of a cell tower varies widely depending on factors such as antenna height, signal frequency, transmitter power, antenna direction, physical obstructions, geographical and regulatory constraints, and weather conditions. Used to support the conclusion that single-tower cell location data in CDRs provides only an approximate area and cannot safely be relied upon, by itself, to pinpoint the phone user’s exact location for purposes of criminal liability.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court began by reiterating the settled principles governing interference with an acquittal in criminal appeals, as summarised in Guru Dutt Pathak. An appellate court may only overturn an acquittal if the trial court’s findings are wholly perverse or contrary to the weight of evidence. When the trial court’s assessment is reasonable and plausible, the presumption of innocence is reinforced and interference must be undertaken cautiously.

Assessment of the Alleged Presence of the Deceased at Suraiya’s House

The High Court had concluded that the appellants were present in their house at around 7–7:30 p.m. when the deceased allegedly came there, partly relying on Noor Ahmed’s answer to Question 7 in his examination under Section 313 CrPC. The Supreme Court examined the precise wording of that question and answer:

7Q. It is in evidence against you that in PS police officials advised both parties for patch up the matter and thereafter Shakeel Ur Rehman came to his house. What do you say?
A: It is correct.

The Court held that, from the tenor of the question, “his house” clearly referred to the deceased’s own residence, not that of Suraiya or Noor Ahmed. This interpretation was supported by the testimonies of PW3, PW4 and PW6, who stated that after the settlement at the police station the deceased returned to his own house. Thus, the High Court’s inference that Noor Ahmed had admitted to the deceased coming to Suraiya’s house was found to be factually incorrect.

The Court next scrutinised the prosecution’s evidence that the deceased went to Suraiya’s residence in the evening. PW3, PW4 and PW6 stated that the deceased received a phone call from Suraiya at about 7:30 p.m. on 6 April 2003 and left his residence saying he was going to her house. However, the only claimed evidence that he actually reached her house was PW3’s statement that he accompanied the deceased there. The Court noted that this alleged accompaniment was not mentioned in either the missing diary entry or the FIR lodged by PW3.

Relying on Tahsildar Singh and Laxman, the Court treated the omission of such a material fact from earlier statements as a contradiction and an embellishment introduced for the first time at trial. This cast serious doubt on the reliability of PW3’s in-court version and on the assertion that the deceased was proved to have reached Suraiya’s residence.

The Court also considered the conduct of the witnesses. Given the earlier quarrel and threat in the morning, if the deceased had indeed gone to Suraiya’s house in the evening and then gone missing, it would have been natural for the relatives (including PW3, PW4 and PW6) to visit Suraiya’s house or inquire of her about the deceased’s whereabouts. No such inquiries were testified to. This omission, in the Court’s view, made it plausible that Suraiya and her family were implicated on the basis of suspicion rather than established fact.

In these circumstances, the Court concluded that there was no credible and reliable evidence that the deceased actually went to Suraiya’s residence on the evening of 6 April 2003.

Presumed Presence of the Appellants in the House

The Supreme Court observed that even if, for the sake of argument, the prosecution version that the deceased went to Suraiya’s house were accepted, the prosecution still had to prove that the appellants were present there between 7:30 p.m. and 9:00 p.m., the time window in which the murder was alleged to have occurred.

The High Court had reversed the acquittal on the reasoning that, as husband and son of Suraiya and ordinarily residing with her, the appellants’ presence in the house was “axiomatic and normal,” and that Suraiya, being a lady, could not have committed the murder alone. The Supreme Court rejected this logic as speculative:

  • There was no direct evidence of the appellants’ presence in the house at the relevant time. The incident did not occur “in the dead hours of the night” when all family members would necessarily be at home.
  • An incriminating fact is “proved” only when, having considered the material, the court believes it exists or finds its existence so probable that a person of ordinary prudence would act on that assumption. A mere assumption that all inmates are present at a given time does not meet this standard.
  • Following Mulak Raj, the Court held that the mere status of being inmates of the house, without more, cannot be the basis to infer guilt or even assured presence at the scene.

The Court further noted that whether a single person (Suraiya) could physically have committed the murder alone had not been put to the postmortem doctor. In the absence of medical evidence indicating that multiple persons were required to inflict the fatal strangulation, the High Court’s assumption that Suraiya must have been assisted by her husband and son was unwarranted.

The Supreme Court therefore held that the High Court had improperly relied on speculative inferences about family presence and gender-based assumptions, instead of on proved facts.

Admissibility and Probative Value of Call Detail Records

A key additional circumstance relied on by the High Court against Rahil was the CDRs showing multiple calls between him and Mohd. Fazal and indicating that Rahil’s phone connected to a cell tower at Nizamuddin on the relevant night. The Supreme Court examined both the admissibility and the evidentiary value of this material.

PW23, the Nodal Officer of Bharti Airtel, produced the CDRs for Fazal and Rahil (Ex. PW23/A and PW23/B), site details (Ex. PW23/C), and an ownership certificate (Ex. PW23/D). These were all computer printouts. PW23 admitted in cross-examination that he had neither signed nor certified these documents.

The Court summarised Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act, which requires a certificate by a person in charge of the relevant computer system, stating that:

  • During the relevant period, the computer(s) were functioning properly and carrying out regular activities; and
  • The information was regularly fed into the computer in the ordinary course of business.

The Court then traced the development of the law on electronic evidence:

  • In Navjot Sandhu, computer printouts were treated as secondary evidence admittable on mere production, without a mandatory Section 65-B(4) certificate.
  • Anvar P.V. later held that Section 65-B prescribes a special, mandatory procedure, requiring a certificate under Section 65-B(4) for admissibility of such evidence.
  • Shafhi Mohammad had questioned Anvar P.V., but this position was overruled by the three-judge bench in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar, which affirmed that a Section 65-B(4) certificate is a condition precedent for admissibility, and that this requirement cannot be replaced by oral evidence.
  • Sonu held that Anvar P.V. should, in general, apply prospectively unless the defence objected at trial. It also stated that if an objection is taken to CDRs being marked without a certificate and the prosecution does not cure the defect in time, the document remains inadmissible.

Addressing an anticipated contention that Navjot Sandhu was the prevailing law during the trial and earlier appellate stages and that Anvar P.V. should not retrospectively invalidate the CDRs, the Court pointed out:

  • In Arjun Panditrao Khotkar, the larger bench did not state that its ruling would apply only prospectively.
  • In Mohd. Arif Alias Ashfaq, the Court, dealing with a death sentence review, retrospectively applied the principles in Anvar P.V. and Khotkar and expressly excluded CDRs lacking a Section 65-B(4) certificate, despite the fact that the original proceedings had been conducted under the earlier Navjot Sandhu regime. A similar stance was taken in Sundar @ Sundarrajan.

Although the present matter did not involve a death penalty, the Court emphasised that the prosecution was still bound to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt and in strict compliance with evidentiary requirements. It noted that, in this case, the appellants had specifically objected at trial to the admissibility of the secondary electronic evidence (Ex. PW23/B–D). The prosecution, despite being on notice, did not furnish the requisite Section 65-B(4) certificate.

In line with Sonu, Anvar P.V. and Khotkar, the Supreme Court held that, because the objection was raised and not cured, the CDRs and related electronic exhibits were inadmissible in law.

Limited Inference from Cell Tower Data

The Court went on to state that even if the CDRs and other electronic records were considered admissible, their probative value was limited. The records merely indicated which cell tower a phone was connected to and the duration of calls. Such data provides only an approximate area corresponding to the tower’s operational range, not the precise location of the phone.

In this case, the CDRs showed that Rahil’s phone was connected to a cell tower at Nizamuddin. The Court observed, citing technical material referenced in Bechuram Bag, that cell towers can cover a range of roughly half a mile to two miles in urban areas, and their range depends on multiple variables, including:

  • Height of the antenna relative to the surrounding landscape;
  • Frequency of the signal in use;
  • Transmitter power;
  • Directional characteristics of the antenna array;
  • Intervening buildings and vegetation; and
  • Local geographical/regulatory factors and weather conditions.

The Court highlighted that better accuracy can be obtained through cell triangulation, which uses overlapping ranges from at least three towers. However, in the present case, no such triangulation evidence was led, nor was there evidence on the specific range of the Nizamuddin tower in question.

Consequently, the Court concluded that tower-location information alone only established that Rahil’s phone was somewhere within the operational range of the Nizamuddin tower. It was “hazardous” to rely solely on such evidence to place him at his residence or to prove his presence at the specific scene of crime beyond reasonable doubt.

Additionally, the Court noted that telephonic exchanges between Rahil and Mohd. Fazal could not, by themselves, justify an inference of conspiracy to murder, particularly since Mohd. Fazal had been acquitted of the murder charge and that acquittal had not been challenged.

Application of Burden of Proof and Section 106 Evidence Act

The Court reiterated that, in criminal cases, whether based on direct or circumstantial evidence, the burden of proof always rests on the prosecution. Only after the prosecution proves incriminating circumstances and establishes that certain facts relevant to the cause of death lie within the “special knowledge” of an accused does the burden shift under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, allowing adverse inferences if the accused fails to explain.

In this case, because the prosecution failed to present reliable and convincing evidence that:

  • the deceased actually went to Suraiya’s residence on the crucial evening; and
  • the appellants were present in the house at the time the murder occurred,

the initial onus was not discharged. The deficiency could not be cured by presuming that all inmates of the house were present, and then invoking Section 106 to demand an explanation from them.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court failed to appreciate this fundamental lacuna and wrongly drew an adverse inference against the appellants under Section 106. That approach effectively reversed the burden of proof, contrary to criminal law principles.

Overall Conclusion on the High Court’s Interference

Synthesising the above analysis, the Supreme Court held that:

  • The trial court’s acquittal of the appellants was based on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence and recognition of significant gaps in the prosecution case.
  • The High Court’s reversal rested on speculative assumptions about the deceased’s movements, the appellants’ presence, gender-based conjecture regarding Suraiya’s ability to commit the crime alone, and inadmissible or weakly probative electronic evidence.
  • In such circumstances, the High Court’s interference with the acquittal did not meet the strict standards required for setting aside an acquittal in criminal proceedings.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not justified in reversing the trial court’s acquittal of the appellants. It ruled that the High Court had relied on mere surmises and speculative inferences rather than cogent evidence. Accordingly, the Court ordered that the impugned High Court judgment, to the extent it convicted the appellants under Section 302/34 IPC, is set aside, and the criminal appeal filed by the appellants is ALLOWED. Pending applications, if any, were disposed of.

Implications: The immediate consequence is that the appellants no longer stand convicted of murder under Section 302/34 IPC; the trial court’s acquittal in their favour stands restored to that extent. The High Court’s findings based on presumptions of presence, misuse of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, and reliance on uncertified CDRs are disapproved.

The judgment applies established principles regarding:

  • the limited scope of appellate interference with acquittals,
  • the mandatory requirements for admissibility of electronic evidence under Section 65-B(4), and
  • the cautious use of cell tower location data and the burden of proof under criminal law.

The Court does not purport to create new legal rules but reaffirms and applies existing jurisprudence to the facts of this case, emphasising that convictions for serious offences like murder must rest on reliable, lawfully admitted evidence rather than assumptions or strengthened suspicion.

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2025 INSC 858 Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1856 OF 2014

Rahil & Anr. .… Appellant(s) Versus

State (Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi) …. Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

Joymalya Bagchi, J

1. By the impugned judgment the High Court had reversed an acquittal passed by the trial court and convicted the appellants for commission of offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 18601and sentenced them to life imprisonment.

2. Prosecution case in brief is as follows:-

Co-accused Suraiya had entered into a sale agreement with the deceased Shakeel ur Rehman for purchase of property number 15/1 Jaipur Estate, Nizamuddin, New Delhi. Prior to the sale deed being executed, on 6.04.2003 Shakeel ur Rehman started raising a boundary wall in the property.

1 Hereinafter 'IPC'.

Page 1 of 21

Suraiya and her associates resisted and a quarrel ensued. Suraiya threatened to kill Shakeel ur Rehman. Matter was reported to the police and amicably settled. At 7.30 pm, Suraiya made a phone call to deceased on the landline and called him to her residence. Thereafter, deceased went missing. Despite efforts deceased could not be traced.

3. As a consequence, Aniq ur Rehman (PW3) lodged missing DD entry No. 27A (Ex. PW3/B) at 7.15 AM on 7.04.2003 at Police Station, Hazrat Nizamuddin. On the same day at 5:30 pm, a written complaint was filed by Aniq ur Rehman (PW3) which was treated as First Information Report under Section 365/34 IPC against Suraiya, Mohd. Fazal her brother, and the appellants, namely Rahil and Noor Ahmed who are her son and husband, respectively.

4. During the investigation, Fazal and one Mohan Seth were arrested on 13.04.2003. On their disclosure statements decomposed body of deceased was recovered near Haridwar. Dr. Pradeep Kumar, Postmortem Doctor (PW9) opined that the death was due to asphyxia as a result of strangulation and had occurred 3 to 5 days ago.

5. In course of trial, charges were framed against Suraiya, Mohd. Fazal, Mohan Seth and the appellants under

Page 2 of 21

Sections 120B and 302/34 read with 120B IPC. Mohd. Fazal and Mohan Seth were also charged under sections 201/34 IPC.

6. During trial, prosecution examined 25 witnesses and exhibited a number of documents. In conclusion of trial, the trial judge while convicting Suraiya and Mohd. Fazal under Section 302/34 IPC acquitted the appellants of the charges levelled against them. Mohd. Fazal and Mohan Seth were also convicted under Section 201/34 IPC.

7. Suraiya, Mohd. Fazal and Mohan Seth preferred appeals against their conviction while the State challenged the acquittal of appellants before High Court.

8. By a common order, High Court while upholding the conviction of Suraiya reversed the acquittal of the appellants and held them guilty under Section 302/34 IPC along with Suraiya. Mohd. Fazal was acquitted of the charge of murder but his conviction along with Mohan Seth under Section

201 IPC was upheld. Appellants as well as Suraiya appealed against their conviction. We are informed that Suraiya has died in the meantime and her appeal has abated. Accordingly, the appellants' appeal is taken up for hearing.

9. Mr. Mohd. Irshad Hanif, ld. counsel for Appellants argued that High Court erred in reversing a well-reasoned acquittal

Page 3 of 21

on the basis of vague surmises and inferences. He contended mere suspicion howsoever high cannot take the place of proof.

10. On the other hand, Mr. Rajan Kumar Chourasia, ld. counsel for Respondent-State argued that findings of trial court were wholly perverse and against the weight of evidence on record. PW-3, 4 and 6 unequivocally deposed that appellant had received a phone call and gone to the house of Suraiya. Appellants are son and husband of Suraiya, their presence at the place of occurrence was most natural. No plea of alibi was taken by the appellants to probabilise their absence. CDRs show active phone calls between Rahil and Mohd. Fazal in the night of 6.04.2003. Tower location of Rahil's phone probabilises his presence at Nizamuddin.

11. Prosecution case is based on circumstantial evidence. The incriminating circumstances proposed by the prosecution are as follows:-

(i) Suraiya had entered into a sale agreement with the deceased Shakeel ur Rehman. On the fateful day, before sale deed could be executed Shakeel ur Rehman started constructing a boundary wall on the property.

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This resulted in a skirmish between Shakeel ur Rehman and Suraiya and her associates.

(ii) The matter was reported to the police and amicably resolved.

(iii) In the evening of the same day, Shakeel ur Rehman received a phone call from Suraiya and stated to his relations, PW-3,4 and 6 that he was going to Suraiya's residence.

(iv) Thereafter Shakeel ur Rehman went missing. On 7.04.2003, PW-3 lodged missing diary at 7:15 am being DD No.27A-Ex.PW 3/B and at 5:30 pm he lodged FIR against Suraiya, Fazal and the appellants.

(v) On the disclosure statements of Mohd. Fazal and Mohan Seth dead body was recovered.

(vi) Postmortem Doctor PW9 opined that the cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation.

12. Trial Court analysed the evidence on record and acquitted the appellants holding as follows:-

Noor Ahmed

"There was a property transaction between the accused's wife Suraiya and the deceased; litigation in that regard is going on; a quarrel between accused, his wife & other accused on one side and the deceased and his brother on the other side on the issue of construction of boundary wall had taken place on 6.4.03 wife Suraiya had called deceased to their house; deceased had come to Suraiya's house. Besides this, no further evidence except his own disclosure and disclosure statements of co-accused,

Page 5 of 21

(which are inadmissible in evidence against the accused) has come on record against the accused; Thus, there is no material on record to establish that the accused had concerted and conspired with other co-accused and had participated in the commission of the crime i.e. murder of the deceased. In view of the above, accused Noor Ahmed is acquitted of charges U/s 302/ r/w 120B IPC"

Rahil

"Accused is the son of the accused Noor Ahmed and Suraiya. His concern regarding old property dispute of his mother was there to the extent as would that be of a son; His presence and participation in the quarrel on 6.4.03 is also substantiated. Beyond that, the only other evidence which has been placed on record against the accused is the recovery of deceased's purse from accused's residence, at his instance. The recovery of deceased's purse at the instance of accused has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Besides above material, prosecution has placed on record the phone call details of accused Rahil which show that accused Rahil made and received phone calls from accused Suraiya and Fazal. The said calls no doubt reflect that the accused Rahil was associating with accused Suraiya and Fazal. Except that no other evidence has come on record against the accused. Except for his own disclosure and that of his co-accused admitting to his complicity in murdering the deceased, no other evidence has been led by prosecution linking accused Rahil to the commission of murder. The accused Rahil is therefore acquitted of charge u/s 302 r/w 120B IPC."

13. The High Court reversed the finding of the trial court holding as follows:-

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"As far are Suraiya, Noor Ahmed and Rahil are concerned, their presence in the house at 7/7.30 PM when the deceased Shakeel ur Rehman was called and came to their residence, has been proved and should be accepted. Suraiya being a lady could not have committed the said offence alone. Presence of her husband and son was axiomatic and normal. We do not find any explanation has been given by Noor Ahmed or Rahil as to their absence from the place of occurrence. In fact, the call details of Rahil (Ex. PW23/B) and Mohd. Fazal (Ex. PW23/A) as noticed above, on 6th April, 2003 starting 7.18 PM show number of calls being exchanged and the presence of Rahil at Nizamuddin as his mobile was connected through tower No. 911 in Nizamuddin. The presence of Noor Ahmed husband of Suraiya with them, when the deceased was called for discussion was natural and normal. (ii) We do not agree with the reasoning given by the trial court that Suraiya and Fazal brother and sister had a property dispute and the same has no connection with Noor Ahmed and Rahil, husband and son of Suraiya. The said reasoning keeping in view the social and cultural background of the family, merits rejection and has to be discarded. It is not acceptable and ignores practical reality."

14. It may not be out of place to note by the self-same judgment and order High Court acquitted Mohd. Fazal of the charge of murder, inter alia holding:-

"his involvement in the offence under Section 302 IPC would be a matter of debate as he was certainly not in the premises where Rahil was present, as both of them were in touch on phone till at least 7.59 PM."

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15. No appeal has been preferred against such acquittal either by State or the victim's family.

16. It is trite in an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court would not interfere with the finding of the trial court unless the same finding is wholly perverse or against the weight of evidence on record. In the event acquittal is based on findings which are reasonable and plausible, appellate court would be slow to interfere with the same as the presumption of innocence stands re-enforced by the acquittal. These principles have been summarized by this Court after referring to a catena of decisions in Guru Dutt Pathak v. State of Uttar Pradesh2

17. Having examined the conclusions of High Court from this perspective, we are unable to concur with them for the following reasons.

18. High Court recorded that presence of appellants in the house at 7-7.30 PM when the deceased Shakeel ur Rehman was called is proved and should be accepted. In arriving at such conclusion High Court had relied on the response of Noor Ahmed to question no.7 in his examination under 313 Cr.PC holding:-

"In his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. while replying to question No. 7, Noor Ahmed had

2 (2 02 1) 6 SCC 116 (paras 15-2 0).

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accepted that Shakeel ur Rehman had come to their house after the police officers had advised them to patch up, though this has been denied and not accepted as correct by Suraiya and others"

19. Such finding of the High Court is incorrect as would appear from the nature of the question and the answer of the appellant therein.

"7Q. It is in evidence against you that in PS police officials advised both parties for patch up the matter and thereafter Shakeel Ur Rehman came to his house. What do you say?

A: It is correct."

From the tenor of the question it unequivocally appears that after the amicable settlement at the police station, Shakeel ur Rehman came to his house. The expression would naturally mean Shakeel ur Rehman came back to his own residence and not that of Suraiya/Noor Ahmed. We are further fortified in arriving at such conclusion as the prosecution evidence on record, particularly that of PW-3,4 and 6, also states that after the patch up Shakeel ur Rehman returned to his residence.

20. The other aspect which was overlooked by High Court is that there is no direct evidence that Shakeel ur Rehman had actually gone to Suraiya's residence on the fateful evening. Prosecution relied on PW-3,4 and 6 to prove this fact. No

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doubt, these witnesses stated that after receiving a phone call from Suraiya in the evening around 7.30 PM on 6.4.2003 Shakeel ur Rehman left his residence stating he is going to Suraiya's house. However, the sole evidence that he actually went to Suraiya's residence is an embellished statement of PW-3 who claims he accompanied the deceased to Suraiya's residence. Such version is stated by PW-3 for the first time in court and is significantly absent either in the missing diary or in the First Information Report lodged by him. Such omission of a material fact by PW 3 in the FIR or his previous statement to police would amount to a contradiction3or even otherwise would cast doubt on the credibility of such embellished version introduced as an afterthought4.

21. Conduct of these witnesses and attending circumstances also improbabilise the fact that Shakeel had gone to Suraiya's house. Evidence has come on record that there was a scuffle between Shakeel ur Rehman and Suraiya in the morning which got settled in the police station. Given such animosity had Shakeel ur Rehman left for Suraiya's

3 Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP, 1959 SCC Online SC 17 (para 25).

4 Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, (1974 ) 3 SCC 704 (para 10).

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residence in the evening of 06.04.2003, and gone missing, it would be most natural for these witnesses to go to Suraiya's residence and enquire of his whereabouts. None of the witnesses stated that they either visited Suraiya's residence or inquired from her about Shakeel's whereabouts. In these circumstances, possibility of the witnesses implicating Suraiya and other family members in the crime out of mere suspicion cannot be ruled out.

22. Given this situation, it is difficult for us to conclude that there is credible and reliable evidence on record that the deceased actually went to the residence of Suraiya on the fateful evening.

23. Even if the prosecution case with regard to the deceased going to Suraiya's residence is accepted, prosecution must prove that appellants were present in the house between

7.30 and 9.00 PM when it is alleged that Shakeel ur Rehman was murdered.

24. The High Court reversed the acquittal on the specious logic that appellants being the son and husband of Suraiya and ordinarily residing with her ought to be presumed to be present in the house. It is nobody's case that the incident

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occurred in the dead hours of the night when all family members are expected to remain in the house.

25. An incriminating fact is said to be 'proved' when after considering the matters before it, the court believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a man of ordinary prudence would act as if the same existed.

26. Admittedly, no direct evidence is forthcoming with regard to presence of the appellants at their residence when the murder is alleged to have occurred. High Court drew an inference with regard to their presence on the ground that being inmates of the house they would be presumed to be present there.

27. In Mulak Raj v. State of Haryana5where the dead body was recovered from the house this Court refused to uphold the guilt of the accused merely because they were the inmates of the house.

28. In these circumstances, we are of the view High Court erred in relying on a speculative inference that all inmates must invariably be present in the house at all times to reverse the acquittal and convict the appellants.

29. Whether Suraiya, a lady could have committed the murder alone had not been posed to the Postmortem doctor. In absence of medical evidence that murder was committed by

5 (1996) 7 SCC 308 (para 22).

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a single person High Court incorrectly drew its own inference that Suraiya was assisted by others in committing the crime and roped in her family members, that is the appellants.

30. Against Rahil another circumstance has been relied upon. High Court referred to call detail records (CDRs) between Rahil and Mohd. Fazal and observed that as the tower location of Rahil's mobile number is Nizamuddin, his presence at the place of occurrence is established. This finding is based on inadmissible evidence and even otherwise such conclusion on the basis of evidence on record is too tenuous.

31. PW23 Nodal Officer Bharti Airtel produced CDRs of the phones of Fazal and Rahil being Ex. PW 23/A and 23/B, respectively. Site details of Airtel in Delhi and NCR were exhibited as Ex. PW23/C. The ownership certificate was also produced as Ex. PW23/D. All the exhibits were secondary evidence being computer printouts of the data said to be preserved in the computers of the service provider concerned. During cross-examination, PW23 admitted he had neither signed the said documents nor were the documents certified.

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32. Section 65-B(4) requires issuance of a certificate by a person-in-charge or responsible officer in relation to operations of the relevant computer network in question stating as per his knowledge or belief that during the relevant period:-

(a) computer(s) were carrying out regular activities, and were working properly; and

(b) the relevant information was regularly fed into the computer in ordinary course of business, as proof of the facts stated therein.

33. In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu6 this Court held computer printouts are secondary evidence and may be admitted on mere production. Production of certificate under section 65-B(4) was not mandatory for admission of such secondary evidence. However, in Anvar PV v. PK Basheer7this Court took a different view and held Section 65-B laid down a special procedure for admissibility of electronic records which mandatorily requires production of certificate under 65-B(4) for admissibility of secondary evidence i.e. computer printouts. This view was doubted in Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh8. In Sonu v.

6 (2005) 11 SCC 6 00.

7 (2014) 10 SCC 47 3.

8 (2018 ) 2 SCC 8 01.

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State of Haryana9, another bench of this Court, held the ratio in Anvar PV (supra) shall apply prospectively unless the defence during trial raised objection to admission of computer printouts. Finally, the issue was settled by a three-judge bench in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal10, wherein the bench overruling Navjot Sandhu (supra) and Shafhi Mohd. (supra) upheld the ratio in Anvar PV (supra) and held issuance of certificate under section 65-B(4) is a condition precedent for admissibility of computer-generated secondary evidence. It cannot be supplemented through oral evidence.

34. It would be argued that Navjot Sandhu (supra) which did not insist on production of certificate for admissibility of computer-generated printouts was prevailing at the time when the case was decided by the Trial Court and the Appellate Court. The judgement in Anvar PV (supra) was delivered subsequently and cannot be a ground to render the CDRs inadmissible. It is also brought to our notice that issue of retrospective application of the ratio in PV Anvar (supra) is pending for consideration before this Court11.

9 (2017) 8 SCC 570.

10 (2020) 7 SCC 1.

11 M.A. No. 1563/2017 in C.A. No. 4226/2012.

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35. Be that as it may, it is relevant to note the larger bench in Khotkar (supra) while reiterating PV Anvar (supra) did not hold that its ratio shall apply prospectively. Furthermore, in Mohd. Arif @ Ashfaq v. State (NCT of Delhi)12this Court while hearing a review petition in a death penalty case retrospectively applied the ratio in Anvar PV to cases decided earlier and eschewed secondary electronic evidence dehors certificate under section 65-B(4), holding as follows:-

"23. Navjot Sandhu was decided on 4-8-2005 i.e. before the judgment was rendered by the trial court in the instant matter. The subsequent judgments of the High Court and this Court were passed on 13-9-2007 and 10-8-2011 respectively affirming the award of death sentence. These two judgments were delivered prior to the decision of this Court in Anvar P.V. which was given on 18-9-2014. The judgments by the trial court, High Court and this Court were thus well before the decision in Anvar P.V. and were essentially in the backdrop of law laid down in Navjot Sandhu. If we go by the principle accepted in para 32 of the decision in Sonu, the matter may stand on a completely different footing. It is for this reason that reliance has been placed on certain decisions of this Court to submit that the matter need not be reopened on issues which were dealt with in accordance with the law then prevailing. However, since the instant matter pertains to award of death sentence, this review petition

12 (2023) 3 SCC 654.

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must be considered in light of the decisions made by this Court in Anvar P.V. and Arjun Panditrao Khotkar.

24. Consequently, we must eschew, for the present purposes, the electronic evidence in the form of CDRs which was without any appropriate certificate under Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act."

Similar view was taken in Sundar @ Sundarrajan v. State by Inspector of Police13.

36. Though the present case does not involve death penalty, it is undeniable that appellants were facing a criminal trial and the prosecutor was required to prove a fact beyond reasonable doubt strictly in accordance with law. Appellants during trial raised objections to admissibility of the secondary electronic evidence relating to Rahil which was marked as exhibit PW23/B-D. Thereby the prosecutor was put on due notice and had opportunity to fill the lacuna by producing the requisite certificate under Section 65-B(4) but did not do so.

In Sonu (supra), this court held if an objection is taken to CDRs being marked without a certificate and the same was

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not cured by the prosecutor at relevant stage the document shall be inadmissible in law.

In these circumstances we are inclined to apply the ratio in PV Anvar and Khotkar to the case and hold that the exhibits are inadmissible in law being secondary evidence without certification.

37. Even if the CDRs and other electronic records were admitted in evidence they merely contain the cell tower location information, that is to say, which tower mobile phone was connected to and how long the calls lasted when it was connected to that tower. These data give an approximate area corresponding to the operational area of the cell tower and not the exact site where the phone is located.

38. In the present case, the CDRs show Rahil's phone was connected to the cell tower at Nizamuddin (Ex. PW/23 C). Cell towers can reach approximately a half mile to two miles in city location14. No evidence is led regarding the range of the said tower. It needs to be borne in mind that cell tower ranges widely vary and are dependent on a number of variables such as:-

14 Quinteros, Penny. (2023) Confronting NELOS: cross-examining the cellphone industry's secret location technology, Syracuse Law Review, 73(1) 375.

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a) how high the antenna is over the surrounding landscape;

b) frequency of the signal in use;

c) rated power of the transmitter;

d) directional characteristic of the antenna array on the site;

e) nearby buildings and vegetation absorbing and reflecting radio energy;

f) local geographical or regulatory factors and weather conditions.15

39. Cell triangulation identifies at least three towers to which the cell phone at a particular time is connected and determines the location of the phone by overlapping the ranges of these towers. This is a better and comparatively more precise method than reference to a single tower. The issue may be better elucidated by the diagrams (Figure 1 and Figure 216) set out herein below.

Single Tower Range Cell Triangulation Range

15 Millman National Land Services, 'What is a Cell Tower and How Does a Cell Tower Work?'(12thMay, 2020), as cited in Bechuram Bag v. State of West Bengal, 2023 SCC OnLine Cal 419, (para 52).

16 Supra note 12 at 396.

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40. Given these circumstances reference to Nizamuddin cell tower in CDRs would merely show that Rahil's phone was within the operational range of such tower and it is hazardous to rely solely on this evidence to prove his presence at his residence beyond doubt.

41. Finally, telephonic exchanges between Rahil and Mohd. Fazal would not lead to an inference of conspiracy to murder as Mohd. Fazal has been acquitted of the charge of murder which has not been appealed against.

42. It is settled law in a criminal case whether based on direct or circumstantial evidence, the burden of proof always rests on the prosecution. Only when the prosecution discharges the initial onus, that is, proves the incriminating attending circumstances to establish the cause of death are within the 'special knowledge' of an accused does the onus shift and an adverse inference against such accused may be drawn if he fails to discharge such onus.

43. In the absence of reliable and convincing evidence proving the presence of the appellants at Suraiya's residence when Shakeel ur Rehman is said to have come there, it cannot be said that the prosecution had discharged its initial onus

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and proved the appellants were present in the house when the murder occurred.

44. Such failure of the prosecution cannot be bridged by an inferential conclusion of presence of all inmates in the house to shift the onus on them to explain away the circumstances leading to Shakeel's homicidal death. High Court failed to appreciate this lacuna in the prosecution case and illegally drew adverse inference against the appellants under Section 106 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

45. Accordingly, we hold that High Court was not justified in reversing the findings of acquittal on the basis of mere surmises and the impugned judgment to the extent that it convicts the appellants is liable to be set aside. Consequently, appeal is allowed. Pending application(s), if any, is disposed of.

…..…………………….J.

(SANDEEP MEHTA)

………………………….J.

(JOYMALYA BAGCHI)

New Delhi,

June 25, 2025

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